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1.1 Introduction 
The Dutch employment protection legislation (EPL)1 regarding the firing of permanent workers is 
unique in the world. It so happens that the Netherlands has two institutes responsible for the 
enforcement of employment protection law. The first institute is the public employment service 
(PES)2, which operates under close supervision of the Dutch government3. It remains from a 
decree that has been enforced during the occupation of the Netherlands during World War II. 
The second institute is the universal civil court. The check for the fairness of the dismissal is a 
preventative check, not a repressive one. As such, the PES and the civil court intervene at an 
early stage of the dismissal process and therefore shape the dismissal protection for employees 
with a permanent contract more directly. The OECD refers to the Dutch system as a “dual 
system” of dismissal (OECD, 2004). More specifically, this dual system entails that an employer, 
when intending to terminate a permanent employment contract of one his employees, may 
either request the PES for a dismissal permission or may ask the civil court to dissolve the 
contract. This given, it is the employer who is the plaintiff, and the employee who is the 
defendant. In countries that apply a repressive check these roles are reversed. 
 The two separate dismissal procedures are rather different. Both institutes follow a 
different set of legal rules. The PES follows the regulations that are recorded in the 
Extraordinary Labor Relations Decree4 and the Dismissal Decree5. Dismissal permission is given if 
dismissal is judged to be fair. Fair dismissals are dismissals based on economic grounds (e.g 
redundancy), dysfunctional behavior, a disturbed employment relationship, illness and 
misconduct. Rules followed by the civil court are governed by the Civil Code of Law. The civil 
court will rescind an employment contract if a substantial reason exists. A substantial reason is a 
circumstance that would have also allowed for an immediate dismissal. Examples are fraud, 
incompetence, drunkenness, theft and reckless behavior. A substantial reason also refers to a 
circumstantial change that justifies the termination of an employment relationship. Examples 
are economic circumstances, a disturbed employment relationship and long-term illness. In 
practice, the majority of economic dismissals is filed at the PES. The civil court route is a more 
popular route to dismiss a worker that is underperforming. Generally speaking, the civil court 
procedure is the quickest route and the likelihood that the contract is dissolved is high. On 
average it is also the most expensive route because courts may require employers to award 
employees a severance pay. The PES procedure is longer. Severance pay, however, is not 
required. There is no appeal possible against the decision made by either civil court or the PES. 
Nonetheless, after being dismissed via the PES route, the employee concerned may ask the 
court for compensation for unfair dismissal. This, however, occurs in less than 1% of all cases.6 
                                                        
1 In this dissertation EPL is used as an acronym for Employment Protection Legislation. 
2 In this chapter we use PES as an acronym for public employment service. The official Dutch name for the PES is 
Uitvoerings Instituut Werknemersverzekering (UWV). In this dissertation, if we refer to the PES, we mean the UWV, 
and in particular the legal department of UWV that is responsible for handling dismissal requests. In this chapter we 
use PES as an acronym for public employment service. 
3 If we refer to the government, we mean all Ministers and all Secretaries of State. In the Netherlands we distinguish 
between a “government”, which is composed of all Ministers and the Queen, and a “cabinet” which is composed of 
all Ministers and all Secretaries of State. 
4 In Dutch: Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen. 
5 In Dutch: Ontslagbesluit. 
6 Source: Data obtained from the civil court Maastricht. 
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After publication of the studies “Regulation or deregulation of the labour market. Policy regimes 
for the recruitment and dismissal of employees in industrialized countries” of Michael Emerson 
(1988), “Job security provisions and employment” of Ed Lazear (1990), and “Job security, 
employment and wages” of Guiseppe Bertola (1990) policymakers became widely interested in 
examining the effect of EPL on labor market outcomes. Since, the OECD calculates the 
Employment Protection Legislation Index (EPL-Index) for a large number of its member states. 
According to this index, the Netherlands is marked with one of the strongest employment 
protection laws for workers with job tenure. Among the EU15 countries, only Portugal and 
Germany have stricter labor markets for tenured workers.  
 A common perception is that extensive regulation is associated with the failure of Western 
European labor markets and their inability to adapt to changing conditions (OECD, 1994; Bertola 
and Rogerson, 1996; Bentolila and Bertola, 1990). Even though different interpretations are 
found in literature, like efficiency wages (Yellen, 1984) or hysteresis and the 1980’s disinflation 
policies (Ball, 1996), most authors agree that EPL plays an important role. As a reaction to the 
idea that strict regulation leads to poor labor market outcomes, different European institutions 
have encouraged their member states to reduce the strictness of their EPL system. The OECD 
Jobs Study (1994, p50) advised to “loosen mandatory restrictions on dismissals in countries 
where current provisions appear to seriously hinder economic restructuring and the hiring 
chances of new labor force entrants.” The European Commission and the International Labor 
Office have made similar recommendations. (European Commission, 2003, ILO, 2005).  
1.2 Motivation  
Ever since the foundation of the dual system in World War II, Dutch EPL is criticized. Different 
governments have attempted to modify the system, almost all proposing to introduce a simpler 
system with only one institute responsible for the enforcement of labor law. Over time, 
different committees were installed and the Corporation of Labor7 was asked for advice. The 
newly proposed modifications were never introduced. Directly after the War, the Corporation of 
Labor concluded that the Netherlands was not ready for the abolishment of the PES route until a 
judicial check on the reasonableness check of the dismissal existed.8 Even when such a check 
was introduced in 1953, the system remained intact.9 After 1953, all bills in favor of a 
modification were withdrawn as different political parties could not reach mutual agreements. 
 The idea for this dissertation stems from one of the most recent attempts made. In a 
request for advice, dated July 3 2007, the former Minister of Social Welfare and Employment, 
Piet Hein Donner, notifies the Corporation of Labor about his ideas to “improve” the Dutch EPL. 
One of the most important aspects of his proposal is a singular regulation of employment 
protection in the Civil Code of Law. The improvements suggested are driven by the general idea 
that the rigidness of the Dutch dual system has led to a situation in which the relatively high 
firing costs have led to a poor functioning labor market. A more flexible EPL is supposed to 
                                                        
7 In Dutch: Stichting van de Arbeid. 
8 “Herziening van het ontslagrecht: advies uitgebracht door het bestuur van de Stichting van de Arbeid aan de 
Minister van Justitie” Den Haag: Stichting van de Arbeid 1947, p28. 
9 In 1953, the Dutch government rejected a motion in favor of the abolishment of the PES route with slight majority 
(Drongelen, van & Rijs, van, 2008). 
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increase labor participation, especially among older employees, younger employees and women 
(AV/IR/2007/23064). The plans of Minister Donner are heavily criticized, political parties do not 
seem to agree and employees’ organizations are strictly against. This political impasse led to the 
establishment of the Commission Labor Participation10 in December 2007. When delivering its 
advice, the commission mainly focused on which measures have to be taken in order to bear the 
costs of the aging population. Liberalization of the employment protection system is hardly 
discussed. Again, the duality in the Dutch system of job security provisions remained untouched. 
 A huge part of the problem is created by the fact that we do not know whether the 
relatively high firing costs of the current Dutch dismissal system lead to a decrease, or to an 
increase in productivity and employment. Literature on the effect of EPL on different labor 
market outcomes draws many different conclusions. Reasons for divergence in results are 
differences in settings, different measures of EPL, but also the use of different methods. This 
leaves room for severe debates and divides the cabinet into opponents and advocates of a more 
liberal EPL. Agreements are not reached because the expected outcomes of certain proposed 
modifications are not testable.  
 We observed that detailed knowledge about the Dutch system is lacking. Although the 
international discussion about EPL is to a large extent a discussion about the effect of firing costs 
on the functioning of the labor market, an up-to-date approximation of the firing costs of both 
separate procedures, PES and civil court, does not exist. Neither do we know the specifics 
behind the choice for the PES or the civil court route. What type of employees and employers 
are involved? Which reasons for dismissal prevail at both routes? We furthermore observed that 
between 1998 and 2008, the two routes were chosen in almost equal proportions.11 For 
economists a balanced decision between both routes is an indication that both routes are of 
equal importance for the termination of the employment contract. On itself, the option to 
choose is an indication of labor market flexibility. Abolishing one of the two routes results in 
more rigidity because decisions are made under stricter requirements. 
 We realized that the Dutch labor market deserves some special attention. Little is known 
and heard about the positive aspects of Dutch EPL. Although we cannot give a more clear cut 
answer to the question how EPL affects different labor market outcome in general, we do know 
that the Dutch labor market is an example that challenges modern theories of unemployment 
and worker protection. Although being marked with one of the strongest regulations for 
permanent workers, the Netherlands outperforms most EU15 countries in terms of employment 
and worker productivity.  
 Five years have passed since the proposal of Minister Donner in 2007. The Dutch EPL has 
been left untouched. For how long is uncertain. In May 2012 the Kunduz12 parties VVD, CDA, 
D66, GroenLinks and ChristenUnie agreed that Dutch EPL will be drastically revised in 2014. The 
new proposition made follows the trend that was set by Minister Donner in 2007 and aims for 
the abolishment of the dual system.  
                                                        
10 In Dutch: Commissie Arbeidsparticipatie. 
11 In 2008, the effects of the Great Recession became tangible and the number of requests filed at the PES became 
twice the amount as the requests filed at the civil court. 
12 Because of an earlier mutual agreement to support the police training missing in the Afghan province of Kunduz, 
the media started referring to these parties as the Kunduz parties. 
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1.3 Scope  
According to the definition of the OECD, employment protection legislation (EPL) “ refers both 
to regulations concerning hiring (e.g. rules favoring disadvantaged groups, conditions for using 
temporary or fixed term contract, training requirements) and firing (e.g. redundancy 
procedures, mandated pre-notification periods and severance payments, special requirements 
for collective dismissals and short-time work schemes)” (OECD, 1999, p50). 
 The Dutch discussion is mainly a discussion about the stringent dismissal regulation for 
permanent workers. Therefore, the general focus of this dissertation is on the firing component 
of EPL, and more specifically on the firing of permanent employees. It furthermore focuses on 
the termination of the employment contract by dismissal via the PES and the civil court. Other 
options to terminate an employment contract are at will during the trial period, termination by 
mutual consent, termination by operation of law13 and by summary dismissal. These options are 
beyond the reach of this dissertation.14 
1.4 Structure 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 presents an overview of the Dutch EPL. It 
commences with a description of the regulations regarding the termination of an employment 
contract by dismissal via the PES and via the civil court. It continuous with a sketch of history. 
The first milestone in history is the introduction of the old Civil Code of Law, which introduced a 
new national civil law that contained three articles regarding the employment relationship 
between an employer and an employee. Originally, these articles were all written to protect the 
employer, not the employee. The introduction of the first legislative measures that aimed for 
the protection of the employee was not until 1909 when the Law on Employment Contracts15 
was enacted. The Law on Employment Contracts resulted in the introduction of the preventative 
check by the civil court. Moreover, periods of notice were introduced. The PES route of dismissal 
was introduced when the occupying force of Nazi Germany enacted the First Enforcement 
Resolution16 on June 11th 1940. After the war the Dutch government upheld this resolution 
through the declaration of the Extraordinary Labor Relations Decree17 of October 5th, 1945. 
Uniquely, the dual system still exists today. We continue Chapter 2 by placing the Netherlands in 
                                                        
13 A termination of an employment contract by operation of law may imply the expiry of a fixed term contract or the 
death of an employee. 
14 An estimation of the distribution of dismissal cases over the different termination options is given by a survey 
conducted in 2001 (Research and Beleid, 2001), which investigates the relationship between the flow into 
unemployment benefit and the different options to terminate an employment contract. This research indicates that 
in 52% of all cases termination of an employment contract occurs because of the expiration of a fixed term or 
temporary contract. 6% is termination by mutual consent. 3% is terminated during the trial period. 21% of contracts 
is terminated either via the PES (10%) or via the civil court procedure (11%%).2% of contracts is terminated without 
permission, 1% of contracts is terminated by summary dismissal, 12% is a rest category and 3% is unknown 
(n=2,263). To our knowledge, a more recent estimation does not exist. 
15 In Dutch: Wet op de Arbeidsovereenkomst. This law was passed in 1907 and enacted in 1909. 
16 In Dutch: Eerste Uitvaardigingsbesluit. 
17 In Dutch: Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen  .
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an international context and end with a discussion on why the proposed modifications of the 
Dutch EPL were never enacted.  
 We have collected a sample of 3,391 individual dismissal requests containing workers’ and 
employers’ information, of which 1,134 requests are filed at PES in the period 2006-2009 and 
2,257 requests are filed at the civil court in the period 2003-2009. This collected sample is 
unique and is used for the analyses in Chapter 4 to 7 of this dissertation. Data collection was not 
an easy task since the civil court does not store employers’ and employees’ information 
electronically. The PES does this only partly. Most information on a case is kept in hard copy 
dismissal files that are stored in an archive. Data have been collected manually. Chapter 3 
presents all specifics of the data collection method.  
 Chapter 4 continues with a comparative analysis of firing cost differences between the two 
separate procedures. We contribute to existing literature by providing an up-to-date overview 
of costs. Hassink, Reitsma and Roorda (1998) estimated firing costs of both procedures in the 
90’s. The more recent research of Knegt and Tros (2007) made similar calculations. Both studies 
use self-reported measures to calculate firing costs. Actual costs are not observed. We use a 
representative sample containing actual data of firing disputes. Instead of estimating firing 
costs, we observe costs using information on the wage, the duration of the dismissal process 
and the actual amount of severance pay awarded. This results in a more precise estimation. We 
find that, on average, firing costs by civil courts are four times larger than firing costs of PES 
dismissals. The difference in costs between both procedures is a result of the fact that 
employers are relieved from the obligation of severance payment when the PES grants a 
request.  
 In Chapter 5, we show that the Dutch labor market is an example that challenges modern 
theories of unemployment and worker protection. Despite of being marked with one of the 
strongest regulations for permanent workers, the Netherland outperforms most other European 
countries in terms of unemployment, labor participation and worker productivity. Moreover, we 
compare the two separate procedures in terms of workers’ and employers’ characteristics. We 
show that larger employers go to the civil court more often. Medium sized firms are more likely 
to follow the PES route of dismissal. Additionally, the employees involved in the civil court route 
earn slightly higher wages. We continue Chapter 5 with introducing the idea that the Dutch 
system can be viewed as a system of the government relieving firms in demise to pay severance. 
This is a unique feature of the Dutch labor market. We present a simple theoretical equilibrium 
model of employment determinations of firms that have the opportunity to receive severance 
pay exemption when facing economic distress. The model predicts that a system of severance 
payment exemption is less costly than the alternative of additional unemployment benefits as 
long as the wage elasticity of labor demand does not exceed the inverse of the replacement 
ratio. 
 Chapter 6 shows that the number of PES dismissal requests and number of civil court 
dismissal requests increases with increasing unemployment rates. This holds true for both 
economic and noneconomic requests. Under the assumption that the judicial decision is 
independent of the state of the economy, we provide evidence that these recession induced 
cases that are filed at the PES procedure are weaker cases from a plaintiff’s perspective. We 
define a weaker case as a case that does not, partly or fully, comply with the definition of a fair 
dismissal as stipulated in the Dutch code of law. Recession induced cases filed at the PES have a 
smaller likelihood of being granted. These results are desirable from a judicial perspective 
INTRODUCTION 
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because they imply that the PES does not allow an employer to terminate a permanent 
employment contract without a reasonable cause. For the civil court we do not find evidence 
that recession induced cases are of lower quality. A possible explanation for this finding is that 
the assumption of judicial independence is a too strong assumption to make for the civil court. 
Further research is needed to clarify this issue. 
 In Chapter 7 we present the latest proposal of the Kunduz18 parties VVD, CDA, D66, 
GroenLinks and ChristenUnie to drastically revise the Dutch EPL.19 In short, the proposal argues 
for the abolishment of the preventative check of dismissal and for the introduction of a budget 
that is used for schooling purposes. The proposal furthermore argues for the financing of the 
first months of the unemployment benefit by the employer. We continue Chapter 7 by sketching 
an overview of the reactions the new proposal has provoked. We summarize a letter of protest 
that was sent by a delegation of scientist to the Upper Chamber, dated June 11th 2012.20 We 
furthermore present opinions from a workers’ employers’ and voters’ perspective. Next, we 
present our point of view. We are against the proposed measures and are in favor of the 
maintenance of the dual system of employment protection. To put strength to the view to reject 
the new proposed measures, we additionally show that the proposed system will not lead to a 
decrease in firing costs. We conclude Chapter 7 by proposing an outlook for future research and 
by presenting the policy implications of our research.  
 Recent political developments have motivated us to write a brief update. Chapter 8 
describes the measures as proposed in the Coalition Agreement21 of October 29th 2012. We 
present a short overview of the agreement, calculate the costs of the newly proposed measures 
and express our point of view.  
  
                                                        
18 Because of an earlier mutual agreement to support the police training missing in the Afghan province of Kunduz, 
the media started referring to these parties as the Kunduz parties. 
19 In the Spring Agreement of May 2012 the political-parties VVD, CDA, D66, GroenLinks and ChristenUnie proposed 
a new drastic revision of the current Dutch EPL. This proposal was revised and sketched in more detail by Henk 
Kamp, (outgoing) Minister of Social Affairs and Welfare and was send to the Upper Chamber at the 18th of June 
2012. 
20 See “Hoogleraren kraken versoepeling ontslagrecht”. Volkskrant June 12th 2012. www.volkskrant.nl/vk 
vk/nl/10637/VK-Dossier-Verkiezingen-van-2012/article/detail/3269984/2012/06/12/Hoogleraren-kraken-
versoepeling-ontslagrecht.dhtml, retrieved September 11th 2012. 
21 In Dutch: Regeerakkoord. 
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2.1 Introduction 
In the Netherlands, the set of rules governing the hiring and firing of employees is rather 
complex. Unlike in most OECD countries, the Netherlands has two institutes responsible for the 
enforcement of labor law: the public employment service (PES)22 and the civil court. The OECD 
refers to the Dutch system as a “dual system” of dismissal (OECD 2004). The check for the 
fairness of the dismissal is a preventative check, not a repressive one. As such, the PES and the 
civil court are involved at an early stage of the dismissal process. It also implies that the 
employer is the plaintiff and the employee the defendant.23 The Dutch system is unique in the 
world. 
 In Section 2 of this chapter we present an overview of the current Dutch employment 
protection legislation (EPL)24. The duality of the Dutch system, together with the preventative 
nature of the dismissal check, implies that a Dutch employer may dismiss a permanent worker 
by either requesting prior permission from the PES, or by requesting the civil court to dissolve 
the employment contract. The PES is a public institute, supervised by the Minister of Social 
Affairs and Employment; the civil court is an independent legal body. Both apply a different set 
of laws. Rules regarding dismissal via the PES are recorded in the Extraordinary Labor Relations 
Decree25 (ELRD) and the Dismissal Decree26 (DD). Termination of employment via the civil court 
is governed by the Civil Code27 (CC). Besides termination by dismissal, an employment contract 
may also be terminated at will during the trial period, by mutual consent, by operation of law28 
and by summary dismissal. As mentioned earlier, these options are beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. 
 We continue this chapter by looking back into the past. An historical overview of the 
evolution of Dutch EPL that is given in Section 3 allows us to understand the system as it exists 
today. We commence with describing a milestone in the history of Dutch employment 
protection: the introduction of the old Civil Code of Law in 1838. The Civil Code introduced the 
concept of contractual freedom, which was quite revolutionary at that time. Despite this 
contractual freedom, the worker remained inferior to the master, who determined the content 
of the contract. As a result of the Industrial Revolution at the second half of the 19th century 
working conditions deteriorated and social injustice increased. A general protest against this 
rising social injustice resulted in the enactment of the first modest labor laws. Labor for children 
                                                        
22 In this chapter we use PES as an acronym for public employment service. The official Dutch name for the PES is 
Uitvoerings Instituut Werknemersverzekering (UWV). In this dissertation, if we refer to the PES, we mean the UWV, 
and in particular the legal department of UWV that is responsible for handling dismissal requests. 
23 The Netherlands also knows a repressive check of dismissal. The employee that is dismissed may file a request at 
the civil court for being manifestly unreasonably dismissed (sec. 7:682 CC). This check, however, is not often used. At 
the Maastricht civil court, over the years 2003- 2009, this procedure is followed an average amount of 36 times per 
year. The average amount of preventative dismissal procedures that was followed at this court was 2,025 
procedures per year.  For the same period, the average number of preventative cases at the PES district Maastricht 
was 3,700. 
24 EPL is used as an acronym for employment protection legislation.  
25 In Dutch: Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen. 
26 In Dutch: Ontslagbesluit. 
27 In Dutch: Burgerlijk Wetboek. 
28 A termination of an employment contract by operation of law may imply the expiry of a fixed term contract or the 
death of an employee. 
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under 12 became forbidden, maximum working hours were set and protection measures against 
working hazards in the industry were introduced. It was not until the Law on Employment 
Contracts of 1907, when employees received some legal rights. The preventative check by the 
civil court was introduced. The law furthermore resulted in the introduction of the notice 
period. The second milestone in the history of Dutch EPL is seen in the post-war period, in 1945, 
when the Dutch government upheld a resolution that was introduced by the occupying force of 
Nazi Germany. This resolution imposed that an employer could not dismiss an employee 
without prior approval of the Labor Inspectorate: the PES route of dismissal was born. The post-
war period is characterized by an increase in employee protection. Notice periods were 
extended and a specific issuing of rules for economic dismissals was introduced. We close 
Section 3 with an overview of the most recent 30 years in which the need for flexibility 
increased. Employers argued that EPL had become too rigid. In times of international 
competition, there was a need better adjust to changes in labor demand and supply.  
 In Section 4 we continue this chapter by placing the Dutch EPL in an international context. 
We use the summary measures of employment protection legislation of the OECD to compare 
the strictness of the Dutch labor market to the strictness of the labor markets of other OECD 
member countries. We show that in terms of regulation for permanent workers, the 
Netherlands has one of the most regulated labor markets of all.  
 Section 5 presents a literature review on how research on the effect of EPL on different 
labor market outcomes has proven inconclusive. A main argument used by policymakers and 
politicians is that the Dutch system does not positively affect the functioning of the labor 
market. We argue that the arguments used by the government are based on untested premises. 
This leaves room for severe debates and divides the government into opponents and advocates 
of a more liberal EPL. Agreements are not reached because the expected outcomes of certain 
proposed modifications are not testable. Section 6 concludes. 
2.2 The current Dutch EPL 
This section describes Dutch labor law as it is enforced today. It starts with a general 
description, followed by an overview of the rules applied by the PES and the civil court. Last, a 
schematic presentation of the differences between both institutes is given. 
2.2.1 Two routes of dismissal 
In the Netherlands, rules regarding the termination of employment contracts are recorded in 
the Civil Code29 (CC), the Extraordinary Labor Relations Decree30 (ELRD), the Dismissal Decree31 
(DD) and the Collective Redundancy Act32 (CRA). In cases where regulations are not compulsory, 
or where the law is silent, collective labor agreements may be a source of law. Dutch law makes 
a distinction between fixed term employment contracts, which are contracts concluded for a 
definite period of time and permanent employment contracts, which are contracts concluded 
                                                        
29 In Dutch: Burgerlijk Wetboek. 
30 In Dutch: Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen. 
31 In Dutch: Ontslagbesluit. 
32 In Dutch: Wet Melding Collectief Ontslag. 
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for an indefinite period of time. Fixed term contracts automatically expire at the end of a 
predefined period.33 
 Under Dutch law, employees (with a permanent employment contract) are protected 
against dismissal by a preventative or a-priori system of dismissal. An employer may either 
request: the PES for a permission of dismissal (sec. 6 ELRD); or the civil court for a dissolution of 
the employment contract (sec. 7:685 CC).If an employer has chosen for termination of the 
contract via the PES, but the PES does not grant dismissal permission, he can still request for the 
rescission of the contract by the civil court, and vice versa. Both institutes act independently 
from each other.  
 Other options to terminate an employment contract are at will during the trial period, 
termination by mutual consent, termination by operation of law34 and by summary dismissal. In 
these cases, the above routes do not apply.  
 A reason for an employer to select the PES route of dismissal is that the payment of 
severance is not obliged. The PES route is also the route to follow when the dismissal is of a 
collective nature. The civil court route is chosen because it is in general the fastest route. 
Furthermore, the civil court may resolve the employment contract when a dismissal prohibition 
exists. The choice to follow the one or the other route is a strategic choice that is dependent on 
the expected cost of a certain route and the likelihood of success. For one employer the PES 
route is the cheapest and the most effective route, for the other employer this holds true for 
the civil court route.  
 Figure 1 shows the number of requests filed at both institutes. In 1993, approximately 75 
percent of all requests was directed at the PES. From 1998 to 2008, the two routes were chosen 
in almost equal proportions. In the year 2003, the number of dismissal requests filed reached its 
peak with 85,881 and 78,419 cases filed at the PES and the civil court, respectively. This number 
decreased until 2008 and rose again in 2009. In 2009, however, the civil court lost its popularity 
as almost 70 percent of all dismissal cases went via the PES route. After 2009, the PES route is 
followed approximately twice as often as the civil court route. 
Route I: Dismissal permission via the PES  
Termination of employment by dismissal via the PES is governed the Extraordinary Labor 
Relations Decree (ELRD) and the Dismissal Decree (DD). The ELRD and DD summarily deal with 
formal and material conditions for granting dismissal permission and apply to all employment 
contracts and cases that are covered by section 7:610 (CC).35 Section 1(b) (ELRD) expands this 
definition to workers who perform personal labor without a contract of employment.36 The 
ELRD and DD do not cover: 1) employees of a public body; 2) persons in an ecclesiastical 
position; 3) the teaching staff of educational institutes led by a natural person or body 
                                                        
33 Fixed term contract may be concluded for a specific task, a project or a definite term (sec. 7:667(1) CC). 
34 A termination of an employment contract by operation of law may imply the expiry of a fixed term contract or the 
death of an employee. 
35 Section 7:610 (1) (CC) states that the employment contract is an agreement under which one party, the employee, 
is employed by the other party, the employer, in return for remuneration for a certain period of time. 
36 Unless a) personal labor is performed for at least three other persons, b) the employee is not assisted by at least 
three other persons other than the registered partner/husband/wife/family member/foster children, c) this personal 
labor is incidental. 
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corporate; 4) employees only or predominantly performing domestic work in private households 
for less than three days a week (sec. 2 ELRD); and 5) statutory directors (Stcrt 1872, 234).  
 
Figure 1 Dismissal requests at the PES and the civil court. 
Sources: CPB 135 – Employment Protection Legislation (2006) , Ontslagstatistieken, 2006-2009, Raad voor de 
Rechtspraak (2012), UWV (2012)  
 
Table 1 The minimal information required in the dismissal application. 
Information required 
Employer related information 
The name and the address of the employer
The date 
An indication that the request concerns a dismissal permission
Employee related information 
The name of the employee concerned 
Address, postal code and place of residence of the employee
Date of birth of the employee, date first day of employment
Job description, gross wage 
Social security number 
Reason for termination of the contract of employment
Source: UWV (2011) 
Table 2 Statutory minimum period of notice. 
Tenure Section 7:672(4) CC: approval of PES  Section 7:672(2) CC 
Less than 5 year 1 month 1 month
5 to 10 years 1 month 2 months
10 to 15 years 2 months 3 months
More than 15 years 3 months 4 months
Source: UWV (2011) 
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The PES operates under close supervision of the government. The minister of Social Affairs and 
Employment is authorized to grant dismissal approval and has delegated this authority to the 
PES. The PES is supposed to report to the Minister on how the authority to grant dismissal 
approval is practiced. Rules governing the dismissal approval are set by the Minister (sec. 6(7) 
ELRD). 
 The dismissal procedure commences with a written application that is send by the 
employer to the PES. The application must contain the reason for dismissal and should be 
substantiated by evidence. The subsidiary of the PES that is situated in the area in which the 
concerned employee is employed is responsible for handling the request.37 Table 1 presents the 
minimum information the application is required to contain. If on receipt of the appeal 
information is missing, the employer has eight more days to fulfill all requirements. As soon as 
the PES has received a complete appeal, the involved employee is notified and given the 
possibility to submit a written defense within two weeks after notification (sec. 2:2 (DD)). In a 
next step, the dismissal file including the employer’s application and the employee’s defense, is 
send to a Redundancy Committee (sec. 6(4) ELRD, sec. 2:5 DD). This committee is composed of 
representatives of the workers’ and the employers’ associations. Its task is to advise the PES. On 
the basis of this advice, the PES reaches a decision. Permission is given if dismissal is judged to 
be fair (sec. 3:10 DD). Fair dismissals are dismissals based on economic grounds (e.g 
redundancy), dysfunctional behavior, a disturbed employment relationship, illness and 
misconduct.38 The dismissal permission is time-limited and valid for a maximum period of eight 
weeks. The employer is not obliged use the permission; he may also let it expire.39,40  
 A standard PES dismissal procedure takes four to six weeks. Complicated cases and cases in 
which the employer fails to provide sufficient information may take longer. 
 Under Dutch law, termination of an employment relationship is unlawful when the 
statutory notice period is not observed 7:672(2) (CC). With permission from the PES, statutory 
notice periods are reduced by one month (sec. 7:672(4) CC)41 (See Table 2). 
 It is not possible to make an appeal to the decision of the PES (sec. 6(10) ELRD). The 
employee, however, may file a request at the civil court because of being manifestly 
unreasonably dismissed (sec. 7:682 CC). Civil court may compensate the employee for being 
unreasonably dismissed or it may recover the employment relationship.  
Route II: Dismissal via civil court 
Rules and regulations regarding the rescission of the employment contract by court are 
recorded in the Civil Code (CC). The Civil Code applies to all employment contracts and cases in 
which one party, the employee, is working for the other party, the employer, in return 
                                                        
37 Multiple subsidiaries of the PES are located throughout the Netherlands, each covering a different, multiply 
exclusive, area. See Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
38 We refer to the Dismissal Decree, section 4 and section 5 for a complete overview of all grounds for dismissal. 
39 The PES determines the term for expiration, the maximum is eight weeks (sec. 2:7 DD). 
40 The PES does not terminate the employment contract. It only permits the employer to terminate the employment 
contract. 
41 In order to resign, employees need to give notice one month in advance (sec. 7:672(3) CC). 
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remuneration for a certain period of time  7:610(1) (CC).,43,44 The civil court that is located in the 
area in which the employee lives or works is responsible for handling the request (sec. 7:685(3) 
CC).45 The procedure commences with a written appeal (sec. 7:685(1) CC) that is send to court 
and that motivates the employer’s intention to terminate an employment contract. No specific 
rules regarding the content of the appeal exist. Shortly after, the employee concerned is notified 
and is given the opportunity to submit a written defense.  
 We can distinguish between two types of dismissal cases. The first type of case is the pro-
forma case. It is a non-contradiction case, which implies that the outcome is mutually agreed 
upon by the employer and employee involved. Preceding the court procedure, agreements are 
made about the date of termination and the severance payment that will be awarded to the 
dismissed employee. The court generally follows the agreements made. As such, an oral court 
session in which the employer and the employee are heard is generally not held. The second 
type of case is the contradiction case. In these cases, employer and employee disagree about 
the terms of dismissal. When the civil court receives a request of the second type, both parties 
are heard in front of court.46 The court’s decision is presented shortly after this court hearing. 
When the court decides to rescind the employment contract it is allowed to ignore the statutory 
minimum notice period as recorded in section 7:672(2) CC (See Table 2). A standard 
contradiction procedure takes three to four weeks. The duration of a pro-forma procedure is 
shorter. 
 The civil court will rescind an employment contract if a substantial reason exists (sec. 7:685 
(2) CC). A substantial reason is a circumstance that would have also allowed for an immediate 
dismissal. Examples are fraud, incompetence, drunkenness, theft and reckless behavior. A 
substantial reason also refers to a circumstantial change that justifies the termination of an 
employment relationship. Examples are economic circumstances, a disturbed employment 
relationship and illness. 
 Unlike the PES, the civil court may award a severance pay (sec. 7:685(8) CC). This only holds 
true when the employment contract is rescinded because of a change in circumstances. In 
calculating the severance pay the Civil Court Formula is used as a guideline. The formula 
multiplies the number of years of service (A) by the gross monthly salary (B) and by a correction 
factor expressing the special circumstances of the case (C). The years of service up to the age of 
35 are counted as half a month’s salary, from 35 to 45 as 1, from 45 to 55 as 1,5 and after 55 as 
2. With the correction factor, the civil court takes into account the culpability of the parties. The 
factor is equal to 1 if none of the parties are culpable. It is larger than 1 if mainly the employer is 
culpable and smaller than 1 if mainly the employee is culpable. The civil court may also take into 
account the financial situation of the employer and the job market position of the employee. It 
is not possible to make an appeal to the court’s decision. 
                                                        
43 Unless agreed-upon otherwise by both parties, before or on initiation of the employment relationship, either by 
law or by ordinance, the provisions of the Civil Code do not apply to persons employed by the State, the District 
Council, the City Council, the Water Board or any other public body (sec. 7:615 CC). 
44 This route of termination via judicial decision is predominantly used by employers, but employees may also follow 
this procedure. 
45 Civil courts are located throughout the Netherlands, each covering a different area, see Chapter 3.  
46 Section 7:685(6) (CC) stipulates that this oral session is supposed to be held within four weeks after the appeal 
date. 
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2.2.2 Prohibitions of dismissal 
In addition to the general protection against dismissal as mentioned above, special protection is 
provided for employees in certain situations. This protection prohibits employers to dismiss 
employees during the first two years of illness, during pregnancy and maternity leave and 
because of membership of the works council, a works council committee or a safety 
committee.47 If an employer contravenes a prohibition, the employee concerned may invoke the 
invalidity of such dismissal within a time limit of two months. In such case, the dismissal is 
declared annul and the employee is reemployed. If an employer intends to dismiss a worker for 
whom a dismissal prohibition exists, he may follow the civil court route as civil courts may 
dissolve a contract in the presence of such a prohibition. The reason for dismissal, however, may 
not be related to the dismissal prohibition. For example, the civil court will not resolve the 
contract of an employee that is sick for less than two years due to the fact that the employee is 
ill. The contract of the concerned employee can be dissolved on the basis of economic grounds. 
 When an employer requests for a dismissal approval of at the PES, he is notified by the PES 
about the existence of a prohibition of dismissal. The employer may decide to proceed with the 
procedure or to withdraw the request. In deciding whether or not to grant dismissal permission, 
the PES does not take into account the existence of a dismissal prohibition. It only checks 
whether the dismissal meets all the criteria of a reasonable dismissal. If all criteria are met, 
dismissal permission is given. The employer may decide to use the permission and dismiss the 
employee before it expires. Dismissal, however, even is the presence of a permit of the PES, is 
invalid when a dismissal prohibition exists.  
2.2.3 A schematic overview of the comparison of both routes 
Table 3 below shows a schematic summary of both routes and their characteristics. Table 4 
presents a summary of the options for both the employer and the employee, after the employer 
has initiated a procedure via either the PES or the civil court. 
  
                                                        
47 The law records more prohibitions of dismissal. For a complete over view see sec. 7:670, Civil Code of Law. 
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Table 3 The two different routes compared. 
 PES Civil Court 
System of a-priori control The permission to terminate an employment 
contract. 
The rescission of the employment 
contract by the judge. 
Who can commence the 
procedure? 
The employer only. Both parties, although it is 
predominantly used by the employer. 
Section of law Section 6 ELRD. Section 7:685 CC
What determines which 
district is responsible for 
handling the appeal?  
The place of employment. The place of residence of the 
employee or the place of 
employment. 
Range All employees covered by section 7:610 (1) 
(CC) with the exception of 1) employees of a 
public body; 2) persons in an ecclesiastical 
position; 3) the teaching staff of educational 
institutes led by a natural person or body 
corporate; 4) employees only or 
predominantly performing domestic work in 
private households for less than three days a 
week (sec. 2 ELRD); and 5) statutory directors 
(Stcrt 1872, 234). Workers who perform 
personal labor without a contract of 
employment are covered.  
All employees covered by section 
7:610 (1) (CC) with the exception of 
persons employed by the State, the 
District Council, the  City Council, the 
Water Board or any other public body 
(sec. 7:615 CC). 
Duration of procedure 75% of all requests is handled within four to 
six weeks. 
Three to four weeks in case of a 
contradiction case. Pro-forma cases 
can be closed within a week. 
Statutory notice period 
applies? 
Yes, however, after dismissal approval of the 
PES, the applicable notice period described 
by law may be reduced with one month, 
provided that the notice period will not be 
less than one month (sec. 7:672(4) CC). 
No. The judge decides when the 
employment contract is rescinded.  
Severance pay awarded The PES is not entitled to award severance 
pay. 
Severance pay is awarded. The Civil 
Court Formula is used as a guideline. 
Appeal possible? No. No.
Possible to dismiss an 
employee for whom a 
dismissal prohibition applies? 
No. Yes, if the reason for dismissal is 
unrelated to the reason for the 
existence of the dismissal prohibition. 
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Table 4 Different options to follow after each dismissal procedure. 
Dismissal via PES Dismissal via the civil court 
PES checks if dismissal is fair.  Civil court checks for the existence of a substantial reason 
to dissolve the employment relationship. 
 
It is not possible to make an appeal against the decision 
of the PES. 
It is not possible to make an appeal against the decision 
of the civil court 
 
Option employer: If dismissal permission is not granted, 
the employer may initiate a dismissal procedure at the 
civil court. 
  
Option employer:  If the contract is not dissolved, the 
employer may initiate a dismissal procedure at the PES. 
Option employee: If dismissal permission is granted the 
employee may file a request at the civil court because of 
his dismissal being manifestly unreasonable. Civil court 
may compensate the employee according to the civil 
court formula (A x B x C). 
Option employee: The employee does not have any 
options. 
 
2.3 History of Dutch EPL48 
This section describes the history of Dutch EPL. An overview of history is important to 
understand the Dutch system as it exists today.  
2.3.1 The first protective measures 
The introduction of the Civil Code of Law 
The introduction of the old Civil Code of Law (old CC)49 in 1838 can be regarded as a milestone in 
the history of Dutch EPL. Inspired by the French Code Civil of 1804, the Dutch Civil Code 
introduced a new national civil law. Even though the Civil Code did not encompass labor law in 
its strictest sense, it did contain three sections regarding the ‘lease and letting of servants and 
workers.50 First, section 1637 (old CC) recorded that a person could only work for one specific 
organization. Second, section 1638 (old CC) stipulated that the master, under oath, should 
always be taken at his word in case of disputes about the amount of wage paid, the terms of 
payment and the length of the employment relationship. Finally, in section 1639 (old CC) it was 
stipulated that servants and workers, unless hired for a predetermined period, were not allowed 
to leave their master without a lawful reason. If, for any reason, servants or workers did leave 
unlawfully, they were fined. 
                                                        
48 When writing this historical overview, main sources of information used were Naber (1981), Nyfer (2000), Heerma 
Van Voss (1992), Pennings (2007), CPB (2006), Loonstra and Zondag (2008) and Van Drongelen, and Van Rijs, (2008). 
49 In 1992 the new Civil Code of Law was introduced. It replaced the old Civil Code of Law. All articles received a new 
number.  
50 Rules and regulations regarding the employment relationship where stipulated in General Agreements Law (In 
Dutch: Algemene Overeenkomstenrecht). 
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Even though these three sections might seem of marginal importance in our 21st century 
perspective, they were quite revolutionary at their time. Since the introduction of the Civil Code 
in 1838, regulations regarding the employment relationship were recorded in General 
Agreements Law51. This law applied the concept of contractual freedom. Before 1838 this 
freedom was unheard of. In the old guild system the employment relationship between the 
master and the apprentice was fixed: the apprentice could not just leave and work for another 
master. Nevertheless, it must be noted that despite of the transition from fixed employment 
relationships to contracts and contractual freedom, the servant remained inferior to the master. 
After 1838 it was still the master who determined the content of the contract. This inferiority of 
the servant is also evident from section 1638 described above: “under oath, the master should 
always be taken at his word”. In modern eyes, this article seems ridiculously unfair. However, 
the legislator of 1838 believed that master was the most sophisticated one, not the worker. 
Therefore, it was ‘obvious’ to trust the former one at forehand. 
The industrial revolution 
As a result of the rise of the Industrial Revolution at the second half of the 19th century, labor 
conditions changed drastically. To keep the production process in factories going, many 
(uneducated) workers were needed and even children were put into use. Labor became 
concentrated around the bigger cities. Hoping for a better life, families were drawn from the 
countryside towards this concentration of work. Living conditions in these cities were far from 
pleasant. Housing was poor, the overall educational level was low and circumstances in factories 
were dreadful. Not occasionally, working shifts took longer than 20 hours. Furthermore, workers 
earned minimum wages and were often forced to spend a huge part of what they earned at the 
shop or factory of the employer, regularly against too high prices. In the event of death or 
sickness of the wage earner, families struggled to survive. Poverty care existed but was little 
developed. 
 This social unjustness led to the development of (worker) unions. In general, however, the 
impact of these movements was minimal. One of the few unions that did have some impact was 
the ‘Comité ter bespreking van de sociale quaestie’ (1870-1880). This committee was formed by 
politicians, intellectuals and members of worker unions and was concerned about the arising 
social unrest and the need for better conditions for workers. Especially the position of women 
and children was perceived as worrisome. Public awareness arose that conditions would not 
improve without governmental interference. Even though the government remained little 
involved in improving social matters, child labor was soon tackled. In 1873, the first, but still 
modest labor law was introduced: de Child Law Van Houten52. It arose as the consequence of a 
parliamentary inquiry about labor conditions in factories and workshops, held in 1866. The law 
forbad paid employment of children under 12, except for domestic services and fieldwork. 
Sixteen years later, the Labor Law53 of 1889 stipulated the working hours of children under 16 
and of women. Furthermore, the new law introduced the Labor Inspection. In that same year 
night shifts for women were forbidden. The Security Law54 of 1895 offered adult men some 
                                                        
51 In Dutch: Algemene Overeenkomstenrecht. 
52 In Dutch: Kinderwet Van Houten. 
53 In Dutch: Arbeidswet. 
54 In Dutch: Veiligheidswet. 
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protection against the hazards in the industry. It imposed employers to protect their workers 
against health and safety danger in factories and workshops.55 
Law on employment contracts 
In 1907, the Law on Employment Contracts56 was passed. This law introduced the first legal 
measures that aimed for the protection of the employee. The institution charged with the 
enforcement of this protection was the civil court. The 1907 law recorded approximately 20 
articles about the termination of the employment contract (articles 1639e till 1639x (old CC)). 
Together, these articles introduced three different options to terminate an employment 
contract. The first option was the termination of an employment contract by operation of law. 
Examples are the expiry of a fixed term contract and death of one of the two parties. The 
second route was the termination of the employment contract by mutual consent. The third 
route was the termination of the employment contract via the civil court.57 A very important 
article in this third route is article 1639w, which enabled the civil court to dissolve a contract 
only in extraordinary circumstances.58 The possibility to award severance pay did not exist yet. 
After some modifications that broadened the possibilities of the civil court to dissolve an 
employment contract, article 1639w (old CC) would later become article 7:685 (CC), the article 
described in the first paragraph of this chapter and the article on which the civil court route is 
based. 
 The 1907 law was characterized by its strong emphasis on wages. Protection was found in 
regulations imposing the form in which the wage should be paid. For example, wages in the 
form of vouchers to be exchanged for goods that were sold by the employer were no longer 
allowed. Article 1638c recorded that the employee was entitled to receive his wage in times of 
sickness. Furthermore, the law regulated medical treatment for resident employees (article 
1638jj (old CC)). Additionally, the new law dealt with regulations about the collective labor 
agreement (article 1937n (old CC)), a competition clause (article 1637w (old CC)) and 
stipulations imposing safety regulations within the organization (article 1638x (old CC)). This last 
article 1638x obliged the employer to safeguard the working environment. If safety regulations 
were not met and damage occurred, the employee was entitled to receive a damage pay 
(Heerma van Voss, 1992; Keirse, 2003; Pennings, 2007).59 Another crucial element in the 1907 
law was the introduction of the notice period. A permanent employment contract could not be 
terminated without notification in advance. The notice period equaled the period in between 
two sequential payments. The maximum was six weeks. 
 Even though the Law on Employment Contracts broke drastically with its past, the 
protection provided by the law was still minimal. In practice, the notice period never took longer 
than a week, regardless of the duration of employment (Naber, 1981). Furthermore, disputes 
between employee and employer were often not resolved. For example, workers still received 
their pay in an unlawful form or did not receive it in time. (Pennings, 2007). Another downturn 
                                                        
55 In all industries except for agriculture, horticulture, forestry, cattle farms, fishing and shipping.  
56 In Dutch: Wet op de Arbeidsovereenkomst. 
57 For a more detailed description of these articles see Heerma Van Voss (1992), p35. 
58 Such a circumstance applied when e.g. the employer lost his fortune. Over one hundred years ago it was quite 
regular that employers and employees formed temporary employment relationship for e.g. three years. If an 
employer fired the employee after 2 years, the employer was obliged to pay the employee the remaining year loan.   
59 This damage pay was only received if the employee could proof the employer was to blame.  
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of the 1907 law was that both employers and employees did not have to state a valid reason to 
terminate a contract, or in other words, the underlying reason for termination was irrelevant.60 
Even though dismissal needed to be declared legitimate by the court – that is, consistent with 
the legal notice period – any check on reasonableness by the court was lacking. In most cases 
this was more harrowing for the employee than for the employer. 
 Following 1907 is a period of continuous discussion about the minimal level of employment 
protection. Both the lack of a reasonableness check on dismissal by the court and the minimum 
notice period were debated. Even though in the 1910’s and 20’s the rising power of labor unions 
led to the naissance of an additional number of collective labor agreements in which rules 
related to the dismissal procedure were recorded, each attempt to bring about a more 
protective national EPL failed.61 
2.3.2 The period during and following the Second World War 
The impact of the German occupation of 1940-1945 
The core of Dutch EPL remained unaltered until the Germans enacted the First Enforcement 
Decision62 on June 11th 1940. This Decision recorded a unilateral dismissal prohibition, imposing 
that an employer could not dismiss an employee without the approval of the Labor 
Inspectorate. For dismissal a reasonable cause was required. If the Labor Inspectorate judged 
dismissal to be unreasonable, permission to terminate the employment contract was not given. 
Violations of the prohibition were sanctioned with a fine of maximum €3.000 or three months of 
detention. As of the 1st of March 1943 not only the employer but also the employee needed 
permission to terminate an employment contract. The unilateral prohibition became a bilateral 
prohibition. 
 Why did the Germans introduce the dismissal prohibition? Actually, the main purpose of 
the introduction of the prohibition was to regulate the labor market, the protection of 
employees was of minor importance. Especially the modification of the prohibition into a 
bilateral one was more driven by need to regulate the labor market than by socio-economic 
considerations. During the war many workers were needed for the war industry in the German 
homeland. Hence, the Germans intended to prohibit workers to resign. 
The Extraordinary Labor Relations Decree 1945 
In 1945, when the defeat of the Germans became apparent, the Dutch government upheld the 
German procedures in the Extraordinary Labor Relations Decree63,64 (ELRD). The role of the 
Labor Inspectorate was taken over by the Regional Employment Exchange65. (From 1991 until 
                                                        
60 Unless summary dismissal (In Dutch: ontslag op staande voet) had occurred (Peeters, 2006). 
61 In the 1930’s only workers in the graphical industry, in the beer breweries in the three largest cities in the 
Netherlands and in a few brick producing companies received special employment protection (Heerma Van Voss, 
1992). 
62 In Dutch: Eerste Uitvaardigingsbesluit. 
63 In Dutch: Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen. 
64 The Dutch government in exile had introduced and earlier version of the Decision at July 17th 1944. Because a 
chosen parliament did not exist, this decision could not be checked by a parliament. As such, the ELRD is a decision 
that received the status of a law by Royal Decision (In Dutch: Koninklijk Besluit). 
65 In Dutch: Gewestelijke Arbeidsbureaus.  
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2002 the Regional Director Labor Facilities66 was assigned to perform the check. In 2002, the 
Centre for Work and Income (CWI) took over. Today, as of January 2009, the PES (UWV) is 
responsible). For dismissal a reasonable cause was required. If the Regional Employment 
Exchange judged dismissal to be unreasonable, permission to terminate the employment 
contract was not given. 
 Before the introduction of the Extraordinary Labor relations Decree (ELRD), Dutch EPL was 
very liberal. An employer could dismiss at will, he or she only needed to take into account the 
notice period. When the employer had met the notification duty, the termination of the 
employment contract was declared legitimate. In other words, before the introduction of the 
ELRD no valid reason for dismissal was required. Additionally, before 1945, the civil court was 
the only institution enforcing employment protection. The ELRD introduced a second, public 
body responsible for this task.  
The 1953 revision of Dutch EPL 
In December 1953, Dutch EPL was revised. Due to this revision also the civil court became 
entitled to perform a check on the fairness of dismissal (article 1639s (old CC)). Unlike the 
reasonable check of the Regional Employment Exchange and the possibility of the civil court to 
dissolve the employment contract (article 1639w (old CC), this check was performed after 
dismissal had taken place. The Civil Code recorded that dismissal could not be manifestly 
unreasonable. Manifestly unreasonable dismissals were sanctioned with a damage pay or with 
the reestablishment of the employment contract (article 1639t (old CC)). Another consequence 
of the revision in 1953 was the prolongation of the notice period and its link to the employment 
duration (article 1639j (old CC)). The maximum notice period was set at a maximum of thirteen 
weeks, the notice period for employees between 50 and 65 was set at a minimum of three 
weeks. Moreover, article 1639w (old CC) was extended. This extension widened the power of 
the civil court to dissolve an employment contract. Dissolution was no longer restricted to 
extraordinary circumstances. Furthermore, the possibility to award severance pay was 
introduced. Last, two prohibitions of dismissal came into being: one during the first two years of 
sickness and one during military service. A violation of these prohibitions was sanctioned with a 
damage pay.67 
 The ELRD was introduced as an emergency plan to brave the post-war chaos on the labor 
market. The most important discussion following the 1953 revision concerned the role of the 
Director of the Regional Employment Exchange. The question arose whether he should still 
proceed in his task in dismissal affairs. The check on dismissal by the Director of Employment 
Exchange gradually gained a different character. Initially its main purpose was to regulate the 
labor market. A few years after the war, the protection of individuals against unreasonable 
dismissals had become more important. In 1953, the post war chaos on the labor market had 
disappeared and according to some members of parliament the ELRD had become redundant. 
Furthermore, since 1953 two checks on the reasonableness of dismissal existed. The first check 
was the check on reasonableness by the Director of the Regional Employment Exchange as 
recorded in the ERLD. The second check was  the manifestly unreasonableness check by the civil 
court as recorded in article 1639s (old CC). Nonetheless, the Dutch government rejected a 
                                                        
66 In Dutch: Regionaal Directeur voor de Arbeidsvoorziening. 
67 This paragraph only describes the most important and well-documented modifications of the law.  
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motion in favor of the abolishment of article 6 ELRD with slight majority. The dual system in the 
Netherlands remained. 
2.3.3 After the post-war period 
Prolongations of the notice period 
In 1968, the notice period was again extended. The occasion for this extension was the closure 
of several companies in the preceding period. Especially workers above a certain age needed 
better protection. As a result, the notice period for employees above 45 years was lengthened 
to a maximum of 26 weeks. This maximum could not be reached before the age of 58. The 1968 
revision of law was in line with collective labor agreements68 of that time in which longer notice 
periods for older employees were recorded. In the situation of a summary dismissal the notice 
period does not apply (Nyfer, 2000). 
Wages 
Before the Second World War, the government seldom interfered in employment conditions. 
However, in 1945 the College of State Intermediaries69 became entitled to approve a collective 
labor agreement before such an agreement was enacted. In addition, the college was given the 
power to set binding wage agreements. The Corporation of Employment70 was closely involved. 
Directly after the war, interference in wage setting was generally accepted. The social partners 
understood that wages should be moderated in order to stimulate the reconstruction of the 
country. Nonetheless, a few years after 1945, the discussion arose whether the Dutch wage 
setting system had not become too strict. In 1953 the Social Economic Council71 pled for a more 
flexible system in which the social partners had more influence. However, compared to 
neighboring countries, which had also introduced similar systems after the war, the Dutch 
system survived relatively long (Pennings, 2007; Trommel, and Van der Veen, 1999 ). 
 With the initiation of the Law on Wage Setting72 of 1970 the existing system was modified. 
Two unions, the NVV and the NKV expressed huge criticism towards the new law. They even 
temporarily resigned from the Social Economic Council and the Corporation of Employment.73 
Article 8 (old CC) was particularly criticized. Even though the law aimed for the principle of free 
collective negotiations, this article entitled the minister of Social Affairs to declare one or more 
articles in the collective labor agreements non-binding. This interference was only permitted 
when socio-economic interests were at stake. The unions also disapproved of article 10 (old CC), 
which allowed the minister to impose a wage regulation.74 On August 15th 1987, the 
government revised the Law on Wage Setting as a reaction to a complaint that was filed by the 
Dutch labor unions to the International Labor Organization (ILO). According to the labor unions, 
Dutch wage policy conflicted with treaties 87 and 98 of the ILO regarding the freedom to found 
labor unions and the right of collective negotiations. The ILO concluded that the Dutch system 
                                                        
68 In Dutch: ollecti ve beids vereenkomst. 
69 In Dutch: College van Rijksbemiddelaars. 
70 In Dutch: Stichting van de Arbeid. 
71 In Dutch: Sociaal Economische Raad. 
72 In Dutch: Wet op de Loonvorming. 
73 Later, the NVV and the NKV would merge into FNV. 
74 Such a wage regulation could for instance impose a freeze of wages for a period of maximum six subsequent 
months (Trommel, Van der Veen, 1999). 
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was indeed in force with these treaties. As a result, Article 10 (old CC) was modified to restrict 
the minister’s possibility to interfere.75 
The Law Notification of Collective Dismissals 
In the situation of a dismissal due to economic reasons, a specific issuing of rules applies. Often 
in such situations the nature of dismissal is a collective one. The law that deals with these 
collective dismissals is the Law Notification of Collective Dismissals76. It was introduced in 1976 
and applies when the employer intends to dismiss at least 20 employees that are working within 
one district of the PES within a time frame of three months. The employer has the duty to notify 
the PES about the collective dismissal.77 This notification duty is one of the most important 
elements in the law. Moreover, preceding notification, the involved labor union needs to be 
informed and the works council has to be consulted. Together with the notification, the 
employer has to request a permission of dismissal for each individual employee involved. The 
PES reviews these requests a month after notification (further referred to as the waiting period). 
During this waiting period it is examined whether political labor market measures (e.g. 
governmental support, retraining) could prevent unemployment on the whole or to some 
extent.78 In addition, a social plan is developed. The content of this plan is the result of the 
deliberation between the labor union, the employer and the works council79. Regulations that 
are recorded are e.g. redundancy schemes, measures regarding outplacement and employment 
mediation. The PES checks the reasonableness of dismissal. 
 In the situation of a collective dismissal, the Last In First Out system (LIFO-system) and the 
principle of reflection apply. The principle of reflection describes that dismissals should reflect 
the age proportions in an organization according to five age groups (15-24; 25-34; 35-44; 45-54; 
55-64). Within these five age categories the LIFO-system is applied. A consequence of the LIFO 
system is that employees with the shortest employment duration are the first ones to be 
dismissed. If an employer does not properly fulfill the notification duty, the PES will not take into 
account the dismissal request.  
Prolongations of prohibitions of dismissal  
As mention previously, the first prohibitions of dismissal were recorded in 1953. After 1953, 
these prohibitions were prolonged. In 1976, prohibitions of dismissal for pregnant women, 
during maternity leave and during the first six weeks after work is resumed are recorded in the 
Civil Code. In that same year, a violation of a prohibition of dismissal is sanctioned with nullity 
(Nyfer, 2000). Initially, such violation was a sanctioned with a damage pay. In 1999, new 
prohibitions of dismissal are introduced for parental leave and performing worker union 
activities.  
                                                        
75 Interference became allowed only in emergency situations (Van der Heijden, 1998).  
76 In Dutch: Wet Melding Collectief Ontslag. 
77 The employer needs to supply the PES with the following information:  the motivation of dismissal; the number of 
employees that is dismissed, divided into function, age and gender; the date of dismissal;  the criteria for dismissal; 
whether the works council is consulted and;  if applicable,  a report of the redundancy scheme.  
78 This waiting period does not hold when a declaration is submitted in which all concerned involved parties declare 
that they have been notified and that they agree with the situation.  
79 The work council is not always involved in constructing the social plan.  
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Equal treatment males and females 
Regulations in the Netherlands regarding the equal treatment of men and women are to a large 
extent based upon an equality program of the European Community that was initiated in 1974. 
This program included several directives on the equal treatment of males and females. In 1975, 
the Netherlands introduced the Law on Equal Remuneration of Males and Females80.  
 In connection with the Guideline of the Council of the European Community81 of 19 
February 1976 concerning the equal treatment of men and women in labor market access, 
promotion and employment conditions, the Social Economic Council was requested to revise all 
Dutch legal regulations that might endanger the equal treatment of males and females in the 
job process. These regulations were originally recorded to protect female employees but had 
become outdated either due to technological or social developments. Following the Council’s 
advice, the Law Equal Treatment of Males and Females82 became effective the 1st of March 
1980. In 1986, the Law on Equal Remuneration of Males and Females of 1975 was repealed. Its 
regulations became classed under the Law Equal Treatment of Males and Females.  
 In September 1994, the General Law Equal Treatment83 is enacted. This law forbids 
discrimination on the basis of religion, conviction, political opinions, race, gender, nationality, 
sexuality or martial state (Grinten, van der, 2005).  
2.3.4 The liberalization of Dutch EPL 
Act on Flexibility and Security 
Since 1907, Dutch employees received more and more legal protection due to EPL. One might 
argue this to be a positive development. Over the years, however, the EPL system received 
more and more criticism. As argued, Dutch EPL had become too rigid. In times of international 
competition, employers needed more flexibility to dismiss their employees or to give them 
different tasks.  
 As a result of the discussion on flexibility, the Act on Flexibility and Security84 came into 
force in January 1999.85 This law was introduced to increase flexibility for employers and to 
increase security for workers with a fixed term contract. Among other things, this law enabled 
employers to offer the employee three successive fixed term contracts without the interference 
of the PES or the court. Before the introduction of the 1999 law, a fixed term contract could only 
be extended once. On the other hand, the law strengthened the legal position of temporary 
workers because after more than 3 successive contracts, or 36 months (intervals of less than 
three months included) these workers are supposed to be offered a permanent contract. It must 
be noted, however, that such a permanent contract is not always offered. As Delsen (2002, p63) 
describes: “As employers can react in different ways, the effect of the ‘flexicurity’ act is 
                                                        
80 In Dutch: Wet Gelijk Loon voor Mannen en Vrouwen. 
81 In Dutch: Richtlijn van de Raad van de Europese Gemeenschap. 
82 In Dutch: Wet Gelijke Behandeling van Mannen en Vrouwen. 
83 In Dutch: Algemene Wet Gelijke Behandeling. 
84 In Dutch: Wet Flexibiliteit en Zekerheid. 
85 An important milestone in the discussion on flexibility was the memorandum of Minister Ad Melkert in December 
1995. In this note, the minister expressed the need for greater flexibility and to improve the position of temporary 
workers. The Corporation of Employment was asked for advice on this matter and proposed that there should be 
more possibilities to extent a temporary contract. Furthermore, the corporation proposed to improve the position of 
temporary employees. The cabinet agreed and the Act on flexibility and security was enacted. 
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uncertain. Either the temporary employee is hired for an indefinite period of time or the 
employer starts looking for another temporary employee or another way to recruit flexible 
personnel.”  
 Since 1999, EPL for employees with permanent contracts is also modified. The main 
purpose of this modification was to shorten the duration of the PES procedure. As such, the 
maximum notice period is shortened to 4 months.86  
The Commission Dual Employment Protection (Commission Rood). 
Since 1953, the Dutch employment protection system survived repeated attempts of 
modification. In 1999, the Commission Dual Employment Protection (also known as the 
‘Commission Rood’) was installed. Under the leadership of Prof. M.G. Rood, the commission’s 
purpose was to investigate the cohesiveness of the two dismissal procedures and to consult 
whether or not this system should remain intact. Furthermore, the commission intended to 
investigate whether certain dismissal procedures could be made more transparent and better 
connected to the labor market. In the report, which was presented in November 2000, the 
commission argued for the abolishment of the preventative dismissal procedure and for the 
introduction of a civil repressive dismissal system.87 Together with this abolishment, the dual 
protection system would disappear. In July 2003, after a long period of deliberation, the 
Cooperation of Labor88 rejected the proposal of the Commission Rood.89 The recommendations 
of the commission were not put into practice. Herewith, however, the discussion about Dutch 
EPL would not come to an end. 
Commission Labor Participation 
The Participation Top Meeting90 of June 27 2007 was organized to elaborate on the issue of 
labor participation. One of the most important subjects of this meeting was the liberalization of 
EPL in the Netherlands. In a request for advice, dated July 3 2007, Minister Donner notifies the 
Corporation of Labor91 about the plans for liberalization. At the first page of this document the 
Minister describes the measures that are needed to increase labor participation; an 
improvement of EPL is amongst those measures. Furthermore, the current EPL and its different 
routes of dismissal is characterized as badly organized. As a result, dismissal procedures have 
become complex, long and expensive. According to the Minister, this complicated employment 
protection system inhibits employers from employing new employees. Furthermore, the 
relatively high costs and burdens of Dutch EPL do not positively affect the functioning of the 
labor market (AV/IR/2007/23064, p2). The cabinet is in favor of a simplification of the Dutch 
system. One of the most important suggestions made is that prior approval from the PES and 
the civil court is not needed. Without prior approval, however, a damage pay for the dismissed 
employee is made obligatory. When dismissal is due to economic grounds, the employer is 
relieved from the obligation to award the employee a damage pay, but only when the PES has 
                                                        
86 As a result of the 1968 prolongation of the notice period this maximum used to be 6 months. 
87 See Commissie Duaal Ontslagstelsel, “Afscheid van het duale ontslagrecht” Den Haag; november 2000 
88 In Dutch: Stichting van de Arbeid. 
89 See Stichting van de Arbeid, Advies inzake het rapport van de adviescommissie duaal ontslagstelsel, Den Haag 
2003, 7/03.  
90 In Dutch: Participatietop. 
91 In Dutch: Stichting van de Arbeid. 
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granted a priori approval. At the 30th of August the Corporation of Labor delivers its advice. 
Employers agree to a great extent with the intentions of the cabinet. Employees are strictly 
against. Despite of much critique received, during the CDA conference at the 10th of November 
2007 Minister Donner indicates to carry though the quest for liberalization (www.nrc.nl).92 
 This political impasse led to the establishment of the Commission Labor Participation93 in 
December 2007. This Commission is requested to investigate which measures are needed to 
structurally increase labor participation in the Netherlands to a level of 80% in 2016. The report, 
which is delivered in June 2008, does not give a concrete advice about the modification of EPL. 
The commission mainly focuses on which (work related) measures have to be taken in order to 
bear the costs of the aging population. Liberalization of the employment protection system is 
hardly touched upon. After the delivery of the report the discussion on EPL seems to have come 
to an end. The reason why is not clear to outsiders.94 
 In October 2008, the cabinet, employers and FNV reach an agreement about the maximum 
dismissal compensation. Employees earning more than € 75,000 gross per year receive 
maximum one yearly salary when dismissed. In exchange for this modification, the current 
cabinet has promised to leave employment protection untouched until the end of its period of 
governance (www.nos.nl). Is this the end of the long debate?  
New developments 
After a relatively long period of minimal discussion about Dutch EPL and the installation of a 
new cabinet, a new law to modify Dutch EPL was proposed in July 2011.95 This proposal is 
closely related to the proposal made in 2007 by Minister Donner. The new proposal states that 
prior approval of the PES or the civil court is not needed. If employees do not agree with being 
dismissed they may file a lawsuit against their employer at the civil court, which may decide for 
the reestablishment of the employment contract or for a damage pay that is awarded to the 
dismissed employee. 
 In the Spring Agreement96 of May 2012, it is stated that Dutch EPL will be drastically revised 
in 2014. The new proposal follows the trend that was set by Minister Donner in 2007. It states 
that the a-priori check of dismissal of the PES and the civil court for permanent workers is 
abolished. Instead, a hearing procedure at the place of employment is introduced. After being 
dismissed, employees may reject against the dismissal at the civil court. Severance payments are 
set to a maximum of 6 months and may only be spend for schooling- and work-to-work projects. 
 One month has passed and the new proposal to modify the Dutch EPL has already received 
a considerable amount of criticism. In a letter to the Upper Chamber, a delegation of 16 
scientists express their concerns about the new proposed EPL system.97 According to the 
delegation, a more flexible EPL will not necessarily lead to a more competitive economy. They 
argue that when labor becomes cheaper employers will be less willing to invest in innovation 
                                                        
92 See also Van Drongelen and Van Rijs (2008). 
93 In Dutch: Commissie Arbeidsparticipatie. 
94 See for instance Jan Hensius “Schaf preventieve toets ontslag af.” Het Financieele Dagblad, 3 juli 2008. 
95 The proposal was made by Fatma Koser Kaya, member of the political party Democrats 66 (D66). 
96 In Dutch: Lenteakkoord. 
97 For a more detailed description of this criticism see Chapter 7 of this dissertation. 
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and training.98 Furthermore, the assumption that the proposed modification will increase job 
security is rejected as underprivileged, as low skilled insider are more likely to be fired and 
replaced by more flexible workers.  
 Meanwhile, (outgoing) Minster Kamp has drafted a new proposal that is related to proposal 
of the Spring Agreement. It is not unlikely, however, that the newly elected government will 
introduce its own vision on how to modify Dutch EPL99.  
2.4 Dutch EPL in an international perspective 
This section describes how the Netherlands performs internationally. How unique is our dual 
system actually? Can our EPL system be characterized as fairly rigid, or is the Dutch dismissal 
procedure amongst the most flexible ones?  
2.4.1 Uniqueness of the system 
The Dutch dual system, with its two routes of dismissal, is unique in the world. Some countries, 
however, do apply a preventative check of dismissal. In Germany for instance, the preventative 
check is executed by the works council (Betriebsrat) and not by a governmental institution such 
as the PES. This works council is supposed to object to the dismissal within seven days after the 
intention of dismissal is made known. The deadline is three days when dismissal due to urgent 
reasons is intended. If the deadline is not met, it is automatically assumed that the council 
agrees with the termination of the employment contract. Accompanied with a valid objection, 
the employee can request for (re)employment. Companies that employ less than five workers 
are not requested to have a works council at one’s disposal. In such circumstances the 
preventative check is not executed. In Belgium the request for dismissal is not checked in 
advance. However, for some ‘special employees’100 exceptional regulation exist and the 
preventative check is applied. In France, the preventive check of dismissal was performed until 
two decades ago. As from the Second World War dismissal was possible with the permission of 
the  Directeur départemental du travail. If permission was not given, the employer could appeal 
to the Labor Inspectorate. A final appeal could be made to the federal government. The 
preventative check is abolished in 1986. Ever since, France is only applying the repressive check 
(Nyfer, 2000).  
2.4.2 The EPL index 
After publication of the studies “Regulation or deregulation of the labour market. Policy regimes 
for the recruitment and dismissal of employees in industrialized countries” of Michael Emerson 
(1988), “Job security provisions and employment” of Ed Lazear (1990), and “Job security, 
employment and wages” of Guiseppe Bertola (1990) policymakers became widely interested in 
examining the effect of EPL on labor market outcomes. In order to achieve this task, a  measure 
of the strictness of EPL became crucial. Updating the work of Grubb and Wells (1993), the OECD 
                                                        
98 In their argument they refer to Naastepad and Storm (2012), Vergeer and Kleinknecht (2010) and  Dekker and 
Kleinknecht (2008).  
99 A general election was held in September 2012, resulting in a new government. In Chapter 8 of this dissertation 
we present a short update of the new plans of this newly elected government. 
100 Members of the works council or of a safety commission (Heerma Van Voss, 2006).  
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has made itself responsible for accomplishing this task by calculating the OECD Employment 
Protection Legislation Index (EPL-index) for a large number of its member states since the late 
90’s. Summarized, the overall EPL index is composed out of three components. One component 
is related to the protection of employees with a regular contract against individual dismissal. It 
incorporates the i)difficulty of dismissal, which relates to the legal conditions under which 
dismissal is characterized to be “fair”. It furthermore quantifies the ii)procedural inconveniences 
of the dismissal process and iii)notice and severance payments. A second component is related 
to specific regulations regarding collective dismissals. It only quantifies the cost which go 
beyond the costs that are applicable to individual dismissals. A third component captures the 
regulations dealing with temporary forms of work. This component measures the restrictions on 
using flexible forms of work. It incorporates the type of work allowed and the duration of the 
fixed term contracts. It also includes rules regarding temporary work agencies and requirements 
for agency workers to receive an equal salary and/or conditions as workers in the user firm. The 
constructed index intends to describe the costs of dismissal from an employer’s perspective. 
Higher costs are interpreted as less flexible EPL. 
 Figure 2 shows the latest version (version 3, 2008)101 of the overall EPL index for all OECD 
member states. The overall EPL scores range from 0.85 for the United States – completely on 
the right hand side of the axis – to 3.46 for Turkey, which is situated on the left hand side 
extreme. The Netherlands has a score of 2.23 and finds itself just left from the middle and has 
an almost similar score as the OECD average of 2.24. Figure 3 presents the separate component 
related to regular working contracts of the total EPL. It shows that the Netherlands has very 
stringent EPL for regular or permanent work. With a score of 2.73 the Netherlands exceeds the 
OECD average of 2.15. The country with the most stringent EPL for regular workers is Portugal, 
the least stringent is the United States. Figure 4 shows the component related to collective 
dismissals. With a score of 3, the Netherlands exceeds the OECD average of 2.85. This score of 3 
positions the Netherland directly next to the United Stated, the United Kingdom, Slovenia, 
Norway and Hungary, which all score a 2.88. Italy scores the highest, Chile the lowest. With 
respect to temporary forms of work the Netherlands is relatively flexible. Figure 5 shows that 
the Dutch score of 1.42 is well below the OECD average of 2.08. Canada is the most flexible 
country when it comes to temporary forms of work, Turkey is the most stringent. 
 
                                                        
101 Version 3 of the overall EPL index is constructed as follows: 5/12 x component regarding the protection of regular 
workers + 5/12 x component regarding the protection of flexible workers + 2/12 x collective dismissal component. It  
is available for 30 OECD member countries and 10 emerging economies for 2008. 
See www.oecd.org/employment/protection for a detailed description of the methodology. 
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Figure 2 The overall OECD EPL index, 2008, version 3. Scale from 0 (least stringent) to 6 (most stringent). 
Data extracted on June 20 2012 15:34 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat 
 
 
Figure 3 Component for regular workers, 2008, version 3. Scale from 0 (least stringent) to 6 (most stringent). 
Data extracted on June 20 2012 15:34 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat 
 
 
 
 
DUTCH EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION LEGISLATION 
39 
 
Figure 4 Component for collective dismissals, 2008, version 3. Scale from 0 (least stringent) to 6 (most stringent). 
Data extracted on June 20 2012 15:34 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat 
 
Figure 5 Component for temporary work, 2008, version 3. Scale from 0 (least stringent) to 6 (most stringent). 
Data extracted on June 20 2012 15:34 UTC (GMT) from OECD.Stat 
2.5 Discussion 
Regarding the liberalization of EPL, a general discord exists between employees and employers. 
Employers are in favor of a decrease in firing costs and promise to adopt more flexible hiring 
policies if the government decides to enact the proposed modification. Worker unions would 
rather increase the responsibilities of the employer and view the abolishment of the third-party 
check as unacceptable. Moreover, the political parties cannot reach an agreement. In December 
2007, the political impasse almost led to the fall of the cabinet.  
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A huge part of the problem is created by the fact that we do not know whether the relatively 
high firing costs of the current Dutch dismissal system lead to a decrease, or to an increase in 
productivity and employment. Empirical research on the effect of EPL on employment, 
participation and productivity has proven inconclusive. When reviewing the literature overviews 
of Addison and Teixeira (2003) and the OECD (2004) one can clearly see how many different 
conclusions are drawn. Reasons for divergence in results are differences in EPL measures across 
studies. Moreover, methodologies used are not the same.  
 In line with the general idea that EPL negatively affects the functioning the labor market, 
there exists a wide range of empirical studies that report a negative effect of EPL on 
employment (Lazear, 1990; Grubb and Wells, 1993) and labor turnover (Nickell, 1997; Gomez-
Salvador, Messina and Vallanti (2004)). Additionally, empirical evidence exists that the effect of 
EPL is different for different subgroups. Nickell (1997) finds a negative relation between overall 
labor supply and EPL, but does not find this relation for males between 25 and 45. Scarpetta 
(1996) finds a larger effect of EPL on unemployment for young workers than for the overall 
population. An analysis of the OECD (2004) indicates that EPL significantly reduces the 
employment rate of prime-age women, but not of prime-age men. In addition, some research 
suggest that the effect of EPL cannot be analyzed in isolation, as it may be influenced by the 
characteristics of other institutions existing in a country (Belot and Van Ours, 2004). Other 
studies do not find a clear effect of EPL on employment and unemployment (e.g. Addison, 
Teixeira and Grosso, 2000). 
 The above mentioned studies are all macro-studies that exploit cross-country variations to 
identify the effect of EPL on specific labor market outcomes. A main problem with most macro-
economic studies is that they rely on a limited short time series for OECD countries and fail to 
provide evidence on the robustness of their results. An additional challenge that emerges is to 
prove causality. Does a significant correlation between EPL and employment imply a direct 
effect of EPL on employment or may we not draw this conclusion? Another possibility is that 
countries modify their EPL as a result of high unemployment. Micro studies that exploit within-
country variations are a more reliable source for understanding the effect of EPL, but are rare in 
academic literature. Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) use a reference group to show that specific 
protection legislation for disabled workers in the United States negatively impacts the hiring 
probabilities of disabled workers. Autor, Donohue III and Schwab (2006) exploit cross-state 
variation in the enforcement of the employment-at-will doctrine in the United States to show 
that one wrongful-discharge doctrine reduced state employment rates by 0.8% to 1.7%. In a 
European context, Bauer, Bender and Bonin (2007) estimate the effect of German employment 
protection on worker flows. The authors exploit the fact that smaller firms were exempt from 
employment protection in certain time periods. No significant effects on worker flows were 
found. Similarly,  Boeri and Jimeno (2005) exploit the fact that firms in Italy below a certain size-
threshold are not covered by the most restrictive EPL provisions. They find that employees with 
permanent contracts in firms exposed to less restrictive EPL are more likely to be fired.  
 In a Dutch study, Pfann (2006) uses personnel files from Fokker Aircraft Manufactures to 
show that workers who are the least costly to fire face the weakest employment protection in a 
firm. In an earlier study, Pfann and Verspagen (1989) collected data from annual reports of 
Dutch manufacturing firms for the period 1978-1986 to relate costs of firing and hiring to the 
rate of workforce adjustments. Pfann and Verhagen find that when hirings exceed firings, 
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employment levels will be lagged more behind the target level of employment than when firings 
exceed hirings.  
 What we do know is that the Netherlands, when compared to the other 14 of all EU15 
countries, shows the lowest unemployment level, the highest labor market participation and the 
highest growth rate in employment. Moreover, worker productivity exceeds the European 
average. Despite the rigid labor market for permanent workers we do not perform poorly after 
all. We describe these findings in more detail in Chapter 5 of this dissertation.  
2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter we present an overview of the current Dutch EPL, which is characterized by a 
preventative check of dismissal and the existence of two institutes responsible for the 
enforcement of labor law. In practice, this implies that, when intending to dismiss a worker with 
a permanent contract, an employer has two options. One option is to ask the public 
employment service (PES) for dismissal permission, the other option is to request the universal 
civil court for a dismissal permission. Both institutes apply a different set of laws and have 
different objectives. In an historical overview we present the most important modifications in 
Dutch employment protection from 1838 until today. Milestones in history are the introduction 
of the Dutch Civil Code in 1838, the enactment of the Law on Unemployment Contracts of 1907 
and origin of the Dutch ‘dual’ system in 1945. Over time several attempts were made to abolish 
the dual system. The high costs of dismissal, the two routes of dismissal and the procedural 
inconveniences are the central themes in the most recent discussions on the Dutch EPL.  
 Seen from an international perspective, the Dutch dual EPL is unique. No other country in 
the world applies a similar system. In terms of the overall strictness of EPL, the Dutch labor 
market is an average performer. The very rigid EPL with respect to workers with a permanent 
contract is offset by the relatively liberal regulations regarding temporary forms of work.  
 Often heard in the political arena is the argument that the relatively rigid EPL for workers 
with a permanent contract does not positively affect the functioning of the labor market. A 
more liberal and cheaper system – without ‘duality’ – should increase flexibility in hiring and 
firing. We argue that the arguments used by the cabinet are based on untested premises. The 
government is not per se right as in-depth knowledge on the effect of labor market liberalization 
is lacking. We argue that too strong emphasis is placed on the modification of EPL as a medicine 
that will stimulate economic recovery. Political parties focus on short-term effects and are 
driven by sentiment. A modification of Dutch EPL should be based on a solid scientific 
foundation, not on cross-country comparisons such as the one conducted by the OECD. We 
propose an outlook for further research that uses micro-data in the line of Pfann (2006) to 
predict the effect of a proposed modification and to provide insight into the decision making 
process behind each individual dismissal case. Without such knowledge, it is impossible to 
forecast whether a modification of EPL will have desired effects.  
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3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2, we have seen that the Netherlands applies relatively strict regulations in terms of 
the protection of regular workers with a permanent contract. Measured by the OECD’s EPL 
employment protection (EPL)102 index of 2008, only Portugal, Czech Republic, Slovenia and 
Germany have more stringent dismissal regulations for workers with permanent contracts. 
Moreover, we have concluded that the Dutch dual dismissal system is unique in the world. We 
furthermore explained that unlike in most OECD countries, the Netherlands applies a 
preventative check for dismissal. This preventative check entails that Dutch employers may 
dismiss a worker by either requesting prior permission from the public employment service 
(PES)103, a public administrative body, or by requesting the civil court to dissolve the 
employment contract. According to the Dutch former Minister of Social Affairs and Employment 
Piet Hein Donner, the existence of two institutes enforcing labor law has created an 
unnecessary stringent labor market in which high firing costs and overly complex dismissal 
procedures discourage employers from hiring and firing (AV/IR/2007/23064). With the intention 
of creating a less rigid employment EPL, different governments over time have proposed to 
simplify the Dutch system by abolishing the dual system. The latest attempt is made in 2012. 
None have caused a fundamental change to the system thus far.104 
 Before introducing a new system it is important to gain a deeper understanding of the 
system as it exists today. The PES route and the civil court route are of equal importance in the 
termination of a permanent employment contract, in the sense that both institutes handle an 
approximately equal number of request per year.105 We do not know the specifics behind the 
choice between the PES route or the civil court route. What type of employer follows the civil 
court route? Who will request for a dismissal permission via the PES? What type of employees 
are involved? What are the reasons for dismissal that prevail in both routes? Academic nor 
popular literature provides us with answers to these questions. Furthermore, the Dutch dual 
system is unique. The advantages of the unique aspects of the Dutch system are not examined 
in literature nor mentioned in the political debate about the modification of the Dutch labor 
market. Another question that is left unanswered is: What are the current costs for both routes? 
Although the studies of Hassink, Reitsma and Roorda (1998) and Knegt and Tros (2007) calculate 
these costs, these studies are outdated and costs are only available for the average worker.106 
Moreover, both studies are based on self-reported measures. 
 Knowledge about the specifics behind both routes will help us to gain more insight into the 
working of the Dutch labor market. In order to gain this knowledge, dismissal case specific 
                                                        
102 In this chapter we use EPL as an acronym for employment protection legislation. 
103PES is used an acronym for public employment service. The official Dutch name for the PES is Uitvoerings Instituut 
Werknemersverzekering (UWV). In this dissertation, if we refer to the PES, we mean the UWV, and in particular the 
legal department of UWV that is responsible for handling dismissal requests. 
104 For a more detailed description of the different attempts to modify the system we refer to Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation.  
105 With the exception of the years after 2008. 
106 Hassink et al. used data gathered with the AVO-questionnaire (Arbeidsvoorwaarden Onderzoek), which contains 
information on the tenure, age and salary of a sample of Dutch workers. Using this information and estimated 
averages of procedural costs and the length of the procedure at both procedures, average dismissal costs for both 
procedures are calculated. Actual costs via the civil court and the PES are, however, not observed. The same holds 
true for the research conducted by Knegt and Tros. 
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information is crucial. After an extensive search, we however realized that this information is 
not easily accessible. The civil court keeps track of the number of dismissal cases filed each year, 
but detailed case information is lacking. The PES, on the other hand, electronically stores most, 
but not all employee - and employer specific information of a case. Hence, we collected the data 
ourselves. This chapter describes how we manually collected data from 4,071 hard copy files 
that document the specifics of a dismissal case at PES or civil court. First, Section 2 describes 
how both institutes store their data. The civil court and the PES have multiple subsidiaries in the 
Netherlands. Only the Maastricht district is selected to be included in our dataset. Section 3 
explains the logic behind this choice. Section 4 describes our sampling method. Section 5 
presents an overview of the variables collected. It furthermore describes the sample in terms of 
missing variables. Last, conclusions are drawn.  
3.2 Data storage at both institutes 
3.2.1 Data storage at the PES.  
For each dismissal request, case specific information is recorded in an Automation of Reports 
and Consolidated Orders System (ARCOS) data base. This is done  by an advisory expert, 
responsible for handling that specific request. Table 1 lists the information the database holds. 
As seen in Table 1, the national database of PES does not contain information about the salary 
of the employee and the number of working hours per week. This information is kept in hard-
copy dismissal files that are stored in a national archive located in Almere. More specifically, this 
information is found in the written defense of the employee.107 Next to the defense, each hard 
copy dismissal file contains a letter in which the employer requests for termination of an 
employment contract and a form stipulating the decision of the PES. The national archive at 
which the files are kept is an independent operator providing its services to different institutes 
in the Netherlands. At the time of our data gathering dismissal files for the years 2006 to 2009 
were kept in the archive and were accessible. Dismissal files before 2006 were inaccessible and 
the year 2010 had not finished yet.  
3.2.2 Data storage at civil court.  
Data on each individual dismissal case filed between 1997 and today is stored in a national 
database. This database allows the civil court to keep track of the number of dismissal cases 
filed each year. It does not contain any detailed information on the contents of a case. Detailed 
information is stored in a paper folder containing a written appeal, a written defense and the 
judge’s disposal. The appeal, which is written by a law firm operating under contract of the 
involved employer, contains a concise description of the reason for dismissal and some 
employee related characteristics such as job tenure, position, date of birth and wage. The 
employee’s defense, as a reaction to the appeal, contains a concise description of objections to 
the dismissal. It furthermore states the amount of severance pay demanded in case that 
dismissal is inevitable. Additionally, employee and employer related characteristics are given. 
                                                        
107 As soon as the PES has received a complete appeal notifying the PES about an employer’s intention to terminate a 
contract of employment with one or more of his employees, the employee about whom it is concerned is notified 
and given to possibility to submit a written defense. This written defense is of a standard format.  
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The judge’s verdict is recorded in the disposal. The disposal furthermore contains a description 
of the date of termination of the contract and of the severance pay that is due. Shortly after a 
case is closed the hardcopy file is moved to the archive and kept there for more than twenty five 
years.  
Table 1 Information stored in ARCOS. Only the variables relevant to our study are listed. 
Variable Remark 
Region Identification of District
File system number ARCOS assigns a unique number to each case
Follow up number In case of collective dismissal, each individual within a case receives a 
unique follow up number 
Collective dismissal This variable indicates whether dismissal is part of a collective dismissal. 
Name employee 
Date of birth employee 
Age employee 
Gender employee 
Date of first day of employment  
Name employer 
Industry employer SBI code
Size employer In categories: <10, 10-100 and >100
Duration  The duration of the procedure
Dismissal granted Yes or no or withdrawn
Reason  The reason of dismissal
Source: UWV (2009) 
Being allowed access to the data of PES and the civil court and to gather the data was not an 
easy task. First of all, because of the privacy rights of both employers and employees involved in 
these cases, allowing a researcher access to these files is more the exception than the rule. 
Another issue is that the data is only partly digitalized. As mentioned above, the civil court 
digitalizes none of its dismissal cases, the PES does this partly. As a consequence, a dataset is 
collected by scanning and reading parts of more than 4,000 dismissal files and storing the 
information retrieved electronically. With respect to the civil court data, all variables are 
collected manually. With respect to the PES data, information about (amongst others) the wage 
and working hours per week is merged to the national PES database via the unique file system 
number of a case.  
3.3 Selection of districts  
Both the PES and the civil court operate on a national level and have different subsidiaries at 
several locations in the Netherlands. The PES is subdivided into 11 different districts, distributed 
among the 6 jurisdictions North, East, North-West, Mid-West, South-West and South-East (Table 
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2).108 There are 19 civil court districts. These 19 districts are distributed among the 5 
jurisdictions Leeuwarden, Arnhem, Amsterdam, The Hague and Den Bosch. Each district has 
multiple civil courts. For instance, district Groningen has courts located in Groningen and 
Winschoten. District The Hague has courts located in Den Haag, Delft, Leiden, Gouda and Alphen 
aan de Rijn (Table 3). 
 We are interested in the drivers behind the decision of employers to follow either the civil 
court route or the PES route. We moreover want to compare the costs of both routes. The cost 
of a particular route is dependent upon several characteristics such as the reason for dismissal, 
the amount of severance pay due and the length of the period of notice. In order to avoid 
regional differences in these costs a selection of civil courts and PES locations that cover similar 
municipalities is a necessary condition. This necessary condition of complete overlap holds for 
the Netherlands in total. However, as mentioned before, the civil court does not store specific 
case information in a database. The information is kept, but recorded in hard copy dismissal files 
that are stored in regional archives. Collecting data on a nationwide scale implies visiting all 19 
civil court districts with courts located at 56 locations spread all over the Netherlands.109 In 
terms of time and costs available this is not a feasible option.  
 Employers are not free to decide to file a request at any civil court or PES district. The PES 
in the district in which the employee works is responsible for handling the request. For a civil 
court to be responsible, an employee should live or work in the district of that respective civil 
court.110 In other words, when deciding to select a civil court or a PES location an employer is 
constrained by the region in which he is located. To give an example, an employer being located 
in Maastricht and employing a worker that lives in Simpelveld, a small town close to the city of 
Maastricht, can only file a request at the civil court in Maastricht or at the PES in Maastricht. 
Figure 1 shows a map of the Netherlands and the different areas that are covered by both 
institutes. The green lines represent the borders of the 19 civil court districts, the red lines those 
of the 11 PES districts. It is seen that the PES and the civil court districts seldom have similar 
borders. Only in the north and in the south of the Netherlands both institutes cover equal areas: 
In the north, the civil court in Leeuwarden and the PES in Leeuwarden cover the exact same 
municipalities (area 1 in Figure 1). Furthermore, the civil court districts Groningen and Assen 
together have the same reach as the PES district Groningen (area 2 in Figure 1). In the south of 
the Netherlands, the PES district Maastricht and the civil court district Maastricht (area 3 in 
Figure 1) show an overlap of all borders, except for the northern border. The PES district covers 
a larger area and reaches further north. 
 In order to decide which of these districts to include in our study we limited ourselves to 
those areas in which the condition of overlap holds (area 1, area 2 and area 3 in Figure 1), As 
such, a more thorough investigation of the regions Maastricht, Groningen and Assen and 
Leeuwarden is conducted. For this purpose we conducted 5 analyses. First, we compared the 
pattern of the number of dismissal request filed over time in the whole of the Netherlands to 
that of the regions Maastricht, Groningen, Assen and Leeuwarden. Second, we checked if any of 
                                                        
108 Before, the PES was located at 15 different locations in the Netherlands, however the subsidiaries in Assen, 
Apeldoorn, Den Bosch and Amsterdam were closed in 2007 due to overcapacity.  
109 At PES, the storage of dismissal files is centralized. As mentioned earlier, all dismissal folders are stored in the 
archive in Almere. The existence of 56 civil courts in the Netherlands was the largest obstacle to collecting data of all 
different locations.  
110 Unless agreed upon otherwise by both parties.  
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the before mentioned regions are representative regions in terms of size. Third, we checked if 
these regions are representative regions in terms of other characteristics than size. Fourth, using 
the PES national database, Chi-square tests are conducted to test on which characteristics the 
PES districts Maastricht, Groningen and Leeuwarden deviate from the total of all districts. Last, 
we examined the number of missing values on several key characteristics in the PES national 
ARCOS database. 
Table 2 All PES districts in the Netherlands. 
PES: 11 districts †  
Jurisdiction North Jurisdiction Mid-West
1. Groningen  6. The Hague
2. Leeuwarden 7. Amersfoort
 
Jurisdiction East Jurisdiction South-West
3. Hengelo  8. Breda
4. Arnhem 
 
9. Rotterdam
 
Jurisdiction North-West Jurisdiction South-East
5. Haarlem 10. Eindhoven
 11. Maastricht
†There used to be 16 PES districts. These were closed due to overcapacity. Assen, Apeldoorn, Zaandam and Den 
Bosch were closed in 2007, Middelburg was closed in 2004.  
Table 3 All civil court in the Netherlands (continued on the next page). 
Civil court: 19 districts Courts in: 
Jurisdiction Leeuwarden  
1. Groningen  Groningen, Winschoten
2. Leeuwarden  Leeuwarden, Sneek, Heerenveen, Opsterland* 
3. Assen Assen, Emmen, Meppel*
Jurisdiction Arnhem  
4. Zwolle  Zwolle, Lelystad, Deventer
5. Almelo Almelo, Enschede
6. Zutphen Zutphen, Apeldoorn, Oost Gelre, Harderwijk, Oude Ijsselstreek 
7. Arnhem Arnhem, Wageningen, Tiel, Nijmegen
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Table  continued. 
Civil court: 19 districts Courts in: 
Jurisdiction Amsterdam  
8. Utrecht Utrecht, Amersfoort
9. Alkmaar Alkmaar, Hoorn, Den Helder
10. Haarlem Haarlem, Zaandam
11. Amsterdam Amsterdam, Hilversum
Jurisdiction The Hague  
12. The Hague Den Haag, Delft, Leiden, Gouda, Alphen a/d Rijn
13. Rotterdam Rotterdam, Schiedam, Brielle, Middelharnas
14.  Dordrecht Dordrecht, Oud Beijerland, Gorinchem
15. Middelburg Middelburg, Terneuzen, Tholen* ,Zierikzee*
Jurisdiction Den Bosch  
16. Breda Breda, Tilburg, Bergen op Zoom
17. Den Bosch Den Bosch, Eindhoven, Helmond, Boxmeer
18. Roermond Roermond, Venlo
19. Maastricht Maastricht, Heerlen and Sittard
*This court is closed in 2008. 
 
 
Figure 1 Borders of the civil court districts and of the PES districts. 
Source: Raad van Rechtspraak (2009), UWV (2009) 
3
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Figure 2a Number of dismissal cases per PES district, displayed per jurisdiction. 
Source: UWV (2009) 
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Figure 2b Maastricht, Groningen and Leeuwarden vs. the total of all jurisdictions. 
Source: UWV (2009) 
† With the total of all jurisdicƟon we mean the sum of requests filed at all locations in the Netherlands. See the graph 
in the lower t corner of Figure 2a above. 
3.3.1 Pattern of the number of dismissal request handled over time 
First, we examined the pattern of the number of dismissal requests handled at all 11 PES 
districts and all 19 civil court districts. PES. Comparing the pattern of the total number of 
dismissal requests handled at all PES locations in the Netherlands to the pattern of the requests 
handled at the districts Maastricht, Groningen and Leeuwarden, we find that none of these 
individual districts follow the nationwide pattern (Figure 2a and 2b). Nationwide, the total 
number of dismissal request handled increases from 2003 to 2004 and decreases from 2004 to 
2008. The year 2009 is characterized by a rise in the number of dismissal requests. The PES 
districts Maastricht and Leeuwarden show an increase in the number of requests during the 
time period 2003 to 2005, instead of during the time period 2003 to 2004. Groningen shows an 
increase after 2007, instead of after 2008. Civil court. The total number of dismissal request 
handled at all civil courts in the Netherlands is the highest in 2003 and the lowest in 2008 
(Figure 3a). The number of request handled at the civil court in Maastricht follows the same 
pattern as the sum of requests handled at all jurisdictions. In both the Maastricht area and in 
the Netherlands the number of dismissal requests decreases from 2003 to 2008 and increases 
again in 2009 (Figure 3b). Groningen shows a peak in the number of dismissal requests in 2004 
and not in 2003. Leeuwarden shows a peak in 2005 and Assen shows an increase in the number 
of dismissal request from 2004 to 2006.  
  
The peak in Maastricht is witnessed in 
2005 instead of in 2004 as with the total 
of all jurisdictions†. 
The peak in Leeuwarden is witnessed in 
2005 instead of in 2004 as with the total 
of all jurisdictions†. 
The lowest number of dismissal request in 
Groningen is witnessed in 2007 instead of 
in 2008 as with the total of all 
jurisdictions†.
righ
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Figure 3a Number of dismissal cases per civil court district. 
Source: Raad van Rechtspraak (2011) 
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3.3.2 Number of cases handled per location 
Second, an examination of the distribution of cases over all PES and civil court locations is 
conducted. PES. Table 3 presents the number of dismissal requests handled at all PES districts in 
ascending order per year. Per year, the mean and median are shown. The differences between 
the mean and the median are very small and the distribution of cases over the different PES 
districts is almost symmetrical. The results of Shapiro Wilk’s tests conducted for all years show 
p-values between .181 and .913, indicating normally distributed data for all years. In the years 
2005 and 2006, Maastricht represents the median and is close to the mean. In most other years, 
the number of cases processed in Maastricht is close to the average number of dismissal 
requests processed. In the year 2008, however, Maastricht is found at the low end of the 
distribution. Groningen and Leeuwarden are mostly located at the low-end of the distribution. 
Civil court. Table 4 presents the number of dismissal requests handled at all civil court districts 
in ascending order per year. Additionally, Table 4 shows the mean and the median per year. The 
distribution of dismissal request is skewed upwards; for most years the mean is larger than the 
median. The further we move to the year 2009, the smaller the difference between the median 
and the mean and thus the more symmetrical the distribution of dismissal request over the 
different locations becomes. Shapiro Wilk’s tests show p-values of less than .05 for all years 
between 2003 and 2006 and p-values of less than .10 for the years 2006 and 2008. A Shapiro 
Wilk’s test conducted for the year 2007 shows a p-value of .110, a value for which we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of normality. We are interested in determining to what extent the 
districts Leeuwarden, Groningen, Assen and Maastricht are representative for the total 
population. The mean is driven up by the larger districts Amsterdam, Utrecht and The Hague 
and is therefore not a representative figure. For this reason, we focus on the median. In the year 
2005, the civil court district Maastricht represents the median. In other words, in 2005 eight 
districts processed more dismissal requests than Maastricht and eight districts processed less 
dismissal requests than Maastricht. In all other years, Maastricht is always located directly next 
 
 
Figure 3b Maastricht, Groningen, Leeuwarden and Assen vs. the total of all jurisdictions. 
Source: Raad van Rechtspraak (2011) 
† With the total of all jurisdicƟon we mean the sum of requests filed at all locaƟons in the Netherlands. See the graph 
in the lower t corner of Figure 3a above. 
A peak in Groningen is witnessed in 2005, 
the total of all jurisdictions† does not show 
this peak in 2005. 
In Leeuwarden, the number of dismissal 
requests increases between 2004 and 2005, 
for the sum of all jurisdicƟons† a decrease 
between 2004 and 2005 is shown. 
In Assen, the number of dismissal requests 
increases between 2004 and 2006, for the 
sum of all jurisdicƟons† a decrease between 
righ
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to the median. Leeuwarden, on the other hand, is always located at the low end of the 
distribution. The same holds for Groningen and Assen. 
3.3.3 Ranking on key characteristics 
As a third analysis to decide which regions to include in our study, we used the national PES 
ARCOS database to rank the 11 PES locations on different key characteristics. These rankings 
include all dismissal requests that were handled by all PES subsidiaries in the year 2008 and are 
used to determine to what extent the districts Maastricht, Groningen, Assen en Leeuwarden are 
representative for the total population of dismissal requests handled. Because a national civil 
court dataset does not exist, Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) data containing several socio-
economic indicators is used to achieve a similar ranking of the 19 civil court districts.  
 PES. Appendix A shows rankings of the different PES locations on different key 
characteristics. In each table, percentages of the district total are given and ranked from lowest 
to highest. Table A1 presents the rankings of the 11 PES subsidiaries based on different dismissal 
reasons. The upper-left sub table shows the percentage of dismissal requests due to economic 
reasons as a percentage of all dismissal requests. The country average is 66.08 percent (17,730 
out of 26,833). Maastricht is below this average; 61.52 percent of all dismissal cases has an 
economical background (873 out of 1,419). Groningen (68.14 percent) and Leeuwarden (71.00 
percent) are both above the country average. Of all districts, Maastricht shows the lowest 
percentage of dismissal requests due to reproachable behavior (2.75 percent). Yet, Maastricht 
has the highest percentage of requests filed because of illness of the employee (30.80 percent). 
Regarding this latter category, Leeuwarden and Groningen are close to the country average of 
22.98 percent. Table A2 shows that, compared to the country average of 17.31 percent, only 
few cases in Groningen are collective cases (5.08 percent). Also Leeuwarden (7.36 percent) and 
Maastricht (7.40 percent) score below the country average. Next, Table A3 ranks the different 
subsidiaries according to the percentage of employees in a certain age category. It shows that 
the Maastricht district has the lowest percentage of employees in the age category 15 to 24. 
Only 46 out of 1,419 cases involve employees below 24 (3.24 percent). Leeuwarden comes 
second with 3.25 percent (23 out of 707). The largest share of employees in the age category 15 
to 24 is found in Groningen (7.40 percent). As concerns the share of employers from different 
industries, Table A4 exhibits a Maastricht area that is never found on the extreme of a ranking. 
Additionally, it shows that Groningen and Leeuwarden receive the lowest percentage of 
requests of employers in the transport, storage and communication industry and the health and 
wellness industry, respectively. The share of employers in the construction industry is the 
highest in Leeuwarden. Last, Table A5 exhibits rankings based on the outcome of the process. In 
Maastricht, the percentage of dismissal requests granted is 73.78 percent (1,047 out of 1,419) 
whereas the country average is 68.22 percent (18,305 out of 26,833). In Groningen, 62.55 
percent of all permissions is granted (862 out of 1,378). In Leeuwarden, permission is granted in 
65.49 percent (463 out of 707) of all cases 
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Civil court. Appendix B presents rankings of the different civil court districts on different socio-
economic indicators. Table B1 exhibits the total number of inhabitants of all 19 civil courts 
districts. With 610,868 and 573,459 inhabitants, respectively, the Maastricht and Groningen 
district are smaller than the averaged sized district. Yet, with 488,135 inhabitants, the Assen 
district is much smaller. With 643,189 inhabitants, Leeuwarden represents the median of the 
distribution. Next, Table B2, most left sub table, shows a ranking on the basis of the number of 
inhabitants in the non-productive phase of their life as fraction of the number of inhabitants in 
the productive phase of their life.111 This ratio is further referred to as total pressure. The total 
pressure in the Netherlands is 63.24 percent. With 62.90 percent, the Maastricht district is close 
to the nationwide average. With ratios of 69.22 and 67.81, respectively, the Assen and the 
Leeuwarden district are located at the high end of the ranking. Groningen has a relatively low 
total pressure (60.33 percent). Total pressure can be divided into green pressure and gray 
pressure. Green pressure refers to the ratio of the number of inhabitants in the age category 0 
to 20 to the number of inhabitants in the age category 20 to 65. Gray pressure measures the 
ratio of the number of inhabitants that are older than 65 to the number of inhabitants in the age 
category 20 to 65. As concerns green pressure, Maastricht and Groningen score relatively low. 
Leeuwarden and Assen score much higher. Gray pressure is high Maastricht, Assen and 
Leeuwarden, whereas Groningen comes close to the country average. Table B3 exhibits the 
share of allochthonous population members. It shows that 17.10 percent of Maastricht’s total 
population is allochthonous with Western origins (104,458 out of 610,868). In Leeuwarden, 
Assen and Groningen this percentage is much lower. Actually, these three cities are located at 
the opposite of the ranking, below the country average of 8.83 percent (1,448,552 out of 
16,405,399). As regards minority groups in general, the ratio of the allochtonous population to 
the total population is the lowest in Leeuwarden and Assen (8.19 and 8.65 percent, 
respectively). Groningen comes fourth (12.34 percent).  With 21.70 percent allochthonous 
inhabitants, Maastricht is found above the country average of 19.60 percent and is located at 
the high end of the ranking. Only the big cities The Hague, Rotterdam and Amsterdam score 
higher. Next, Table B4 presents the percentage of companies in a certain industry as a 
percentage of the total population of companies. Of all districts, Leeuwarden has the lowest and 
second lowest percentage of companies in the commercial services industry and the non-
commercial services industry. It scores high in terms of companies in the agricultural industry. 
The Maastricht data show the highest percentage of employers working in non-commercial 
services. Groningen and Assen do not appear on the high-end or the low-end extreme. Last, in 
table B5 we examined the number of households living below the social minimum. In the 
Netherlands, 8.51 percent of all households is living below the social minimum (616,203 out of 
7,242,202 households) In the Maastricht, Groningen and Leeuwarden area this percentage is 
higher. In the Maastricht area 10 percent of all households is living below the social minimum 
(28,325 out of 283,254). In the Groningen area this percentage equals 10.42 (28,417 out of 
272,445), in the Leeuwarden area it is 9.52 percent (26,385 out of 277,053). With 7.57 percent 
of all households (16,429 of 206,146) living below the social minimum the Assen district is close 
to the country average. 
                                                        
111 Inhabitants between 0 and 20 years of age and of 65 years of age and older are characterized to be in the non-
productive phase of their lives, those between 20 and 65 years of age belong to the latter category. 
57 
CHAPTER 3 
58 
3.3.4 Deviation from the nationwide total using Chi-square tests 
Fourth, using data retrieved from the PES national database112, Chi-square tests are conducted 
to test on which characteristics the PES districts Maastricht, Groningen and Leeuwarden deviate 
from the total of all districts.113 Table 5 shows the results of these tests. P-values for Pearson χ2 
statistics are reported. The PES district Maastricht is not significantly different from the country 
total in terms of the percentage of employers that operate in the industry sector (p=.837) and in 
terms of the percentage of employers that work in the commercial services sector (p=.557). 
Furthermore, the Maastricht area is not significantly different from the nationwide total as 
regards the share of persons in the age category 25 to 44 and the share of persons in the age 
category 65 to 75. For Groningen and Leeuwarden, the null hypothesis of no difference between 
the district total and the country total cannot be rejected for the percentage of employees that 
work in commercial services. For Leeuwarden this also holds true for the percentage of 
employees between 45 and 75 years of age and for the number of dismissal requests being 
granted.  
 Chi-square test for the civil court districts cannot be conducted because of the lack of a 
national dataset including several observations per district. The Central Bureau of Statistics data 
used to rank the 19 different civil court districts is aggregated on district level and can therefore 
not be used in this section. 
3.3.5 Analysis of missing values 
As a fifth analysis an examination of the number of missing values on several key characteristics 
in the PES national database is conducted. We present figures of the year 2008. Because the 
data that is manually collected from hardcopy dismissal files had to be matched to the data of 
the PES national ARCOS database, the selection of a district that shows few missing values on 
key variables in ARCOS is preferable. Table 6 shows that the percentage of missing values is very 
low for all variables except for company size. For 41.81 percent of 26,833 dismissal cases 
information about company size is lacking. Table 7 shows that this 41.81 percent is not evenly 
distributed among districts. The Maastricht data is almost complete; for only 0.35 percent of all 
1,419 dismissal cases information about company size is absent. For the Groningen district, in 
48.33 percent of all 1,378 observation information on company size is absent. For Leeuwarden, 
this holds for 28.71 percent of all observations. 
                                                        
112 The same data as before is used. (n=26,833, year 2008) One observation represents one individual dismissal case. 
113 As such the proportions of district X are compared to the proportions of the sum of all districts – district X. (e.g. 
Maastricht versus the sum of all districts excluding Maastricht) Furthermore, chi-square statistics are only shown for 
the largest categories.  
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Table 5 Chi-square tests114. 
Dismissal Economical Individual Collective Prolonged illness 
 % p  % p  % p  % p  
Amersfoort 57.21 .000 – 51.40 .010 + 5.80 .000 – 29.43 .000 + 
Arnhem 73.39 .000 + 41.64 .000 – 31.75 .000 + 18.03 .000 – 
Breda 66.30 .832  46.55 .050 – 19.75 .004 + 24.18 .204 + 
Eindhoven 71.52 .000 + 47.79 .147 23.72 .000 + 20.10 .000 – 
Groningen 68.14 .096 + 63.06 .000 + 5.08 .000 – 22.57 .715  
Haarlem 60.97 .000 – 50.64 .007 + 10.32 .000 – 23.90 .113 + 
Hengelo 71.65 .000 + 54.56 .000 + 17.09 .800 19.35 .000 – 
Leeuwarden 71.00 .005 + 63.65 .000 + 7.36 .000 – 20.37 .095 – 
Maastricht 61.52 .000 – 54.12 .000 + 7.40 .000 – 30.80 .000 + 
Rotterdam 63.53 .005 – 47.82 .331 15.71 .029 – 23.03 .946  
The Hague 61.09 .000 – 39.63 .000 – 21.46 .000 + 25.99 .000 + 
Industry Industry  Wholesale  Commercial serv. Health and wellness 
Amersfoort 11.24 .000 – 25.66 .049 + 29.16 .000 + 12.57 .228  
Arnhem 27.13 .000 + 18.11 .000 – 15.05 .001 – 18.77 .000 + 
Breda 24.62 .000 + 30.03 .000 + 13.57 .000 – 9.74 .000 – 
Eindhoven 32.02 .000 + 21.58 .000 – 13.03 .000 - 11.50 .000 – 
Groningen 7.33 .000 – 29.39 .000 + 16.47 .658 9.07 .000 – 
Haarlem 7.06 .000 – 27.76 .000 + 23.28 .000 + 11.33 .000 – 
Hengelo 28.35 .000 + 24.98 .302 15.62 .150 11.57 .024 – 
Leeuwarden 7.64 .000  28.43 .004 + 15.28 .241 8.49 .000 – 
Maastricht 16.98 .837  27.41 .002 + 17.48 .557 15.15 .049 + 
Rotterdam 5.67 .000 – 19.41 .000 – 11.02 .000 – 15.95 .000 + 
The Hague 1.72 .000  21.72 .005 – 14.57 .001 – 17.45 .000 + 
Age categories 15-24 25-44 45-64 65-75 
Amersfoort 4.88 .210  43.62 .289 50.07 .135 1.01 .267 + 
Arnhem 3.63 .021 – 41.99 .472 53.52 .012 + 0.44 .007  
Breda 4.92 .219  37.04 .000 – 56.29 .000 + 0.93 .549  
Eindhoven 3.80 .041 – 41.92 .347 52.89 .056 + 0.55 .029 – 
Groningen 7.40 .000 + 44.70 .096 + 46.66 .000 – 0.36 .058 – 
Haarlem 4.94 .039 + 46.05 .000 + 47.20 .000 – 1.06 .046 + 
Hengelo 5.27 .063 + 42.99 .706 49.72 .117 0.86 .821  
Leeuwarden 3.25 .145  42.01 .772 52.48 .639 0.42 .247  
Maastricht 3.24 .035 – 40.66 .141 54.40 .030 + 1.13 .168  
Rotterdam 3.66 .077 – 39.80 .004 – 55.10 .000 + 1.07 .133  
The Hague 3.93 .258  43.78 .171 50.79 .373 1.01 .218  
 
                                                        
114 Chi-square tests for dismissal reason are only conducted for the largest categories.  
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Table 5 continued. 
Granted Yes  
 % p  
Amersfoort 61.31 .000 – 
Arnhem 71.39 .000 + 
Breda 62.86 .000 – 
Eindhoven 71.85 .000 + 
Groningen 62.55 .000 – 
Haarlem 74.45 .000 + 
Hengelo 63.56 .000 – 
Leeuwarden 65.49 .114  
Maastricht 73.78 .000 + 
Rotterdam 62.87 .000 – 
The Hague 65.17 .000 – 
Source: UWV (2009) 
3.3.6 Selecting the Maastricht region 
In selecting districts for data collection, the absence of overlap of borders of PES and civil court 
districts in a specific region was a constraining factor. As a consequence, only the districts 
Groningen, Assen, Leeuwarden and Maastricht were considered as possible options. The 
analyses presented above show that it is difficult to state which of these districts is 
representative for the Netherlands in total. The rankings in appendices A and B do not provide 
clear cut answers, as districts appear on different positions on the rankings. A position on a 
ranking is very much dependent on which criterion is used to construct this ranking. The Chi-
square tests presented in Table 5 also do not give an indication of which districts to select. The 
rankings based on the size of the districts in Table 3 and Table 4, however, do present a 
Maastricht districts that is better in terms of representatives than the northern districts.  Last, 
the analysis of missing values shows that Maastricht has the lowest number of missing values 
for the variable company size. Combining the analyses that are conducted in this section of this 
chapter, made us determine to collect data in the Maastricht region only. The rankings in Table 
3 and Table 4, in which we show that Maastricht is closest to the average district in terms of 
size, and the analysis of missing values in Table 7, which shows that the ARCOS data on the 
Maastricht area is the most complete of all districts, led to this decision. Another option would 
have been to collect data on a nationwide scale. However, as we mentioned earlier, collecting 
data on a nationwide scale implies visiting all 19 civil court districts with courts located at 56 
locations spread all over the Netherlands. In terms of time and costs, this was not a feasible 
option. 
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Table 6 Missing values, total PES, year 2008, n=26.833 (continued on the next page). 
Subsidiary n % of total Dismissal reason n % of total 
Amersfoort 2,171 8.09 Economical 17,730 66.08 
Arnhem 3,660 13.64 Dysfunctional 645 2.40 
Breda 1,828 6.81 Disturbed relationship 354 1.32 
Eindhoven 4,582 17.08 Reproachable behavior 1,344 5.01 
Groningen 1,378 5.29 Frequent illness 46 0.17 
Haarlem 4,351 16.22 Prolonged illness 6,166 22.98 
Hengelo 1,633 6.09 ReintegraƟon measures† 237 0.88 
Leeuwarden 707 2.63 Missing values 311 1.16 
Maastricht 1,419 5.29 Total 26,833 100 
Rotterdam 2,432 9.06  
The Hague 2,670 9.95  
Missing values 0 0  
Total 2,.833 100  
Age category  n % of total Industry n % of total 
Category 15-24 1,169 4.36 Industry 4,504 16.79 
Category 25-44 11,415 42.54 Wholesale†† 6,421 23.93 
Category 44-65 13,847 Transport††† 1,367 5.09 
Category >65 217 0.81 Hotel and catering 806 3.00 
Missing values 185 0.69 Commercial services 4,537 16.91 
Total 26,833 100 Health and wellness 3,601 13.42 
  Culture and recreation 2,433 9.07 
  Construction 1,340 4.99 
  Other 1,585 5.91 
  Missing values 239 0.89 
  Total 26,833 100 
Collective case n % of total Permission  n % of total 
Yes 4,646 17.31 Granted 18,305 68.22 
No 22,187 82.69 Not granted 1600 5.96 
Missing values 0 0 Case not treated 1,666 6.21 
Total 26,833 100 Case withdrawn 5,262 19.21 
  Missing values 9 0.03 
  Total 26,833 100 
Size (# of empl.) n % of total Tenure in years n % of total 
<10 4,291 15.99 0 to 10 years 18,657 69.53 
10-100 7,185 26.78 11 to 20 years 4,268 15.91 
>100 4,139 15.43 21 to 30 years 1,817 6.77 
Missing values 11,218 41.81 more than 30 years 901 3.36 
Total 26,833 100 Missing values 1,190 4.43 
  Total 26,833 100 
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Table 6 Continued. 
Gender n % of total    
Male 13,812 51.47  
Female 12,730 47.44  
Missing values 291 1.08  
Total 26,833 100  
Source: UWV national ARCOS data base  (2008) 
 † Not cooperaƟng with reintegraƟon measures. 
†† Wholesale, trade, resale trade and repairs. 
†††Transport, storage and communicaƟon. 
Table 7 Missing values for company size per PES location, year 2008. 
 <10 10-100 >100 missing n % missing of n 
Amersfoort 567 762 374 468 2,171 21.56 
Arnhem 618 1,469 398 1,175 3,660 32.10 
Breda 97 31 44 1,656 1,828 90.59 
Eindhoven 1,001 1,608 1,523 451 4,583 9.84 
Groningen 329 249 134 666 1,378 48.33 
Haarlem 534 483 418 2,917 4,352 67.03 
Hengelo 430 613 512 78 1,633 4.78 
Leeuwarden 185 230 89 203 707 28.71 
Maastricht 346 845 223 5 1,419 0.35 
Rotterdam 57 40 224 2,111 2,432 86.80 
The Hague 127 855 200 1,488 2,670 55.73 
Total 4,291 7,185 4,139 11,218 26,833 41.81 
Source: PES national ARCOS data base (2008) 
3.4 Sample selection 
PES data is collected for the years 2006 to 2009, civil court data is collected for the years 2003 to 
2009.115 In order to select the dismissal files to use for the construction of our final dataset we 
randomly selected 20 percent of the population total.  
PES. In the years 2006 to 2008, the PES handled 10,361 dismissal requests. All files documenting 
these 10,361 dismissal requests are stored in 1,671 folders. 20 percent of these 1,671 folders 
was selected for review, which equals a total of 334 folders.116 Of the 334 folders selected, 19 
folders were not available or unreadable. The remaining 315 folders included 1,818 dismissal 
files. This selection of 1,818 dismissal files equals 18% of the total of all dismissal files (1,818 out 
of 10,361). For reasons mentioned earlier, the borders of the civil court district and of the PES  
  
                                                        
115 We would have preferred to also collect PES data for the years 2003 to 2005, however, the PES national archive 
did not store dismissal files dating before 2006. 
116 When selecting one file, the complete folder containing that file had to be ordered.  
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Table 8 Coverage of the civil court and the PES district Maastricht. 
Civil Court Maastricht PES Maastricht Overlap 
Subdivision Maastricht  
Eijsden, Gulpen-Wittem, Maastricht, 
Margraten, Meerssen, Vaals, 
Valkenburg aan de Geul 
Eijsden, Gulpen-Wittem, Maastricht, 
Margraten, Meerssen, Vaals, 
Valkenburg aan de Geul 
Complete overlap
  
Subdivision Heerlen  
Brunssum, Heerlen, Kerkrade, 
Landgraaf, Nuth, Simpelveld, 
Voerendaal 
Brunssum, Heerlen, Kerkrade, 
Landgraaf, Nuth, Simpelveld, 
Voerendaal 
Complete overlap
  
Subdivision Sittard  
Beek, Onderbanken, Schinnen, Sittard-
Geleen, Stein. 
Beek, Onderbanken, Schinnen, Sittard-
Geleen, Stein. 
Complete overlap
  
 Echt-Susteren, Leudal, Maasgouw, 
Roerdalen, Roermond. 
Not covered by the  working district of 
the civil court Maastricht 
 
need to overlap. Figure 1 of this chapter shows that this is not the case for the Northern borders 
of the Maastricht area. To ensure complete overlap, the case files involving employees that do 
not live or work in municipalities that are covered by the civil court in Maastricht were excluded 
from our sample. Table 8 shows and overview of the reach of both institutes and of the 
municipalities that are excluded.  
 In 211 out of 1,818 dismissal files examined, the written defense of the employer was not 
enclosed. As the written defense contains the majority of information needed, these files were 
also excluded from our sample. After a period of three and a half months, and after reading all 
1,818 dismissal files, information on 1,268 PES dismissal cases is included in the final data set 
(Table 9).  
 
Table 9 Number of dismissal files included and excluded. 
Dismissal files  
Number of dismissal files included in sample: 1,268 
Number of dismissal files from sample because of lack of overlap: 339 
Number of dismissal files excluded from sample because of lack of usable information: 211 
Total number of dismissal files that were accessible for data collection: 1,818 
 
Civil court. As mentioned before, the civil court district Maastricht has courts located in 
Maastricht, Heerlen and Sittard. For the years 2003 to 2009, the total number of dismissal 
requests brought to court in the Maastricht district is 14,207. The Heerlen civil court is the 
largest court with a total of 5,260 received requests, followed by Maastricht with a total of 
4,699 received requests. With 4,248 requests received, Sittard is the smallest court. A random 
selection of 20% of the population total, evenly distributed across the three courts, resulted in 
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2,842 selected files. Of these 2,842 dismissal files, 38 files were not accessible. The remaining 
2,803 files represent 19,73 percent of the population total. 
3.5 Representativeness of sample 
To test the representativeness of the PES data, we compare our sample to the total population 
in terms of 5 variables that are present in the PES national ARCOS data base: 1) the outcome of 
the process, 2) reason for dismissal, 3) industry, 4) size and 5) gender. More specifically, we 
conduct chi-square tests to analyze if the proportions found in the population total deviate from 
proportions found in our selection of 1,818 dismissal files.117,118 The total population of dismissal 
files handled by PES equals 10.361 for the period 2006 - 2009  (3,441 + 1,872 + 1,419 + 3,640, 
see Table 3). Table 10 displays the Chi-square test results. 
 With regards to the outcome of the trial, Table 10 shows that 4.01 percent of all requests in 
our original selection is not granted. This percentage is very close to the percentage non-
granted requests in the total population (3.74 percent). A chi-square value of .298 (p=.585) 
indicates that this difference between the original selection and the total population of 
dismissal requests is not significant. The difference between the number dismissal requests 
granted in the total population and the original selection is insignificant at a 1 percent level, but 
significant at a 5 percent level (χ2=4.586; p=.032). Other non-significant differences are found 
for the percentage of requests filed due to economic reasons (χ2=2.542; p=.111) and for the 
percentage of requests filed because of prolonged illness (χ2=0.829; p=.362). Moreover, the 
distribution of employers over the different industry sectors is similar across groups, except for 
the wholesale, trade and repairs industry (χ2=14.063; p=.000). Additionally, the distribution of 
small, medium and large sized employees is equal for both groups. Chi-square values range from 
3.126 (p=.077) to 0.0786 (p=0.106). Last, the proportion of men in our original selection is equal 
to the proportion of men in the total population (χ2=,006; p=,0,939). From the results of the chi-
square tests, we may conclude that we drew a sample that is representative for the whole 
population. Proportions from our original selection hardly deviate from the total population 
proportions. 
  
                                                        
117 We use the original selection of 1,818 cases because these 1.818 cases cover the same area as the total 
population. The sample of 1,268 cases does not because of the exclusion of cases in the non-overlapping 
municipalities (see Table 8). As mentioned earlier in this chapter, of these 1,818 dismissal files, 399 files were 
excluded from our dataset because of a lack of overlap and 211 files were excluded because of a lack of information. 
118 We also compared the total population to our sample of 1,268. Results are similar to the results in Table 10. 
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Table 10 Chi square tests to check for representativeness of sample. 
  
Population Total 
n=10,372 
Original selection
n=1,818 
χ2 p 
Outcome of the process in %      
Permission not granted 3.74 4.01 .298 .585 
Permission granted 73.82 76.21 4.586 0.032 
Other   22.44 19.78 6.312 0.012 
Reason for dismissal  
Economical  72.19 70.36 2.542 0.111 
Prolonged illness 21.85 20.89 0.829 0.362 
Other  5.96 8.75 19.997 0.000 
Industry of employer in %     
Industry     23.28 21.39 3.076 0.079 
Wholesale, trade, resale trade and 
repairs 21.12 25.07 14.063 
 
0.000 
Commercial services 17.30 16.21 1.266 0.261 
Health and wellness 13.42 12.14 2.153 0.142 
Other  24.89 25.18 0.069 0.739 
Size employer in %   
less than 10  18.76 19.66 0.0786 0.375 
between 10 and 100 58.74 59.75 0.622 0.430 
more than 100  22.50 20.59 3.126 0.077 
Gender in %    
Men  54.47 54.57 0.006 0.939 
3.6 Variables collected and missing data  
This section gives an overview of the variables collected and missing data per variable. It does 
not give a detailed overview of descriptive statistics. These are given in more detail in the 
following chapters of this dissertation. We furthermore show how we narrow down our dataset 
to adapt it to the scope of this dissertation. 
 Table 11 shows the variables that are present in the PES data, together with the number of 
missing values. The main employee specific variables collected are the wage of the employee, 
age, tenure and working hours per week. The main employer specific variables are industry 
employed, size and legal form. Variables related to the dismissal itself are reason for dismissal, 
duration of the process and the decision of the PES. The largest numbers of missing values are 
reported for the variables Hourly wage and Monthly wage. 
 Table 12 shows the variables that are present in the civil court data. The number of missing 
values are moreover reported. The main employee specific variables collected are the wage of 
the employee, age, tenure and working hours per week. The main employer specific variables 
are industry employed, size and legal form. Variables related to the dismissal itself are reason 
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for dismissal, pro-forma, duration of the process and the decision of the civil court.  The largest 
numbers of missing values are reported for the variables Hourly wage and Size of employer.  
 Instead of deleting observations that include missing values, we estimated the missing data 
using the non-missing information in the dataset. As a result of this estimation our final and 
complete dataset contains 1,162 PES observations and 2,390 civil court observations. Appendix 
C and Appendix D show the exact details of the estimation method used. 
 The scope of this dissertation is workers with a permanent contract. We are furthermore 
not interested in civil court cases in which the plaintiff is the employee. Table 13 shows the PES 
data and the civil court data and the distribution within this data with respect to contract form, 
plaintiff and year. With respect to the PES data, 28 requests of all 1,162 requests involve 
employees with a fixed term contract. These 28 requests are excluded in further analyses of this 
dissertation, 1,134 dismissal cases involving employees with a permanent contract remain. With 
respect to the civil court data, 106 requests of all 2.390 requests involve employees with a fixed 
term contract. These are excluded in further analyses. The remaining 2,284 dismissal cases 
involve employees with a permanent contract. 27 of the 2,284 dismissal requests were filed by 
the employee, not the employer. In connection with the scope of this dissertation these 27 
cases are excluded from further analyses. 2,257 civil court cases remain; of which 1,315 cases 
were closed in the period 2003-2005 and 942 cases were closed in the period 2006-2009. 
3.7 Conclusion 
We have collected a representative sample of 3,391 dismissal cases of which 1,134 are filed at 
the PES in the period 2006-2009 and 2,257 are filed at the civil court in the period 2003-2009. 
Each dismissal case filed at the PES is recorded in an Automation of Reports and Consolidated 
Orders System (ARCOS) data base. The information included in the data base keeps track of a 
small number of employer and employee related characteristics, the reason for dismissal, and 
the duration of the dismissal procedure. Additional information about each case is kept in hard-
copy folders that are stored in a national archive located in the city of Almere. With respect to 
the civil court, an electronic database allows the civil court to keep track of the number of 
dismissal cases filed each year. It does not, however, contain any detailed information on the 
contents of a case. Detailed information is stored in a hard-copy folder. 
 In order to collect our sample, we collected information out of these hard copy folders of 
civil court cases and PES dismissal files and stored this data electronically. Collection of data for 
the Netherlands in total, however, implies visiting all 19 civil court districts with courts located 
at 56 locations spread all over the country. In terms of costs and logistics, this was not a feasible 
option. As a consequence, a thorough analysis of multiple data sources made us draw the 
conclusion to only include cases filed at the Maastricht area. A first factor that led to this 
decision is the fact that the borders of the PES and the civil court in this area are to a large 
extent similar. A second factor is that in terms of size, the Maastricht districts are closest to the 
nationwide average. Third, in terms of missing values, the ARCOS data base covering the data of 
the PES district of Maastricht is the most complete. 
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DATA COLLECTION 
Table 13 Dismissal though PES or civil court: temporary contracts, plaintiff and year. 
PES (2006-2009) n %   
Temporary contracts 28 2.41
Permanent contracts 1,134 97.59
Total 1,162 100
Civil court (2003-2009) n %   
Temporary contracts 106 4.44
Permanent contracts 2,284 95.56
Total 2,390 100
Civil court (2003-2009) n %   
Plaintiff is employee 27 1.18
Plaintiff is employer 2,257 98.82
Total 2,284 100
Civil court (2003-2009) n %   
2003-2005 1315 58.26
2006-2009 942 41.74
Total 2,257 100
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4.1 Introduction 
Under Dutch law, dismissal protection is regulated by an a priori control of dismissal. In this 
system, a Dutch employer can either request the civil court for a rescission of the employment 
contract or he may ask the public employment service (PES)119 for a dismissal permission. 
Termination by dismissal induces certain costs, which are different for both procedures. On 
average, the civil court is the faster and more expensive procedure. Termination of the contract 
is possible at short notice as legal notice periods may be ignored by the judge. The severance 
pay that is often awarded results in an increase in firing costs especially when long-tenured 
workers are dismissed. The likelihood that dismissal permission is given is high. The PES 
procedure is a less costly procedure, mainly because severance pay is not awarded. However, 
the procedure itself may take longer and the employer is bound to observe a notice period. 
Furthermore, the likelihood that dismissal is granted is smaller. 
 Following the European political debate about “labor market flexibility” in which the 
general perception holds that strict employment protection legislation (EPL)120 contributed to 
the inability of European labor markets to adapt to new conditions, Dutch EPL has received a 
considerable amount of criticism. According to the OECD-index, the Netherlands offers one of 
the most stringent provisions for permanent contracts (OECD, 2004). The overall intent of this 
index is to reflect the cost implications of various labor laws for employers. In other words, 
Dutch EPL regarding permanent contracts is characterized as costly. However, little information 
on the actual costs of a dismissal process exists. Previously, Hassink et al. (1998) estimated firing 
costs of both procedures. The authors used data gathered with the AVO-questionnaire 
(Arbeidsvoorwaarden Onderzoek), which contains information on the tenure, age and salary of 
a sample of Dutch workers. Using this information and estimated averages of procedural costs 
and the length of the procedure at both procedures, average dismissal costs for both 
procedures are calculated. Actual costs via the civil court and the PES are, however, not 
observed. The same holds true for the research conducted by Knegt and Tros (2007), 
commissioned by the Dutch government. Both analyses find that the civil court procedure is the 
most expensive procedure.  
 The purpose of this chapter is to calculate the actual dismissal costs of a dismissal 
procedure via the PES and via the civil court and to find out how they are different. To 
accomplish this, a selection of our unique dataset containing information of 878 and 994 
individual dismissal cases brought to civil court and the PES,  respectively, will be used. The main 
research question of this paper is the following: What are the costs of a dismissal procedure via 
the PES and of a dismissal procedure via the civil court and how do these costs differ? 
 After we shortly introduce the Dutch legislative system with respect to the termination of 
employment in Section 2, an overview of important literature on EPL is given in Section 3. 
Section 4 continues with a theoretical overview of costs and explains how cost components of 
both routes are different. In Section 5, we use a unique data set and highlight some specific 
examples from this data set. We show that costs of individual dismissal cases involving 
                                                        
119 In this chapter PES is used as an acronym for public employment service. The official Dutch name for the PES is 
Uitvoerings Instituut Werknemersverzekering (UWV). In this dissertation, if we refer to the PES, we mean the UWV, 
and in particular the legal department of UWV that is responsible for handling dismissal requests. 
120EPL is used as an acronym for employment protection legislation 
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employees that earn median wages may differ to a large extent. Differences in costs are found 
due to differences in the duration of the dismissal procedures, differences in notice periods and 
differences in severance payments. We also show that costs of the civil court procedure do not 
always outwit the cost of the PES procedure. In terms of average dismissal costs for both routes, 
we show that the civil court average is approximately 4 times the PES average. Median costs are 
twice as large. Furthermore, the standard deviation of the firing costs through the civil court is 
10 times larger than for the PES. We also show that the differences in costs for both routes 
differ per reason of dismissal and for different employee and employer related characteristics. 
We must note that the decision of an employer to choose the one or the other route is a 
strategic decision, the particular route with the lowest expected cost is chosen. For some 
employers the civil court is the least expensive route. For other employers this holds true for the 
PES route of dismissal. As such, it is a different selection of employers and cases that turns to 
court or to the PES. Last, Section 6 concludes. 
4.2 Legislation 
Employees in the Netherlands are protected against dismissal via an a priori control of dismissal. 
An employer may either request the PES for a permission of dismissal (sec. 6 Extraordinary 
Labor Relations Decree) or he may ask the civil court for a dissolution of the employment 
contract (sec. 7:685 Civil Code (CC)).121 This section gives a short description of these two 
possibilities to terminate a permanent employment contract in the Netherlands. 
PES. In order to terminate an employment contract, the employer needs prior approval of the 
PES. This is recorded in the Extraordinary Labor Relations Decree (ELRD), sec. 6. The PES 
operates under close supervision of the government. The minister of Social Affairs and 
Employment is authorized to grant dismissal approval and has delegated this authority to the 
PES. The PES is supposed to report to the Minister on how the authority to grant dismissal 
approval is practiced. Rules governing the dismissal approval are set by the Minister. 
 Prior approval is not needed for employees in the public service122, for dismissal during the 
probationary period, dismissal on grounds of an urgent case and dismissal as a result of the 
employer’s  bankruptcy. After having received an employer’s application for dismissal and after 
having obtained the advice of a Redundancy Committee123 which is composed of representatives 
of the workers’ and the employers’ associations, the PES will reach a decision. Permission is 
given if dismissal is judged to be fair. Fair dismissals are dismissals based on economic grounds 
(e.g redundancy), dysfunctional behavior, a disturbed employment relationship, illness and 
misconduct.124 Yet, after having obtained approval, it is not the PES but the employer who 
terminates the employment contract. The employer may also decide not to use the permission.  
                                                        
121 Next to termination by dismissal, an employment contract may also be terminated by mutual consent and by the 
expiration of a fixed term contract, on the expiration of an agreed upon period. Other options are termination of the 
contract during the trial period and summary dismissal. These options are not covered by our data. 
1221)Employees of a public body; 2) persons in an ecclesiastical position; 3) the teaching staff of educational 
institutes led by a natural person or body corporate; 4) employees only or predominantly performing domestic work 
in private households for less than three days a week and 5) statutory directors.  
123 In Dutch: Ontslagadviescommissie. 
124 See the different grounds for dismissal in section 4 and section 5 of the Dismissal Decree. 
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Under Dutch law, termination of an employment relationship is unlawful when the statutory 
notice period is not observed. After prior approval of the PES, the applicable statutory notice 
period may be reduced with one month, provided that the notice period will be at least one 
month. Statutory minimum periods of notice (PoN) are presented in Table 1 below. Moreover, 
notice of termination must take effect at the end of a calendar month.125 To give an example, if 
prior approval of the PES is obtained on the 15th of March and the employer decides to use the 
dismissal permit immediately, the period of notice takes effect April 1st. Once given, the 
dismissal approval is time-limited. This implies that the employer needs to terminate the 
contract before the expiry date of the permit. It is not possible to make an appeal against the 
decision of the PES. The employee, however, may file a protest against the decision of the PES at 
the civil court. In a repressive check, the judge may decide that the employee is compensated 
for the termination of his or her employment contract.126 
Table 1 Periods of notice: statutory minimum and after approval of the PES. 
Years of service Statutory minimum PoN PoN after approval of the PES 
Less than 5 year 1 month 1 month
5 to 10 years 2 month 1 month
10 to 15 years 3 months 2 months
More than 15 years 4 months 3 months
 
Dismissals based on economic grounds have to follow the “last in, first out” and the principle of 
reflection (see also Chapter 2). Together, these principles state that dismissal should be a 
function of age and tenure. A collective dismissal is a dismissal where the employer intents to 
dismiss at least 20 employees that are working within the same working district of the PES, and 
within a time frame of three months. If such is the case, the employer needs to follow the rules 
of the Collective Redundancy Notification Act (CRNA), which stipulates that employers have the 
obligation to notify the PES and all workers’ organizations involved of termination dates, of 
specific details about the employees who are likely to be made redundant, and of the date on 
which the Works Council has been consulted. The PES does not assess the dismissal until one 
month after the application is received. During this month, the employer shall assess whether, 
and to which extent, job loss can be prevented.127 Moreover, a social plan is developed. 
 The PES procedure is a procedure in writing. In general, parties do not appear in front of 
the PES. An unjust termination of the employment contract without prior approval of the PES 
may be declared annul.128 
Civil court. Rules and regulations regarding the rescission of the employment contract by court 
are recorded in the Civil Code.129 This route of termination via judicial decision is predominantly 
used by employers, but employees may also follow this procedure. 
                                                        
125Unless agreed otherwise in writing or determined by custom. 
126 Either the employee is awarded a severance payment that compensates for the losses that the employee incurs 
due to his or her dismissal, or the judge may decide that the employee is again employed by the employer.  
127This waiting period does not hold when a declaration is submitted in which all concerned involved parties declare 
that they have been notified and that they agree with the situation. 
128This implies that the employment contract is continued. 
129 The provisions of the Civil Code do not apply to persons employed by a public body, unless agreed-upon 
otherwise by both parties, before or on initiation of the employment relationship, either by law or by ordinance. 
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The civil court may dissolve the contract for substantial reasons. A substantial reason is a 
circumstance that would have also allowed for an immediate dismissal. Examples are fraud, 
incompetence, drunkenness, theft and reckless behavior. A substantial reason also refers to a 
circumstantial change that justifies the termination of an employment relationship. Examples 
are financial distress, disturbed employment relationship, and employee dysfunctional behavior. 
If an employment contract is rescinded because of a change in circumstances, the civil court 
may oblige the employer to pay severance payment.  
 The civil court procedure commences with an appeal motivating the termination of the 
employment contract. We can distinguish between two types of dismissal cases. The first type 
of case is the pro-forma case. In a pro-forma case, the employer and the employee have 
reached an agreement on the termination of employment. The employer submits a pro-forma 
request and the employee a pro-forma defense, which were harmonized in the negotiations. An 
oral hearing is not held. Generally, the court’s verdict is in line with the agreements made by 
both parties. The second type of case is the contradiction case. In this type of case, the 
employer and the employee disagree about the terms of dismissal. When the civil court receives 
a request of the second type, both parties are heard during an oral session.  
 Unlike the PES, the civil court is not bound to observe the statutory notice period. It is not 
possible to make an appeal to the decision of the judge.  
4.3 Literature on EPL 
Employment protection legislation (EPL) was introduced to enhance workers’ welfare and to 
improve employment conditions. However, that same legislation also translates into a cost for 
employers. If economists discuss EPL, they discuss the effects imposed by the set of laws on 
employment relationships on the working of the labor market (e.g. Emerson (1988); Lazear 
(1990); Autor, Donohue III & Schwab (2006)). In this discussion, the costs that employers incur 
due to EPL are used as a reflection of the strictness of these set of laws (e.g. more costly is 
interpreted as more strict)).  
 Even though the European political arena seems to agree about the negative effects of EPL 
on different labor market outcomes, among economists there is a lot of controversy about the 
effect of EPL. We have shown in Chapter 2 of this dissertation that we do not know exactly what 
is the effect of EPL on different labor market outcomes. We refer to the overviews of Addison 
and Teixeira (2003) and the OECD (2004) to understand how many different conclusions are 
drawn. Although most studies use a measure that quantifies EPL in terms of costs, the way in 
which these costs are measured differs across studies.  
 Some macro studies use the severance pay and notice periods as a measure for EPL 
strictness. Drawing data from 22 countries over a period of 29 years, Lazear (1990) finds that an 
increase of no required severance pay to a required severance pay of three months would result 
in a decrease in the employment-population-ratio of 1 percent. Lazear furthermore finds that 
obliged severance pay results in an increase in unemployment rates. Results however, are not 
completely consistent. Drawing from the same sample of countries130, Addisson and Grosso 
(1996) revise the study of Lazear and find no evidence that severance pay increases 
                                                        
130 The sample is similar in one exception; data on Portugal was dropped and on Finland was included.  
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unemployment. Also, in contrast to the study of Lazear, Addisson and Grosso find that longer 
notice periods lead to positive effects on employment and unemployment. Other macro-studies 
use the OECD EPL-index (e.g. Nickell (1997)) or the existence of certain labor market institutions 
(LMI) as a measure of EPL strictness. In an empirical analysis, and using a sample of 17 OECD 
countries over the period 1960-1999, Belot and Van Ours (2004) show that certain combinations 
of LMI result in low unemployment rates. Other studies, such as the study of Di Tella and 
MacCulloch (2005) use self- reported measures of labor market flexibility. Using a data set 
covering 21 OECD countries over the period 1984-1990 that consists of surveys that were 
conducted amongst economic leaders and CEO’s, Di Tella and MacCulloch suggest that labor 
market flexibility has a positive effect on employment and on the participation rate . 
 In micro studies, the effect of an EPL reform or the introduction of a new law is often 
analyzed. In a American based micro study, Oyer and Schaefer (2000) use the introduction of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA91), a law which affected the relative costs of individual 
dismissal suits, as their treatment effect. They argue that when an employee is more likely to file 
a suit against his employer when being individually dismissed than when being collectively 
dismissed as a part of a layoff, then a change in law that increases the expected costs of an 
individual lawsuit would cause firms to substitute away from individual firing towards mass 
layoff. In their focus on HR decisions made by the firm, Oyer and Schaefer’s analysis departs 
from a large amount of studies that study the relation between EPL and labor market outcomes. 
See for instance DeLeire (2000) who analyzes the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and its 
relation to the employment and wage of protected workers. DeLeire finds that an increase in 
protection due to ADA, which resulted in an increase in hiring and firing costs for employers, 
lead to 7.2 percentage points decrease in the employment of men with disabilities. Wages were 
not affected by ADA. Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) also investigated the effect of ADA and 
report results similar to the results of DeLeire. Furthermore, Autor, Donohue III and Schwab 
(2006) examine the effect of the employment-at-will doctrine in the United States and show 
that one wrongful-discharge doctrine, which resulted in an increase in firing costs and 
procedural inconveniences for employers, reduced state employment rates by 0.8% to 1.7%. 
 Other micro-studies use company data and investigate the effect of firing costs on 
unemployment. See for example Pfann (2006) who uses personnel data of airplane 
manufacturer Fokker to develop a model that predicts how firing thresholds depend on the 
characteristics of individual workers. He finds a strong positive significant effect of firing costs 
on the possibility that a worker is rehired by the bankrupt trustees in charge of creating a new 
firm out of the bankrupt firm. Because firing costs depend on wages, for employees with similar 
characteristics, the employee with the highest wage has the lowest chance of being fired. In an 
Italian setting, Boeri and Jimeno (2005) exploit the fact that firms in Italy below a certain size-
threshold are not covered by the most restrictive EPL provisions. They find that employees with 
permanent contracts in firms exposed to less restrictive EPL are more likely to be fired. Also in 
an Italian setting, Kugler and Pica (2008) study the effect of an Italian reform in 1990 that lead to 
an increase in dismissal costs for business below 15 employees, while dismissal costs for larger 
firms stayed constant. Their results suggest that the increase in dismissal costs had a negligible 
effect on net employment. The reform moreover led to reduced entry rates and employment 
adjustments. Different from Boeri and Jimeno, who exploited the variation of EPL across small 
and large firms. Kugler and Pica fully exploited both cross sectional and temporal variation in 
EPL. 
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Although the Dutch discussion about EPL is a discussion about costs, we do not exactly know the 
costs of a Dutch dismissal procedure. The studies of Hassink et al.(1998) and Knegt and Tros 
(2007) calculate the average costs of dismissal for both the PES and the civil court procedure but 
have, as mentioned in the introduction, some potential drawbacks. Furthermore, they are 
outdated. In order to gain more insight into the Dutch situation, an overview of dismissal costs 
that is up-to date and that goes beyond the calculation of averages is needed.  
4.4 Theoretical overview of costs 
The costs that arise from a PES procedure or a civil court procedure are different. When 
following a dismissal procedure via the PES, the employer incurs the costs of ongoing wage 
payment to the employee during the duration of dismissal. When following a dismissal 
procedure via the civil court the employer incurs the costs of a court fee, the costs of ongoing 
wage payment to the employee during the duration of dismissal and the costs of a severance 
payment that is paid to the employee when he or she is dismissed. This section will describe the 
above mentioned costs in more detail. Figure 1 gives an overview of these costs.131 
 PES. When an employer follows the PES procedure of dismissal, he will incur the ongoing 
wage costs that are made during the duration of the dismissal. The duration of dismissal can be 
broken down into three components: 1) the duration of the PES procedure, 2) the time to notice 
and 3) the period of notice. The first component, the duration of the PES procedure, is the 
actual time the PES needs to reach a decision. It commences the moment a request is registered 
and it ends the moment the PES grants dismissal permission. The second component, the time 
to notice, equals the time in between the moment dismissal permission is granted and the 
moment the period of notice commences. The third duration component of dismissal, the 
period of notice, is solely determined by the number of years of service of the employee, and is 
recorded in the Civil Code of law (see Table 1).132 
 We shall illustrate the above with an example. Consider a specific dismissal case in which 
the dismissal procedure is initiated at the 1st of March and dismissal permission is granted by 
the PES at the 15th of March. The employee involved worked for his employer for 4 years and 
earns a gross monthly salary of €2,000, including a holiday payment. For this specific case the 
duration of the PES dismissal procedure equals ½ months (from the 1st of March until the 15th of 
March). Approval may be granted the 15th of March, yet, the period of notice does not take 
effect until the 1st of April133. In this specific case, the duration of the time to notice equals ½ 
months (from the 16th of March until the 31th of March). Because the employee was employed 
for 4 years, the official period of notice equals 1 months (from the 1st of April until the 30th of 
April). The total duration of dismissal equals 2 months (½ months + ½ months + 1 month) and 
costs incurred are 2 times the monthly salary of €2,000.  
 Civil court. Before commencing a procedure at the civil court, the employer is obliged to 
pay a court fee. This fee is dependent upon the legal form of the employer. Legal forms that do 
                                                        
131 With respect to the wage costs that are made during the duration of dismissal, we make the assumption that 
workers are not productive during this period.  
132 As mentioned before, when terminating an employment contract after receiving a dismissal permission of the PES 
the legal period of notice needs to be respected. 
133 By law, the notice period commences at the first day of a calendar month, unless agreed upon otherwise. 
CHAPTER 4 
78 
not involve a legal person are charged €106. Legal forms that do involve a legal person are 
charged €71 (www.rechtspraak.nl, 2009.134,135,136 Furthermore, the employer will incur costs of 
the ongoing wage payments that are made to the employee during the duration of the 
dismissal. At the civil court, the duration of dismissal can be broken down into two components. 
1) the duration of the civil court procedure and 2) the time in between the date the civil court 
reaches a verdict and the date the employment contract is terminated. The first component of 
the dismissal duration, the duration of the civil court procedure, is the time the court needs to 
reach a decision. It commences the moment a request is registered until the moment the court 
reaches a verdict. The second component of the dismissal duration, the time in between the 
date the civil court reaches a verdict and the date the employment contract is terminated is 
determined by the court. A court is not bound to observe the statutory notice period, and 
decides when the employment contracted is dissolved. A last cost that is incurred by employers 
when following the civil court procedure is the cost of a severance payment, which is paid to the 
dismissed employee. The height of this payment is stated in a civil court guideline and equals A x 
B x C, where factor A is the weighted years of service. The older the employee, the more weight 
is attached to his or her years of service (see Table 2). Factor B is the gross monthly salary and 
factor C is a correction factor that is determined by the civil court. 
 We shall illustrate the above with an example. Consider a specific dismissal case that is 
initiated at the 1st of March. The employer involved holds a limited liability private company 
(BV) As such, his court fee equals €106. The employee involved earns a gross monthly salary of 
€2,000, including a holiday payment. The court delivers its judgment at the 15th of March and 
decides that the employment contract of the involved employee is dissolved at the 31th of 
March. This given, the duration of the civil court procedure equals ½ months (from the 1st of 
March until the 15th of March), and the duration of the time in between the date the civil court 
reaches a verdict and the date the employment contract is dissolved equals ½ months (from the 
15st of March until the 31th of March). The court verdicts the employer to award the employee a 
severance payment of €20.000. The total costs in this specific case equal the sum of the court 
fee, one monthly salary and the severance payment, which are €106, €2,000 and €20,000, 
respectively. Costs thus equal €22,106. 
  
                                                        
134 Retrieved December 15th 2009. 
135 Legal forms that do not involve a legal person are: Sole traders, Commanditaire vennootschap (CV) or limited 
partnership and Maatschap or partnership. Legal forms that do involve a legal person are: Besloten Vennootschap 
(BV) or limited liability private company, Vereniging or association and Stichting or foundation. VOF’s are also 
charged a fee of €106.  
136 Another cost that may arise when following the PES or the civil court procedure, is the cost of legal support. 
These costs are not covered by this paper. Additionally, when reaching a verdict, the civil court may oblige the 
employer to reimburse employees for the legal expenses incurred. In some cases, employees are sentenced to 
reimburse employers. Again, these costs are not taken into account in this paper, because with respect to total costs 
in our data these costs are negligible. The PES does not address reimbursement of legal expenses.  
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Table 2 Factor A of the civil court formula. 
Before January 1st 2009 After January 1st 2009 
Years of service Factor A Years of service Factor A 
< 40 years 1 < 35 years 0.5
40-50 years 1.5 35-45 years 1
> 50 years 2 45-55 years 1,5
  > 55 years 2
 
 
Figure 1 Observed costs of dismissal. 
4.5 Data 
In order to calculate the firing costs per procedure, we only selected cases in which the PES has 
granted dismissal permission and the civil court has dissolved the employment contract. For 
matters of comparability, we furthermore selected cases that were closed in the period 2006-
2009. As such, the sample used in this chapter contains 994 PES cases and 878 civil court 
cases.137 Figure 2 presents an overview of the data in terms of the number of requests closed 
per month. It shows that the number of dismissal cases closed at the PES and at the civil court 
are approximately equal until 2009. Furthermore, the pattern at PES is a more cyclical pattern. 
Peaks are shown every other fourth month.  
Six different dismissal cases in the data138 
This section discusses six dismissal cases, of which three are filed at the PES and three are filed 
at the civil court. The six examples are all about median wage workers. The examples show, 
however, that dismissal costs can vary widely. All examples are presented in Table 3. 
 PES. Worker 1, age 40, male, earns a gross monthly salary of €2,264, including a holiday pay 
of 8% of the gross yearly salary. The reason for his dismissal is an economic ground. His 
employer is a limited liability private company (BV). Worker 1 worked 6 years under a 
permanent employment contract. As such, the legal period of notice equals one month. The 
dismissal procedure is initiated at the PES in February 2006. The employment contract is 
terminated at the end of March 2006. The total duration of the dismissal, including the duration 
of the PES procedure, the time to notice and the period of notice equals 1.2 months. Because 
                                                        
137 2 cases civil court cases were only partly dissolved. These are excluded. 
138 All amounts presented are in 2006 constant prices. That is why the court fee does not always precisely equal €106 
or €71. 
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the PES does not ask for a procedural fee, nor does it impose the employer to pay severance 
payment, total dismissal costs equal 1.2 months times the gross monthly wage, which comes 
down to €2,271 (1.2 x €2,264).  
 
Figure 2 Number of dismissal files per month. Registered date: closure of the procedure ( 2006-2009). 
 
Worker 2, age 44, female, earns a gross monthly salary of €2,002, including a holiday pay of 8% 
of the gross yearly salary. The reason for her dismissal is an economic ground. Her employer is a 
limited liability private company (BV). Worker 2 worked 17 years under a permanent 
employment contract. As such, the legal period of notice equals 3 months. The dismissal 
procedure is initiated at the PES in January 2008. The employment contract is terminated at the 
end of April 2008. The total duration of the dismissal, including the duration of the PES 
procedure, the time to notice and period of notice equals 3.5 months. The total dismissal costs 
equal 3.5 months times the gross monthly wage, which comes down to €6,694 (3.5 x €2,002). 
 Worker 3, age 57, female, earns a gross monthly salary of €2,682, including a holiday pay of 
8% of the gross yearly salary. The reason for her dismissal is a disturbed relationship. Her 
employer is a limited liability private company (BV). Worker 3 worked 24 years under a 
permanent employment contract. As such, the legal period of notice equals 3 months. The 
dismissal procedure is initiated at the PES in October 2008. The employment contract is 
terminated at the end of April 2009. The total duration of the dismissal, including the duration 
of the PES procedure, the time to notice and period of notice equals 6,8 months. The total 
dismissal costs equal 6.8 months times the gross monthly wage, which comes down to €18,185 
(6.8 x €2,682). 
 Civil court. Worker 4, age 33, male, earns a gross monthly salary of €2,240, including a 
holiday pay of 8% of the gross yearly salary. Worker 4 worked for 2 years under a permanent 
employment contract. His employer holds a limited liability private company (BV). The court fee 
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equals €102. His employer intended to dissolve the contract because of a disturbed relationship. 
The procedure is a pro-forma procedure. It is initiated in March 2008 and has a duration of 3 
days. The civil court decides that the employment contract is terminated one day later. As such, 
the total duration of the dismissal is 0.13 months. Moreover, the court does not impose 
severance payment on the employer. Total costs of the dismissal equal the sum of the court fee 
and 0.13 months times the monthly wage. This is equal to €499 (€102 + (0.13 x €2,240)). 
 Worker 5, age 34, female, earns a gross monthly salary of €2,343, including a holiday pay of 
8% of the gross yearly salary. Worker 5 worked for 9 years under a permanent employment 
contract. Her employer holds a limited liability private company (BV). The court fee equals €101. 
Her employer intended to dissolve the contract because of a disturbed relationship. The 
procedure is a pro-forma procedure. It is initiated in August 2009 and has a duration of one day. 
The court decides that the employment contract is terminated 50 days later. As such, the total 
duration of the dismissal is 1.7 months. Moreover, the court imposes a severance payment of 
€9,521 on the employer. Total costs of the dismissal equal the sum of the court fee, 1,7 months 
times the monthly wage and the severance payment. This is equal to €13,628 (€101 + (1.7 x 
€2,343) + €9,521). 
 Worker 6, age 50, male, earns a gross monthly salary of €2,161, including a holiday pay of 
8% of the gross yearly salary. Worker 6 worked for 11 years under a permanent employment 
contract. His employer holds a limited liability private company (BV). The court fee equals €107. 
His employer intended to dissolve the contract because of economic reasons. The procedure is 
not a pro-forma procedure. It is initiated in May 2007 and has a duration of 23 days and 5 
months. The court decides that the employment contract is terminated one day later. As such, 
the total duration of the dismissal is 5.8 months. Moreover, the court imposes a severance 
payment of €50,456 on the employer. Total costs of the dismissal equal the sum of the court 
fee, 5.8 months times the monthly wage and the severance payment. This is equal to €63,132 
(€107+ (5.8 x €2,161) + €50,456). 
 The overview in Table 3 shows that in these six cases civil court procedures are not always 
more expensive than PES procedures. In fact, the costs of dismissal for worker 4 are the lowest 
of all examples presented. Would worker 4 have been fired via the PES, costs would have 
equaled 1 monthly salary at least due to the obligatory period of notice of one month. 
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Table 3 Six different workers and calculation of total dismissal costs (close to median wages, different costs)*.  
 Worker 1 Worker 2 Worker 3 
Age  40 44 57
Tenure 6 years 17 years 24 years 
Reason for dismissal Economical Economical Disturbed relationship 
Institute PES PES PES
Procedural fee € 0 € 0 € 0
Ongoing wage payment during 
duration of dismissal 
Total duration:
1.2 months 
Total duration:
3.5 months 
Total duration: 
6.8 months 
 Wage payment
1.2 x €2,264  
= € 2,711 
Wage payment
3.5 x €2,002  
= € 6,694 
Wage payment 
6.8 x €2,682 
 = € 18,185 
Severance pay € 0 € 0 € 0
Total costs € 2,711 € 6,694 € 18,185 
 
 Worker 4 Worker 5 Worker 6 
Age 33 34 50
Tenure 2 years 9 years 11 years 
Reason for dismissal Disturbed relationship Disturbed relationship Economical 
Pro-forma Pro-forma Pro-forma Non pro-forma 
Institute Civil court Civil court Civil court 
Procedural fee € 102 € 101 € 107
Ongoing Wage payment during 
duration of dismissal 
 
Total duration:
4 days  
Total duration:
1.7 months 
Total duration: 
58 months 
Wage payment
0.13 x € 2,240 
= € 397 
Wage payment
1.7 x € 2,343 
=€ 4,006 
Wage payment 
5.8 x € 2,161 
= € 12,573 
Severance pay € 0 € 9,521 € 50,456 
Total costs € 499 € 13,628 € 63,132  
*All costs are in 2006 constant prices. 
Variables in the data 
Table 4a presents descriptive statistics of the duration of dismissal. Additionally, for the civil 
court procedure descriptive statistics of the court fee and the severance payment are given. The 
total duration of the dismissal at the PES is the sum of the duration of the actual PES procedure, 
the time to notice and the period of notice (column 2 + 3 + 4).139 The average total duration 
equals 3.5 months, the minimum total duration equals 1.03 months and the maximum duration 
                                                        
139 The duration of the procedure we report is slightly longer than the one reported by the PES. We took the 
difference between the closure date and the registration date of the request. The PES calculates the duration of the 
procedure by taking the difference between the closure date and the date the request is taken into account. We also 
calculated the duration of the civil court process as the difference between the closure date and the date of 
registration, as such durations of both procedure are comparable.  With respect to wage, for both procedures we 
calculated the gross wage including an 8% holiday payment. We did not include additional fees, such as bonuses.  
These additional fees are only known for the civil court observations. We made this decision  because the main goal 
of this paper is to compare the costs of both procedures.  
FIRING COSTS 
83 
over a year.140 With an average of 1.72 months, the period of notice has the longest duration, 
followed by the duration of the PES procedure (1.39 months) and the time to notice (0.39 
months). 
 For the civil court, the total duration of the dismissal is the sum of the duration of the 
actual civil court procedure and the time in between the date the civil court reaches a verdict 
and date the employment contract ends (column 2 + 3). With 1.5 months, the average total 
duration of dismissal is less than half the length of the average total duration of dismissal at the 
PES. The duration of the actual civil court procedure equals 0.29 months, the duration of the 
time to termination is longer (1.24 months). The average court fee equals €102, average 
severance payments are €26,619. Table 4b presents other continuous variables that are present 
in the dataset. It shows that workers who are dismissed via the PES procedure have longer 
tenure than workers who are dismissed via the civil court. Additionally, workers that are 
dismissed via the PES procedure are slightly older and their salary, expressed in both monthly 
salary and hourly wage, is lower. Table 4c shows the descriptive statistics of the categorical 
variables that are present in the dataset. It shows that employers turn to civil court and the PES 
for different reasons of dismissal. PES mainly processes dismissal cases due to economic reasons 
(73 percent of total) and prolonged illness (25 percent of total). Of all economic cases, 28 
percent is of a collective nature. At the civil court the majority of cases is filed due to a disturbed 
employment relationship or dysfunctional behavior (73 percent of total), followed by cases filed 
due to economic reasons (25 percent of total). Furthermore, 86 percent of all cases at civil court 
is pro-forma. The distribution of cases with respect to the industry in which the employer 
operates is not so different for both procedures. Larger differences in firm size are found. The 
majority of employers following the PES procedure employ between 10 and 100 employees, the 
majority of those filing a suit via the civil court are large employers, employing more than 100 
people. Last, differences in the distribution of gender and legal form are small. 
Average dismissal costs 
Table 5 presents the average dismissal costs for all costs components of both the PES procedure 
and the civil court procedure. Figure 3a and Figure 3b give a graphical representation of the 
average dismissal costs. Average dismissal costs are calculated as follows: 
 
	ܣݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁	݀݅ݏ݉݅ݏݏ݈ܽ	ܿ݋ݏݐݏ	ܲܧܵ	 = ∑ ((ܣ1௜ + ܣ2௜ + ܣ3௜)݈ܵܽܽݎݕ௜)
௡௜ୀଵ
݊ 	 
 
, where n equals 994. A1 refers to the duration of the PES procedure. A2 refers to the time to 
notice, and A3 to the period of notice. Salary is the gross monthly salary including a holiday 
payment of 8%. 
 
ܣݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁	݀݅ݏ݉݅ݏݏ݈ܽ	ܿ݋ݏݐݏ	ܿ݅ݒ݈݅	ܿ݋ݑݎݐ		 =
∑ (ܥ݋ݑݎݐ	݂݁݁௝ + ቀ൫ܤ1௝ + ܤ2௝൯݈ܵܽܽݎݕ௝ቁ + ܵ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݊ܿ݁	݌ܽݕ௝)௠௝ୀଵ
݉  
 
                                                        
140 For all statistics related to time, the following rule applies: 
Number of years = (number of months)/12. 
Number of months=(number of days/365) x 12. 
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, where m equals 878. B1 refers to the duration of the civil court procedure, and B2 to the time 
in between the moment the court reaches a verdict and the moment the contract is terminated. 
Salary is the gross monthly salary including a holiday payment of 8%.  
 Table 5 and Figure 3a show that, on average, the PES procedure costs €7,480. The lowest 
costs incurred by an employer equal €171, the highest costs incurred equal €61,714. The largest 
costs component for employers that follow the PES procedure are the ongoing wage costs that 
are made during the period of notice. These costs equal €3,728. Moreover, the ongoing wage 
costs that are made during the duration of the PES procedure are €2,964. Ongoing wage costs 
during the time to notice are much smaller, namely €787. Figure 4a gives a graphical 
presentation of the distribution of total PES dismissal costs in our sample. It shows that the 
distribution of costs is not a symmetric distribution where the median and mean are equal (see 
also Table 5). Instead, it is skewed to the right. The distribution shows that 0.6 percent of all 994 
dismissal cases cost less than €500 and that 0.1 percent of cases cost more than €6,000. The 
majority of cases cost between €4,000 and €6,000 (21.4 percent). 
 On average, the civil court procedure is more expensive than the PES procedure (Figure 3b, 
Table 5). Total dismissal costs add up to an average of €30,982. The median costs are € 13,708 
and are only twice as large as the median PES costs. The variance, however, is much larger. This 
is an important finding because it implies that the outcome in terms of costs is much more 
uncertain.  
 Court fees are a negligible share of total costs. The ongoing wage costs made during the 
duration of the civil court procedure equal €765 and are lower than the ongoing wage costs that 
are incurred by employers during the PES procedure. A good explanation for this difference is 
given by Table 4a and Table 4b. Although wages are generally higher for employees of 
employers that follow the civil court procedure, the duration of the actual procedure is shorter. 
As such, the outcome of the multiplication of duration and wage is lower for dismissals via civil 
court than for dismissals via the PES.  
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Table 4a Descriptive statistics: continuous variables related to the costs of dismissal (2006-2009). 
column 1 2 3 4 5 6 
PES, 
 n=994 
Court fee * Duration of PES 
procedure in 
months** 
Time to notice in 
months 
Period of notice 
in months 
Total duration in 
months 
(column 2+3+4) 
Severance 
payment * 
Mean  1.39 .39 1.72 3.50  
Median  1.18 .33 1.00 3.28  
Std. Dev.  1.09 .26 .88 1.44  
Minimum  .00 .03 1.00 1.03  
Maximum  10.82 1.02 3.00 12.90  
column 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Civil Court, 
n=878 
Court fee * Duration of civil 
court procedure 
in months*** 
Time to 
termination of 
contract in 
months 
 Total duration in 
months 
(column 2+3) 
Severance 
payment *† 
Mean € 102.46 .29 1.24 1.53 € 26,619 
Median € 104.10 .10 1.05 1.26 € 10,159 
Std. Dev. € 7.31 .60 .95 1.06 € 52,370 
Minimum € 66.83 .00 .00 .00 € 0 
Maximum € 118.17 9.47 3.58 10.78 € 664,174 
 *In 2000 constant prices. 
**The duration of the procedure we report is slightly longer than the one reported by the PES. We took the difference 
between the closure date and the registration date of the request. The PES calculates the duration of the procedure 
by taking the difference between the closure date and the date the request is taken into account. We also calculated 
the duration of the civil court process as the difference between the closure date and the date of registration, as such 
durations of both procedure are comparable. 
***In pro-forma cases at the civil court, a judge can make a decision at the same day the request is registered.This 
occurs in 10 percent of the cases. At the PES this occurs only very occasionally (0.6 %). In all of these dismissal cases 
the employee signed a “Declaration of no objection” (Werknemersverklaring van geen bezwaar),which allowed for a 
faster procedure.  
† Severance payments also include payments as sƟpulated in a social plan, payments that are awarded to 
supplement the unemployment benefit or to supplement retirement money. 
Table 4b Descriptive statistics: continuous variables (2006-2009) (continued on the next page). 
PES,  
n=994 
Tenure in 
months 
Age when in 
employed 
Age at time of 
process 
Gross monthly 
wage*  
Hourly wage** Hours per week 
Mean 129.90 33.62 44.45 € 2,050 € 13.46 31.79 
Median 93.45 32.52 45.00 € 2,003 € 12.35 36.41 
Std. Dev. 105.26 10.26 10.11 € 1,106 € 5.22  9.85 
Minimum 1.64 15.59 17.00 € 92 € 3.59 2.13 
Maximum 513.44 65.45 70.00 € 12,640 € 69.25 50.00 
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Table 4b continued 
Civil Court 
n=878 
Tenure in 
months 
Age when in 
employed 
Age at time of 
process 
Gross monthly 
wage 
Hourly wage Hours per week 
Mean 119.47 32.26 42.21 € 2,644 € 16.33 33.35 
Median 79.10 30.74 42.00 € 2,247 € 14.02  36.00 
Std. Dev. 112.96 9.51 9.81 € 1,748 € 8.56 7.90 
Minimum 1.12 15.16 19.00 € 222 € 6.85 4.85 
Maximum 550.13 56.44 64.00 € 17,129 € 86.64 43.49 
* Including holiday payment, in 2000 constant prices. 
** Excluding holiday payment, in 2000 constant prices. 
Table 4c Descriptive statistics: categorical variables (2006-2009) (continued on the next page)  
PES    Civil court   
Reason for dismissal n % Reason for dismissal n % 
Economical 722 72.64 Economical 222 25.28 
DysfuncƟonal†  6 0.60 DysfuncƟonal† 642 73.12 
Prolonged illness 253 25.45 Prolonged illness 7 0.80 
Other 13 1.31 Other 7 0.80 
Total 994 100 Total 878 100 
   
Collective or not n % Pro-forma or not n % 
collective dismissal  216 27.98 Pro-forma cases 753 85.76 
Non-collective dismissals  556 72.02 Non-proforma cases 125 14.24 
Total 772* 100 Total 878 100 
   
Industry n % Industry n  % 
Agriculture and Forestry 14 1.41 Agriculture and Forestry 4 0.46 
Electricity, gas and water 9 0.91 Electricity. gas and water 10 1.14 
Industry 303 30.48 Industry 238 27.11 
Construction 59 5.94 Construction 39 4.44 
Wholesale, trade, resale trade 
and repairs 
215 21.63 Wholesale. trade. resale 
trade and repairs 
117 13.33 
Hotel and catering 25 2.52 Hotel and catering 19 2.16 
Transport, storage and 61 6.14 Transport. storage and 87 9.91 
Financial firms 2 0.20 Financial firms 24 2.73 
Commercial services 119 11.97 Commercial services 163 18.56 
 Recruitment 14 1.41 Recruitment 26 2.96 
Governmental  3 0.30 Governmental 8 0.91 
Education 3 0.30 Education 20 2.28 
Health and wellness 135 13.58 Health and wellness 92 10.48 
Culture and recreation 32 3.22 Culture and recreation 31 3.53 
Total 994 100 Total 878 100 
†DysfuncƟonal behavior/disturbed relaƟonship. 
* Total refers to only dismissal cases due to economic reasons. 
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Table 4c continued. 
Firm size  n %  Firm size n % 
Less than 10 194 19.52 Less than 10 134 15.26 
Between 10-100 570 57.34 Between 10-100 235 26.77 
More than 100 230 23.14 More than 100 509 57.97 
Total 994 100 Total 878 100 
    
Gender n %   Gender n %  
female 408 41.05 female 344 39.18 
male 586 58.95 male 534 60.82 
Total 994 100 Total 878 100 
    
Legal form n %   Legal form n %  
Limited liability 745 74.95 Limited liability 624 71.07 
Foundation 139 13.98 Foundation 108 12.30 
Sole trader 77 7.75 Sole trader 26 2.96 
Other 33 3.32 Other 120 13.67 
Total 994 100 Total 878 100 
* Total refers to only dismissal cases due to economic reasons 
Table 5 Average costs of dismissal†. 
PES n=994 Court fee Wage costs 
duration of 
process 
Wage costs time 
to notice 
Wage costs 
period of notice
 Total dismissal 
costs  
Mean € 2,964 € 787 € 3,728 € 7,480  
Median € 2,347 € 583 € 2,458 € 6,054  
Std. Dev. € 3,098 € 685 € 3,102 € 5,648  
Min € 0  € 9 € 92 € 171  
Max € 32,651 € 3,948 € 25,685 € 61,714  
Civil Court 
n=878 
Court fee Wage costs 
duration of 
process 
Wage costs time 
to termination 
 Severance 
payment 
Total dismissal 
costs 
Mean € 102 € 765  € 3,496 € 26,619 € 30,982  
Median € 104 € 216  € 2,213 € 10,159 € 13,708  
Std. Dev. € 7 € 1,791 € 4,315 € 52,370 € 54,808  
Min € 67 € 0  € 0 € 0 € 97  
Max  € 118 € 17,033 € 37,730 € 664,174 € 683,947  
† When an employee is ill for longer than two years, the employer is no longer obliged to pay the salary of the 
employee. For dismissals due to illness of the employee, we did multiply the gross wage of the concerned employee 
with the duration of the dismissal (including time to notice, period of notice for PES dismissals and time to 
termination for civil court dismissals) when calculating the ongoing wage costs. Herewith we assume that the loss in 
productivity of the concerned employee equals the wage costs of that concerned employee.  
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Figure 3a PES dismissal costs, per cost component (n=994, 2006-2009). 
 
 
Figure 3b Civil court dismissal costs, per cost component (n=878, 2006-2009). 
 
 
Figure 3c Civil court dismissal costs, per cost component, by severance payment (n=878, 2006-2009). 
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Figure 4a Distribution of costs: PES data (n=994, 2006-2009). 
 
 
Figure 4b Distribution of costs: civil court data (n=878, 2006-2009). 
 
Ongoing wage costs that are paid during the time to the termination of the employment 
contract equal €3,496, which is quite a substantial amount of total costs. The severance pay cost 
component of €26,619 is the largest cost component that employers face. In 155 cases 
however, which is 17.5 percent of total, severance payments equal € 0. If we distinguish 
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between cases in which severance payments are awarded and those in which severance 
payments are not awarded differences in costs are large. Average total dismissal costs incurred 
by employers that are sentenced to award severance payment equal € 36,799 average total 
dismissal costs of those employers who are not sentenced to award severance payment equal € 
3,850 (Figure 3c).  
 Figure 4b gives a graphical presentation of the distribution of total civil court dismissal 
costs in our sample. The distribution of costs is skewed to the right. 2.6 percent of cases cost 
below €500 and 0.3 percent of cases cost more than €400,000. The majority of cases cost 
between €500 and €10,000. If we match the scale of the x-axis of the civil court distribution to 
the scale of the x-axis of the PES distribution for costs between €500 and €20,000, we obtain the 
figure in the right corner of Figure 4b. It shows percentages much lower than the PES 
distribution.  
 Our cost calculations are consistent with the cost calculations of Hassink et al. (1998). 
Translated into 2006 constant prices and euros, Hassink et al. calculated civil court costs to be 
between €25,983 and €26,662 and PES costs to be €6,968.141, 142, 143 
Specific dismissal costs 
In the section above we presented average dismissal costs per procedure, this section explores 
whether dismissal costs are different for different workers, different types of employers and 
different reasons of dismissal. Figure 5a and Figure 5b present a graph with age in years on the 
x-axis and the average dismissal costs on the y-axis. Figure 5a depicts the situation of the PES, 
Figure 5b that of the civil court. Both figures show that dismissal costs are a concave function of 
age. Since costs are a function of earnings, this is in line with Mincer’s (1958) formulation of 
earnings as a concave function over one’s labor market experience. Moreover, with regards to 
dismissals via PES, for younger workers, the ongoing wage costs incurred during the duration of 
the PES procedure are higher than the ongoing wage costs incurred during the period of notice. 
An equilibrium is reached around the age of 35 in the sense that at this age both costs are equal. 
After 35, the opposite is seen and the ongoing wage costs during the period of notice transcend 
the ongoing wage cost that are incurred during the duration of the procedure. A logical 
explanation is that tenure, and as such the period of notice, increases with age. The duration of 
the process does not. Figures 6a and Figure 6b show a graph with tenure in years on the x-axis 
and the average dismissal costs on the y-axis. Similar patterns as in Figure 5a and Figure 5b are 
shown.  
                                                        
141  Fl. 12,838 at PES versus  Fl. 47,869 - Fl. 49,119 at civil court.  
142 The cost components used by Hassink et al. are slightly different from the costs components that we use. For the 
calculation of costs the PES procedure, they do not take into account the time to notice. Furthermore, for the 
calculation of costs of the civil court procedure Hassink et al. also include the costs of legal support. When 
subtracting these legal support costs from the total costs of the civil court procedure, Hassink et al.’s calculated costs 
are between € 20,037 and € 20,148 (in constant prices). 
143 Our results are also similar to the results of Knegt and Tros (2007), in the sense that these authors show that 
dismissal costs are much higher for the civil court procedure than for the PES procedure. However, the authors show 
a  magnitude of the difference between the two procedures that is smaller. Knegt and Tros show costs of  €16,112 
and  €35,316 for the PES procedure and for the civil court procedure, respectively. Our study however, does not take 
into account the costs of schooling and outplacement procedures, the study of Knegt and Tros does. Furthermore, 
the study of Knegt and Tros is based upon self-reported measures of employers and employees, our study is based 
on actual dismissal cases filed at the civil court and the PES. 
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Figure 7 shows dismissal costs for economical and non-economical dismissals. At the PES, 
differences in costs are negligible. Total dismissal costs for non-economical dismissal equal 
€7,339. Total dismissal costs for economical dismissals are €7,532. At the civil court, larger 
differences are found. Economical dismissals are almost twice the costs of non-economical 
dismissals. The former are €42,994, the latter are €26,918. The higher severance payments 
awarded when economic motives are at stake explain the largest difference in costs. 
 
 
Figure 5a PES: Age and dismissal costs (n=994, 2006-2009). 
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Figure 5b Civil court: Age and dismissal costs (n=878, 2006-2009). 
 
 
Figure 6a PES: Tenure and dismissal costs (n=994, 2006-2009). 
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Figure 6b Civil court: Tenure and dismissal costs (n=878, 2006-2009). 
 
Figure 8 shows dismissal costs for collective and non-collective dismissals at the PES. Collective 
dismissals are more expensive than non-collective dismissals. Costs are €9,392 versus €6,738, 
respectively. Figure 8 also shows the difference in costs between pro-forma procedures and non 
pro-forma procedures at the civil court. Differences in costs between these two types of 
procedures are minimal. Pro-forma procedures cost €30,910, and non pro-forma procedures 
cost €31,419. The way in which these costs are build up, however, are different. For non pro-
forma cases, the ongoing wage costs made during the duration of the civil court procedure 
equal €2,935. For pro-forma cases, these ongoing wage costs equal €405. Yet, for non-pro-
forma cases the ongoing wage costs made during the time to termination are much lower than 
for pro-forma cases. The former equal €1,998, the latter equal €3,745, Costs of severance 
payment are similar.  
 Figure 9 presents the differences in dismissal costs for employers in different industries. At 
the PES, costs incurred are the highest for employers that operate in the industry sector. These 
employers incur costs of €10,314.  Employers that operate in the health sector incur the lowest 
costs, namely €5,454. With respect to the civil court procedure, the most expensive dismissal 
procedures are seen in the industry sector, the least expensive dismissal procedures are seen in 
the wholesale sector. A dismissal procedure in the industry sector costs €46,421, a dismissal 
procedure in the wholesale sector costs €18,340.  
 Figure 10 distinguishes in costs between small, medium and large companies. With respect 
to the PES procedure, employers employing less than 10 employees incur a cost of €5,283. 
Employers employing between 10 and 100 employees incur a cost of €7,578, and employers 
employing more than employees incur a cost of €9,088. These results show that dismissal costs 
increase with the size of the employer. A similar pattern is found for the civil court procedure. 
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Employers employing less than 10 employees, employers employing between 10 and 100 
employees and employers employing between 10 and 100 employees incur costs of €9,519, 
€20,851 and €40,442, respectively. 
 
 
Input for Figure 7a 
 Non 
economical 
Economical 
 n=272 n=722
Costs duration of 
procedure 
 
€ 3,437 € 2,786 
Costs time to notice € 866 € 758
Costs period of 
notice 
 
€ 3,037 € 3,988 
Total costs € 7,339 € 7,532
 
 
 
Input for Figure 7b 
 Non 
economical 
Economical 
 n=656 n=222 
Court fee € 102 € 104 
Costs duration of 
procedure € 740 
 
€ 839 
Costs time to 
termination  € 3,357 
 
€ 3,905 
Severance payment € 22,718 € 38,146 
Total costs € 26,918 € 42,994 
 
Figure 7 The costs of economical versus non-economical dismissals (in 2006 constant prices) (2006-2009). 
 
Figure 11 presents differences in dismissal costs with respect to gender. Procedures in which 
females are involved are less costly than procedures in which men are involved. At the PES, 
procedures involving women cost €4,847, procedures involving men cost €9,312. At the civil 
court, procedures involving women cost €19,832, and procedures involving men cost €38,122. 
 Last, Figure 12 distinguishes in costs between different types of legal forms of the 
employer. At the PES, costs incurred are highest for employers holding a limited liability private 
firm (BV) and lowest for employers that are sole traders (VOF). These costs are €8,217 and 
€4,147, respectively. At the civil court, a similar pattern is found. Costs are highest for limited 
liability private (BV) firms and lowest for sole traders (VOF). These costs are €33,511 and 
€10,770, respectively. 
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Input for Figure 8a 
 Non collective Collective 
 n=506 n=216
Costs duration of 
procedure 
 
€ 2,690 € 3,012 
Costs time to notice € 752,53 € 769
Costs period of 
notice 
 
€ 3,296 € 5,611 
Total costs € 6,738 € 9,392
 
Input for Figure 8b 
Non pro-forma Pro-forma 
n=125 n=753 
Court fee € 102 € 103 
Costs duration of 
procedure € 2,935 
 
€ 405 
Costs time to 
termination  € 1,998 
 
€ 3,745 
Severance payment € 26,384 € 26,658 
Total costs € 31,419 €30,910 
 
Figure 8 Costs of (non) collective  dismissal and (non) pro-forma cases (in 2006 constant prices) (2006-2009). 
4.6 Conclusion 
An employer in the Netherlands has two options to terminate a permanent employment 
contract. He may turn the PES for a dismissal permission, or he may ask the civil court to 
dissolve the employment contract144. Both procedures induce certain costs. This dissertation is 
the first to use a unique sample of 998 individual dismissal cases filed at the PES and 878 
individual dismissal cases filed at the civil court to calculate the exact costs of both the PES 
procedure and the civil court procedure. Our results show that the civil court procedure is 
approximately four times more expensive than the PES procedure. An average dismissal 
procedure at civil court costs €30,982. An average PES dismissal procedure costs €7,479. Median 
differences however are much smaller. Furthermore, an examination of real life cases shows 
that the civil court is not always the most expensive route to follow. In 17 percent of all cases 
(155 cases), severance payments are equal to zero and average dismissal costs are below 
€4,000. 
                                                        
144 As mentioned earlier, other options to terminate an employment contract are at will during the trial period, 
termination by mutual consent, termination by operation of law144 and by summary dismissal. These cases are not 
covered by our data. 
CHAPTER 4 
96 
We fill a gap in literature by observing actual dismissal cases. The studies of Hassink et al. (1998) 
and Knegt and Tros (2007) that also calculate the dismissal costs of both the PES procedure and 
the civil court procedure are based on surveys, and not on actual dismissal data. The 
observation of almost 2000 actual dismissal files enables us to be more accurate because we do 
not have to rely on self-reported values of employers and employees. Furthermore, we make a 
distinction in costs with respect to different characteristics related to the employee and the 
employer involved. This distinction allows for a better understanding of how firing decisions are 
made. For example, costs of economic dismissals via the civil court are almost six times larger 
than costs of economic dismissals via the PES (€ 42,994 vs. € 7,532) This cost difference puts 
additional strength to our argument that employers select a route strategically. Based on 
principles of economic efficiency one would predict that employers select the route with the 
lowest expected costs. An unobservable factor other than costs, however, results in the 
selection of the civil court route. The likelihood of success is one of those factors. 
 This distinction also allows us to predict the effect of the abolishment of one of both 
routes. For example, smaller firms are more likely to follow the PES route of dismissal.  When 
abolishing the PES route, these employers will be forced to select the more expensive civil court 
route. Dismissals due to a disturbed relationship are mostly filed at the civil court and rarely 
appear in front of PES. This is an indication that the civil court is a superior institute in judging 
whether a reasonable ground exists in disputes concerning the functioning of an employee. 
Similarly, one may argue that the PES is more specialized in prolonged illness dismissal requests. 
Abolishing the one or the other route will result in the destruction of a specialism of the specific 
route that is abolished.  
 The calculation of average dismissal costs of the current system as we presented in this 
chapter moreover allows for the comparison of costs of the current system and of any proposed 
modification in general. This idea is presented in Chapter 7 of this dissertation in which we show 
that the latest proposal to modify the Dutch EPL of June 2012 is not likely to result in a decrease 
in average firing costs. Employers that originally selected the PES route will incur costs that are 
higher than in the system as it exists today, employers that originally selected the civil court 
route are confronted with a decrease in costs.   
 We conclude this chapter by expressing that a choice per definition implies greater 
flexibility. Taking these thoughts one step further, we propose to formulate a model that 
explains the strategic choice of employers. The expected costs of both procedures are used as 
input for this model. This model can be used for sensitivity analysis to assess the impact of a 
modification of EPL on the working of the labor market.145 
 
                                                        
 145 In this chapter we showed that costs of dismissals via the civil court are on average higher than the costs of 
dismissal via the PES route. Herewith we do not express our preference for the PES route. It is an objective 
observation. Throughout this dissertation we plead for the maintenance of the dual preventative system.   
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Input for Figure 10a 
 < 10 10-100 >100 
 n=194 n=570 n=230
Costs duration of 
procedure 
 
€ 1,929 
 
€ 3,181 3,300 
Costs time to 
notice 
 € 705 € 780 € 874
Costs period of 
notice 
 
€ 2,648 
 
€ 3,617 € 4,914 
Total costs € 5,283 € 7,578 € 9,088
 
Input for Figure 10b 
 < 10 10-100 >100 
n=134 n=235 n=509 
Court fee € 98 € 103 € 103 
Costs duration of 
procedure € 780 
 
€ 839 
 
€ 727 
Costs time to 
termination € 2,420 
 
€ 2,672 
 
€ 4,160 
Severance payment € 9,519 € 17,238 € 35,452 
Total costs € 12,816 € 20,851 € 40,442 
 
Figure 10 Costs according to firm size (in 2006 constant prices) (2006-2009). 
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Input for Figure 11a 
 Female Male 
 n=408 n=586
Costs duration of 
procedure 
 
€ 2,133 € 3,543 
Costs time to notice € 561 € 945
Costs period of 
notice 
 
€ 2,153 € 4,825 
Total costs € 4,847 € 9,312
 
 
 
Input for Figure 11b 
Female Male 
n=344 n=534 
Court fee € 102 € 103 
Costs duration of 
procedure € 454 
 
€ 965 
Costs time to 
termination € 2,554 
 
€ 4,102 
Severance payment € 16,721 € 32,995 
Total costs € 19,832 € 38,166 
 
Figure 11 Costs according to gender (in 2006 constant prices) (2006-2009). 
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5.1 Introduction146 
According to existing labor market theories and common belief countries with strong 
employment protection will have high unemployment rates and low employment participation 
levels, especially in Europe (e.g. Emerson (1988), Bertola (1990), and Blanchard and Portugal 
(2001)). This chapter, Section 2, presents a comparison of the EU15 countries. It shows that the 
Dutch labor market is marked with one of the strongest employment protection laws for 
workers with job tenure, but in the meantime the country’s economy is among the top 3 
performers in Europe with respect to unemployment levels, labor market participation and 
worker productivity. We argue that this remarkable phenomenon is based on a long-lasting 
characteristic of duality in the Dutch labor market, a feature that has been overlooked by most 
of the existing scholarly research on labor market institutions, job protection and social 
insurance.147 Firms in the Netherlands have a unique option to choose from two different ways 
to dissolve tenured worker contracts. One possibility is to ask the public employment service 
(PES)148 for a dismissal permission. The other possibility is to request the court to dissolve the 
contract. The check on the reasonableness of dismissal is a preventative check. The most 
important difference between the PES and the civil court is that the PES relieves the firm from 
the obligation of severance payment.  
 In Section 3 we shortly present the Dutch system in more detail. We shows that larger firms 
tend go to court more. Furthermore, employees involved in the civil court procedure earn 
slightly higher wages. On average the duration of the court procedure is shorter (three weeks), 
but the expected length of the procedure is more unpredictable. As shown in the previous 
chapter of this dissertation the expected costs are higher and more uncertain. This is 
predominantly caused by the fact that severance payments are determined by court ruling and 
when a dismissal is approved by the PES the firm is relieved from the obligation of severance 
payment. Severance pay lenience for firms in distress is a unique feature of the Dutch labor 
market that results from the duality in the Dutch system.  
 Section 4 presents a simple theoretical equilibrium model to study the system’s effects. The 
model predicts that as long as the wage elasticity of labor demand does not exceed the inverse 
of the replacement ratio a system of severance payment exemption is less costly than the 
alternative of additional unemployment benefits. The likelihood that this condition holds 
increases when a firm is hit by a negative shock. We conclude this chapter with an outlook for 
future research. 
                                                        
146 I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Pfann for the development of this thesis in general, and for the development of this 
chapter more specifically. 
147 Belot, Boone and Van Ours. (2007), and Freeman (2008a) and Freeman (2008b). 
148 PES is used as an acronym for public employment service. 
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5.2 Some characteristics of European labor markets 
We start our analysis with a comparison of labor market statistics of the EU15 countries.149 In 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation we have presented the OECD index of the strictness in protection 
against individual dismissal of workers with permanent employment contracts. Of all EU15 
countries, Portugal, Germany, and the Netherlands form the top three of countries with the 
strictest protection of permanent jobs. 
 According to existing labor market theory, countries with strict employment protection 
laws will have high levels of temporary employment, high unemployment rates, low 
employment participation levels, and low worker productivity. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show, 
respectively, temporary employment and unemployment rates for the EU15 countries. The rate 
of temporary workers in the Netherlands is indeed one of the highest in Europe, but the 
unemployment rate is among the lowest. Labor market participation in the Netherlands is the 
second highest in Europe (Figure 3), and labor productivity per hour worked is far above the 
EU15 average (Figure 4). The long-term growth in labor market participation is higher in the 
Netherlands than in Europe (Figure 5), and the rate of unemployment is structurally among the 
lowest in Europe during the past decades (Figure 6). On the basis of these comparisons it does 
not seem to be unreasonable to state that the Dutch labor market is an example that challenges 
modern theories of unemployment and worker protection. 
 
 
Figure 1 Temporary employment† rates in EU15 countries (Eurostat, 2011). 
†Temporary employment is measured as temporary employees as percentage of the total number of employees. 
Data extracted on 06 Jul 2012, Eurostat. 
 
 
                                                        
149 The EU15 refers to the number of member countries of the European Union prior to May 1st, 2004. The countries 
are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
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Figure 2 Unemployment rates† in EU15 countries (Eurostat, 2011). 
† The unemployment rate is measured as unemployed persons as a percentage of the labour force based on 
International Labour Office (ILO) definition. Data extracted on 06 Jul 2012, Eurostat. 
 
 
Figure 3 Labor market parƟcipaƟon rates† in EU15 countries (Eurostat, 2011). 
†The labor market parƟcipaƟon rate is calculated by dividing the number of persons aged 20 to 64 in employment by 
the total population of the same age group. Data extracted on 06 Jul 2012, Eurostat. 
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Figure 4 Labor producƟvity per hour worked† in EU15 countries (Eurostat, 2010*) 
†Labor producƟvity per hour worked is measure as GDP per hour worked. Data extracted on 06 Jul 2012, Eurostat. 
*Latest complete version available. 
 
 
Figure 5 Labor market parƟcipaƟon† rates though Ɵme (1992-2011), Eurostat (2011). 
†The labor market parƟcipaƟon rate is calculated by dividing the number of persons aged 20 to 64 in employment by 
the total population of the same age group. Data extracted on 06 Jul 2012, Eurostat. 
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5.3 Duality in the Dutch labor market 
What is special about the Dutch labor market in comparison to other labor markets is that it is 
characterized by a system of duality. This duality implies that an employer has two choices to 
terminate employment contracts of tenured workers.150 The first possibility is to ask the PES for 
a dismissal permission. The second option is to request the universal civil court to dissolve the 
contract. Both institutes apply a preventative check during which the reasonability of the 
dismissal is checked before a worker can be dismissed. The most important difference between 
the civil court and the PES is that when permission for dismissal is granted by the PES a firm is 
relieved from the obligation of severance payment.151 It can be regarded as a form of public 
solidarity. We interpret this as a pure cost reduction for the firm in need paid for by the 
government in times of economic distress.152 
 Figure 7 presents how the number of requests that have been filed at the PES and at the 
civil courts in the period 1997-2011 vary with the unemployment rate. It shows that the two 
routes of dismissal are chosen by employers in almost equal proportions independent of the 
state of the business cycle. Figure 7 furthermore shows that not only in recessions firms are 
granted permission from the PES to dismiss workers but during expansions also. This outcome is 
consistent with the fact that job destruction and job creation occur simultaneously over the 
business cycle (Davis and Haltiwanger (1992)). The incidence of negative demand shocks and 
therefore of permissions by the PES is only smaller during economic upturns. Each volume of 
requests is noticeably a leading indicator for the unemployment rate.  
 We continue this section with comparing the PES route to the civil court route with respect 
to differences in employees and employers involved, but also with respect to case-specific 
characteristics. Table 1 shows the numbers and percentages of lay-offs divided by the 
employment sector, firm size and gender. It furthermore shows the likelihood that the request 
is granted. That is, that the PES grants dismissal permission and that the civil court dissolves the 
contract. Pearson χ2 statistics and corresponding p-values are added to show whether 
differences in sample proportions are significant. An often heard argument of why employers 
choose the civil court route is that the likelihood of success is larger. Indeed, in less than 1 % of 
all cases the contract is not dissolved. Win rated at PES, however, are also high. The distribution 
of dismissals over the various sectors does not differ in great detail between the civil court and 
the PES. This result is in line with the partition shown in Figure 7. Moreover, the data show no 
significant difference between the numbers of male and female lay-offs. We do find differences 
with respect to firm size. Larger firms tend go to court more often. This is a novel finding, that is 
                                                        
150 As mentioned earlier in Chapter 2, other options to terminate an employment contract are at will during the trial 
period, termination by mutual consent, termination by operation of law and by summary dismissal. 
151 For a more detailed overview of the difference between the separate procedures, we refer to Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation. 
152 Alternatively, workers can be exempted from paying income tax. The 1997 Alabama Severance Pay Exemption Act 
exempts the first $25,000 of severance pay (including unemployment compensation, termination pay, or income 
from a supplemental income plan) received by an employee, who, as a result of “administrative downsizing” loses 
his or her job (quoted from http://ador.alabama.gov/incometax/esp.html). 
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in line with related research of other European countries (Bender, Dustmann, Margolis and 
Meghir (2002) for Germany and France; Boeri and Jimeno (2005) for Italy). 
 
Figure 7 Duality of the Dutch labor market. 
 
Table 2 presents information on the differences in duration of the dismissal procedures and 
some other job characteristics. T-test statistics and corresponding p-values that are reported 
show that all differences in means are significant. Differences in age and tenure between the 
two separate procedure are small though. The average age of an employee involved in a PES 
procedure and civil court procedure equal 44 years and 42 years, respectively. The tenure 
difference between the separate procedures is only one year. The duration of the civil court 
procedure is about three weeks shorter than the PES procedure. However, the variance of the 
court procedure duration is much larger. Employees involved in the civil court route earn higher 
wages than those involved in the PES route, both in terms of monthly wage and hourly wage. 
Moreover, the former groups works longer hours than the latter. 
Table 1 Dismissals trough PES or civil court: Descriptives for the period 2006-2009 (continued on next page). 
 PES  Civil court    
Likelihood of dismissal n %  n %  Pearson χ2  p-value 
Granted/dissolved 994 87.65 878 93.21 17.89 .00 
Non granted/not dissolved 45 3.97 8 0.85 20.12 .00 
Withdrawn 95 8.38 56 5.94 4.51 .03 
Total 1,134 100 942 100  
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Table 1 continued. 
 PES  Civil court    
Sectors of employment n %  n %  Pearson χ2  p-value 
Commercial services 153 13.49 172 18.26 8.85 0.00 
Construction 67 5.91 40 4.25 2.91 0.09 
Culture and recreation 36 3.17 33 3.50 0.17 0.68 
Health and wellness 147 12.96 105 11.15 1.59 0.21 
Hotel and catering 29 2.56 21 2.23 0.24 0.63 
Industry 337 29.72 248 26.33 2.92 0.09 
Transport 70 6.17 98 10.40 12.38 .00 
Wholesale 247 21.78 129 13.69 23.68 .00 
Other 48 4.23 96 10.19 28.30 .00 
Total 1,134 100 942 100  
Firm Size n %  n %  Pearson χ2  p-value 
Less than 10 215 18.96 147 15.61 4.02 .05 
Between 10-100 662 58.38 257 27.28 201.66 .00 
More than 100 257 22.66 538 57.11 258.43 .00 
Total 1,134 100 942 100  
Gender n %  n %  Pearson χ2  p-value 
Male 670 59.08 360 38.22 1.57 0.21 
Female 464 40.92 582 61.78  
Total 1,134 100 942 100  
 
Table 3 gives an overview of the different reasons for which a dismissal has been requested. 
Distinctions are made between economic and non-economic reasons. Important economic 
reasons are long-term declines in sales or reduction in orders of production. Our data include 
1,049 cases of lay-offs for economic reasons. The majority of dismissal requests being granted 
by the PES exist of job destructions for economic reasons. A smaller but not negligible amount 
of 21.9 percent of dismissal requests for economic reasons end up in court. Non-economic 
reasons are divided into dysfunctional behavior/disturbed relationship, reproachable behavior, 
illness, and a rest category. Almost all cases of prolonged illness are filed at the PES. Most other 
cases, mainly of disputes, are dealt with by the civil courts. A majority of firms successfully 
applies for permission to lay-off workers for economic reasons. We can compare the 
unconditional probabilities of permanent job destruction by the PES for economic reasons and 
of the non-economic reasons through court. The respective probabilities are 0.395 and 0.343, 
and almost equal. The “off-diagonal” probabilities of non-economic dismissals approved by the 
PES and economic dismissals through court are, 0.152 and 0.111, respectively, and also almost 
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equal. These results corroborates with Figure 7 that the graphs for the PES and the civil court 
dismissals move along over the business cycle.  
 Since firms are relieved from the obligation of severance payment when the PES grants a 
dismissal request we argue that the PES is the institution that is responsible for severance pay 
exemption for firms that go through a period of economic contraction. The PES is instructed to 
judge whether a request for permission to dissolve a permanent worker contract is based on 
reasonable grounds. This preventative check of the PES is one of the most important disciplinary 
instruments currently available for the Dutch labor market. That is, it prevents firms in demise 
to seek a reduction of severance payments for unjustifiable reasons, and it reduces the costs of 
a firm’s moral hazard to lay-off a worker at will imposed upon the Dutch society. In general, the 
concept of moral hazard implies that human beings will take risks if they have a reason to do so 
and ignore the moral implications of their choices. As an alternative, they will do what benefits 
them the most. More specifically, when a firm runs the risk of having to pay a high severance it 
has an incentive to lay off a worker at will on unjustifiable grounds, especially when being in 
economic distress. A preventative check does not allow an employer to do so. Additionally, the 
PES offers firms that are hit by a negative shock the option to dismiss an employee without the 
obligation of severance payment. Dismissals on unjustifiable grounds are rejected and costs of 
additional unemployment in recessions are avoided. 
 
Table 2 Dismissals trough PES or civil court: Descriptives for the period 2006-2009. 
PES Duration in 
months† 
Age Age 
employed 
Tenure in 
months 
Hourly wage Monthly 
wage 
Working 
hours  
Mean 1.11 44.72 33.65 132.85 € 13.51 € 2,059.62 31.79 
Median 0.82 45.00 32.64 96.48 € 12.38 € 2,013.46 36.02 
St. Dev. 1.01 9.97 10.28 104.83 € 5.26 € 1,112.20 9.81 
Min 0.00 17.00 15.59 1.81 € 3.59 € 92.31 2.13 
Max 10.16 70.00 65.45 513.44 € 69.25 € 12,640.38 50.00 
Civil court Duration in 
months† 
Age Age 
employed 
Tenure in 
months 
Hourly wage Monthly 
wage 
Working 
hours  
Mean 0.34 42.28 32.25 120.33 € 16.35 € 2,654.92 33.46 
Median 0.10 42.00 30.86 78.95 € 13.97 € 2,250.01 36.02 
St. Dev. 0.63 9.79 9.49 114.18 € 8.48 € 1,741.27 7.87 
Min 0.00 19.00 15.16 0.89 € 6.85 € 222.24 4.85 
Max 9.47 64.00 57.61 550.13 € 86.64 € 17,128.79 44.53 
    
t-staƟsƟc†† -27.48 -5.60 -3.12 -2.60 8.93 9.07 4.30 
p-value .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 
†PES: The duraƟon reported here is the diﬀerence between the date a case is taken into account and the date a case 
is closed. In Chapter 4 we reported the difference between the registration data and the closure date. Civil court: The 
duration is the difference between the registration date  and the closure date. 
†† For duraƟon, age employed, hourly wage, monthly wage and working hours, we conducted a t-test assuming 
unequal variances (Satterthwaite’s approximate t-test). For age and tenure we conducted a t-test assuming equal 
variances. 
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Table 3 Reasons dismissal: Descriptive statistics and probabilities for the period 2006-2009. 
Panel A. Reasons dismissal 
 PES   Civil court  
 n %   n %  
Economical 819 72.22 230 24.42 
Dysfunction/Disturbed relationship 18 1.59  684 72.61 
Reproachable behavior† 13 1.15  12 1.27 
Illness 269 23.72  10 1.06 
Other 15 1.32  6 0.64 
Total 1,134 100  942 100 
Panel B. Probabilities for Economic and Non-economic reasons 
PES Civil Court Both  
Economic Reasons 
0.395 0.111 0.505  
819 230 1,049  
Non-Economic Reasons 
0.152 0.343 0.495  
315 712 1027  
All 0.546 0.454 1.000  
1,134 942 2,076  
† For civil court these cases include, theŌ, fraud and misconcepƟon. For PES we cannot make a distinction between 
different reproachable behavior cases. 
5.4 Some theoretical considerations 
In competitive labor markets government mandated severance payments are offset by optimal 
contracts between the worker and the firm (Lazear (1990), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999), 
Pissarides (2001)). Concerns about everlasting job shortage in modern labor markets challenged 
the equilibrium market model and induced the development of theories of labor market 
rigidities (Akerlof and Yellen (1985), Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Nickell (1997), Garibaldi and 
Violante (2005)). In a recent theoretical paper, Michaillat (2012) argues that in periods of 
contraction matching frictions, as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), are relatively 
unimportant. Job shortage can occur in equilibrium nevertheless and results from a combination 
of wage rigidity and diminishing marginal returns to labor. That being the case this chapter 
investigates the possibility that a government can intervene to overcome job shortage by 
securing jobs in recessions. For the economy as a whole Kaldor (1936) suggested a model of 
government intervention through wage subsidy to reduce unemployment. This chapter is the 
first to study this set up in the style of modern economics. We present a simple equilibrium 
model to investigate the possible effects of a specific government policy  to secure jobs in firms 
that go through a period of economic downturn.  
 Consider a competitive labor market, where the costs of a firm to employ a worker are w 
that includes a severance pay contribution τ to the government. R(ℓ) is the firm’s revenue 
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function of a single input ℓ, with 0'>R and 0"<R . In order to determine the optimum input *L  
given w the firm’s objective is to maximize the expected profit E{Π( *L )} with respect to *L  
  
(1) ( ){ } ( ){ }***
**
wLLRMaxLEMax
LL
−=Π  
The first order necessary condition yields  
  
(2)  wR =' . 
 
Solving (2) provides the unique solution for input *L .  
 
Severance pay exemption for a firm in demise 
If the firm is relieved of the obligatory severance pay, then the wage costs will be lower. The 
firm’s objective function changes into 
 
(3) ( ){ } ( ){ }ττττ
ττ
LwLRMaxLEMax
LL
−=Π , 
 
with wτ = w – τ The first order necessary condition is  
 
(4) τwR ='  or  τ−= wR'  
 
Since, it holds that ∆wτ = wτ – w=– τ, it holds that )(')(' *LRLR <τ . 
 
The probability of exemption 
Now suppose that with probability 0 < pτ < 1 a firm is granted exemption of severance pay. This 
case describes closest the situation for firms in the Netherlands. The firm’s objective function 
then becomes 
 
(5). ( ){ } ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]{ }LwLRpwLRpMaxLEMax
LL
τττττ +−−+−=Π 1  
 
The first order necessary condition is 
 
(6) [ ] ( ) ( )[ ] 0'1' =+−−+− τττττ wRpwRp . 
 
Rewriting gives 
  
(7) ττpwR −='  
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With 0 < pτ <1 it holds that )(')(')(' *LRLRLR <<τ , so that the marginal revenue in the case 
of a probable exemption of severance pay is lower than without that possibility (when pτ = 0), 
but higher when no uncertainty exists and exemption is always granted (when pτ = 1). L is being 
chosen in advance of the state of nature being revealed. In the real world, of course actual firms 
have to make exactly such ex ante decisions. 
The effect of severance pay exemption policy on revenues 
In this section we investigate the effect of the severance pay exemption policy on the firm’s 
total revenues. Let R be a linear-quadratic revenue function of the firm with employment as the 
only input, 2)21()/()( lll ββα −=R with α,β>0, so that βα /)()(' ll −=R  for *,LL=l  
 
From equations (2) and (7) we get 
 
(8)  *L = α – βw 
  
and  
 
(9)  L= α – βw + βpττ.  
 
Since pτ > 0, we have 0* >=−≡Δ τβ τpLLL , and therefore the firm’s employment level is 
higher with the severance pay exemption policy than without. 
 The change in employment that results from the severance pay exemption policy is --  
positively -- related to three parameters. The first parameter is the severance pay rate, τ. The 
effect of the exemption policy will be larger when the severance pay rates are higher. The 
second parameter is the probability of exemption, pτ. An increase of the exemption probability 
renders the exemption policy more effective to secure jobs. The third parameter is β, the slope 
of the demand curve. If labor demand is highly elastic (flat demand curve, β is small), then the 
effect of the policy will be small (ΔL will be small). If labor demand is inelastic the effect of the 
policy will be large. This is a surprising result. It holds true because in equation (9) β determines 
the slope as well as the intercept of the demand curve. 
The firm’s expected revenues are always higher with the severance pay exemption 
policy than without. This can be shown as follows. Define ΔR ≡ R(L)–R( *L ). Subtracting 
equation (9) from (8) gives ΔR = β((wpττ – ½(pττ)2). So ΔR>0 iff w> ½pττ. Since w = wτ + τ, wτ>0, 
and 0 < pτ < 1 , the inequality w > ½ pττ always holds and therefore ΔR> 0.153 
 The responsiveness of the firm to the exemption policy can be investigated in more detail 
in the following way. Define η as the wage elasticity of labor demand between the two regimes 
with and without the probability for a firm to receive severance pay exemption. Then  
 
 
τ
τη
w
w
L
L ΔΔ
= , 
 
                                                        
153 Similarly, the firm’s expected profits are higher with the severance pay exemption probability than without. 
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With Δwτ = – τ, so that η < 0. Let ν > 0 be the unemployment benefit per worker paid by the 
government and let ρ ≡ v/wτ be the replacement ratio. The equilibrium condition for the 
exemption policy to be effective is that the costs for the government are equal in both regimes. 
Without the policy the government receives from the firm severance payments τ *L . In case of 
an exemption the government receives zero severance payments, but saves νΔL on 
unemployment benefits. The equilibrium condition can be written as 
 
(10) τ *L = νΔL,  or τ(L-ΔL) = νΔL. 
 
Given that ΔL > 0, we write 
 
(11) 


−
Δ
= 1
L
Lv τ  
 
Combining equations (9) and (11) yields 
 
(12)  
η
τ τ
wv −=+ ,  or 
1−




+−=
τ
τρρη
w
 
 
From this we conclude that a necessary condition is –ρ –1 <η <0, or in absolute terms  
|η| < |ρ –1|. In this simple model of linear demand and linear-quadratic revenue functions with 
employment as the only input we find that in order for the severance pay exemption policy to 
be effective and cost-conscious the wage elasticity of labor demand should not exceed the 
inverse of the replacement ratio. A system of severance payment exemption is less costly than 
the alternative of additional unemployment benefits as long as the wage elasticity of labor 
demand does not exceed the inverse of the replacement ratio. Let’s assume generously that the 
replacement ratio is .75, so that its inverse is 1.33.  Generally, the full (substitution and scale 
elasticity) labor-demand elasticity in absolute terms is one or below (Hamermesh, 1996). 
The effect of a negative shock  
The wage elasticity of labor demand increases (less negative, closer to zero) with the size of the 
shock. This can be shown as follows. Let ῆ be the wage elasticity of labor demand after a 
negative shock that shifts the demand curve inwards. Given that τ−=Δ=Δ ww~ , LL Δ=Δ~ , and 
''~ LL = , it holds that  
 
L
w
L
w
~
~
ττ < , and therefore that 1~
~
~ <= L
w
L
w ττ
η
η , so that ηη ~< , or in absolute terms ηη ~>  
 
This result states that the likelihood that the necessary condition -- that the wage elasticity of 
labor demand does not exceed the inverse of the replacement ratio -- holds increases during 
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recessions, when more firms are hit by downward shocks.154 Consequently, the severance pay 
exemption policy is more effective during periods of recession.155 
Estimate for the transfer probability pτ 
An estimate for the transfer probability pτ can be obtained from Table 4: pτ = 
(819/1134)/[(230/942)+(819/1134)] = 0.75. Three out of four permanent contract jobs that are 
terminated for economic reasons receive approval from the PES. The fourth ends up in court. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Severance pay lenience is one the most important disciplinary instruments currently available 
for Dutch labor market policy. Preventive dismissal checks restrain firms to seek reduction of 
severance payments on unjustifiable grounds. Consequently, firms are discouraged to shift 
private costs to society on considerations of self-interest alone. The possibility to grant 
permission for dismissal of tenured workers by the PES reduces moral hazard in the labor 
market when firms go through bad times.  
 The analysis of a simple general equilibrium model shows that in order for severance pay 
exemption policy to be effective and cost-conscious the wage elasticity of labor demand must 
not exceed the inverse of the replacement ratio. Then a labor market policy with severance 
payment exemption is less costly than the alternative of additional unemployment benefits. 
Moreover, the policy is more effective during periods of recession. 
  Our study uses the tools from modern micro- and labor economics to analyze job security 
provision and social insurance policies in times of economic recession. The equilibrium policy 
analysis presented in this paper leaves ample ground for extension, specialization, and 
generalization.  For example, in line with Michaillat (2012) we assumed that in times of 
economic downturn there is excess labor supply, so that demand determines the level of 
employment. One of the most imperative steps to take next is to design a dynamic general 
equilibrium search model as in Landais, Michaillat and Saez (2012). Such a model extended with 
cyclical severance pay exemption governmental policy is necessary for sensitivity analysis of the 
critical assumptions and to perform analyses of the influence of government policy on job 
protection during periods of economic expansion and recession separately. 
 
 
  
                                                        
154 This theoretical result is also supported empirically. Drazen, Hamermesh and Obst (1984), for example, find that 
during recessions the demand elasticity is found to be closer to zero. 
155 A negative shock can be so large, that L<0 and the firm would go bankrupt unless the government is willing to 
make a contribution to the firm and jobs might be saved. In our model this implies that temporarily τ<0. This was in 
fact the situation in the Great Recession of 2008-2009 when the Dutch government helped saving private banks such 
as Fortis, Aegon, ABN-AMRO and ING with large financial injections. 
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CHAPTER 6:  
RECESSION INDUCED REQUESTS AND THE 
LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS 
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6.1 Introduction 
Two employees that perform equally well should have the same likelihood of being dismissed. 
From a normative point of view, employers should not be influenced by the state of the 
economy in their decision to fire an employee. In practice, both Siegelman and Donohue III 
(1995) and Ichino, Polo and Rettore (2003) provide evidence that the decision to file a dismissal 
case is not only dependent on the severity of the misconduct, but also on the state of the 
economy. They discovered that recession induced cases are weaker than cases that are filed in 
economic booms.  
 The Dutch system is different from the Italian and the US dismissal system discussed in the 
studies of Ichino et al. and Siegelman and Donohue III. Because the Netherlands applies a 
preventative check of dismissal, the plaintiff is the employer and the defendant is the employee. 
In both Italy and the US a repressive check exists, implying that the role of plaintiff and 
defendant are reversed; the plaintiff is the employee, the defendant the employer. 
Furthermore, unlike Italy and the US, and most other countries, the Netherlands has two 
institutes responsible for the enforcement of employment protection laws. When intending to 
terminate a permanent employment contract, the employer may request the public 
employment service (PES)156 to dissolve the employment contract, or he may ask the universal 
civil court to dissolve the contract. Both routes apply a different set of laws (see Chapter 2).  
 This chapter shows that the number of PES dismissal requests and number of civil court 
dismissal requests increases with increasing unemployment rates. This holds true for both 
economic and noneconomic requests. The aim of this chapter is to test if the recession induced 
cases that we observe in the Dutch system exhibit the same characteristic as the recession 
induced cases observed by Ichino et al. and Siegelman and Donohue III. If exhibiting the 
characteristic of being of lower quality, cases that are filed in recessionary periods should have a 
larger likelihood of being rejected. Using a novel data set, this paper tries to answer the 
following research question. Are recession induced cases that are filed at the PES and the civil 
court relatively weaker cases? In the Netherland, a written set of employment protection laws 
determine under which conditions dismissal is fair . We define a weaker case as a case that does 
not, partly or fully, comply with the definition of a fair dismissal as stipulated in the Dutch code 
of law.  
 We show that recession induced PES dismissal request are less likely to be won by the 
employer. Under the assumption that judicial decision making is independent of the state of the 
economy, we provide evidence that recession induced cases are weaker. These results are 
desirable because they imply that the PES does not allow an employer to terminate a 
permanent employment contract without a reasonable cause. For the civil court we do not find 
evidence that recession induced cases are weaker.   
 The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section 2 present a short overview of Dutch 
legislation. Only the most important aspects of law are discussed, for a more detailed 
description of law see Chapter 2 of this dissertation. Section 3 proceeds with a theoretical 
                                                        
156PES is used as an acronym for public employment service. The official Dutch name for the public employment 
service (PES) is Uitvoeringsinstituut WerknemersVerzekeringen (UWV). The subsidiary responsible for handling 
dismissal requests  is the UWVwerkbedrijf. Troughout this chapter we will use the acronym PES. 
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framework in which hypothesis are presented. Section 4 shows data and results. In Section 5 the 
implications of our results are discussed. Last, Section 6 concludes. 
6.2 Legal background 
The Netherlands, unlike other countries, has two institutes enforcing employment protection 
legislation (EPL); the public employment service (PES), and the civil court. Both institutes 
perform an a priori check of dismissal. This implies that, before dismissing a worker, an 
employer needs to request the PES for a dismissal permission or he may ask the court to 
dissolve the employment contract.157 This section briefly explains the Dutch EPL. It only 
highlights those rules that are applicable in this chapter. For a more detailed overview of the 
Dutch employment protection legislation (EPL)158 system, see Chapter 2 of this dissertation.  
PES. The PES is an administrative public body that operates under close supervision of the 
government.159 In order to judge whether dismissal is fair, the PES consults the policy rules 
governed by the Dismissal Decree (DD). A fair dismissal is a dismissal that is able to fulfill all 
criteria that are stipulated in the DD. The list of criteria that should be met is different for 
different dismissal reasons. Fair dismissals are dismissals based on economic grounds (e.g. 
redundancy), dysfunctional behavior, a disturbed employment relationship, illness and 
misconduct. A dismissal request needs to be substantiated with detailed evidence.160 If the PES 
judges dismissal to be fair, dismissal permission is given. Employees who are dismissed via the 
PES are not awarded a severance payment.  
Civil court. The civil court is an independent legal body. Rules and regulations regarding the 
rescission of the employment contract by court are recorded in the Civil Code.161 The civil court 
may dissolve the contract for substantial reasons. A substantial reason is a circumstance that 
would have also allowed for an immediate dismissal. Examples are fraud, incompetence, 
drunkenness, theft and reckless behavior. A substantial reason also refers to a circumstantial 
change that justifies the termination of an employment relationship. Examples are financial 
distress, disturbed employment relationship, employee dysfunctional behavior and illness. If an 
employment contract is rescinded because of a change in circumstances, the civil court may 
oblige the employer to pay severance payment. The amount is stated in a civil court guideline 
and equals A x B x C, where factor A is the weighted years of service. The older the employee, 
                                                        
157 Next to termination by dismissal, an employment contract may also be terminated by mutual consent and by the 
expiration of a fixed term contract, on the expiration of an agreed upon period. Other options are termination of the 
contract during the trial period and immediate dismissals. An estimation of the distribution of dismissal cases over 
the different termination options is given by a research conducted in 2001 (Research and Beleid, 2001). This 
research indicates that in 42% of all cases termination of an employment contract occurs because of the expiration 
of a fixed term contract. 5% is termination by mutual consent. 14% of cases follows either the PES (7%) or the civil 
court procedure (7%). 
158 In this chapter EPL is used as an acronym for employment protection legislation. 
159 The minister of Social Welfare and Employment is authorized to grant dismissal approval and has delegated this 
authority to the PES. The PES is supposed to report to the Minister on how the authority to grant dismissal approval 
is practiced. 
160 For a detailed description of these criteria, see the Beleidsregels Ontslagtaak UWV, UWV (2012). 
161 The provisions of the Civil Code do not apply to persons employed by a public body, unless agreed-upon 
otherwise by both parties, before or on initiation of the employment relationship, either by law or by ordinance. 
CHAPTER 6 
120 
the more weight is attached to his or her years of service.162 Factor B is the gross monthly salary, 
including fixed components such as holiday pay. Factor C is a correction factor that is 
determined by the civil court. Factor C usually equals 1, but may be fixed at a higher or a lower 
level. 
 One can distinguish between two type of civil court dismissal cases. The first is a 
contradiction case. A contradiction case is a case of mutual disagreement: the employer intends 
to dismiss the worker but the worker does not agree about being dismissed, about the terms of 
dismissal, or both. Both parties are heard during an oral session after which the court decides 
about the outcome of the dismissal dispute. The second type of case is a non-contradiction or 
pro-forma case. The outcome of a pro-forma case is mutually agreed upon by the employer and 
the employee and is already known before turning to court. Preceding the court procedure, 
agreements are made about the date of termination and the severance payment that will be 
awarded to the dismissed employee. The court has no incentive not to follow the agreements 
made. Before the 1st of October 2006, non-contradiction procedures were mainly followed to 
safeguard the payment of unemployment benefit.  Before the 1st of October 2006, the Dutch 
social security system did not award unemployment benefit to a worker whose contract was 
terminated with the worker’s consent. Since October 2006 this no longer holds true. Today, 
non-contradiction procedures are followed to safeguard agreements made. In the years 2003-
2009 approximately 80% of all civil court cases in the Netherlands were non-contradiction 
cases.163 
 
 
Figure 1 Contradiction versus non-contradiction cases. The total Netherlands (2003-2009). 
6.3 Theoretical background 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the relation between the number of dismissal requests filed at the 
PES and the civil court, respectively, and the unemployment rate. Both figures distinguish 
                                                        
162 The years of service up to the age of 40 are counted as one month’s salary, from 40 to 50 as 1.5 and after 50 as 2. 
163 We obtained this information from the Raad voor de Rechtspraak (2010). 
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between economical and non-economical dismissals. Furthermore, Panel A shows actual 
numbers per month obtained from the sample data collected. For a more detailed overview of 
this data see Chapter 3 of this dissertation. Panel B shows 3-month moving averages to smooth 
out small-term changes and to highlight a longer term trend.  Both figures show that the 
number of total request moves together with the unemployment rate. The same holds true for 
the number of economic request. This simultaneous movement with the unemployment rate is 
less visible for the number of noneconomic dismissal, especially at the PES. Correlations, 
however, show that both the number of economic admissions and the number of non-economic 
admission are positively correlated with the unemployment rate. This holds true for both the 
PES route and the civil court route, see Table 1 for an overview of correlations.  
Table 1 The unemployment rate and number of dismissal request, correlations (based on total sample, PES n=1,162, 
civil court n=2,390). 
   r p-value. 
Total dismissals PES  .342 .017 
Economic dismissals PES  .349 .015 
Non-economic dismissals PES  .322 .026 
       
Total dismissals civil court  .282 .007 
Economic dismissals civil court  .288 .006 
Non-economic dismissals civil court  .280 .008 
 
From an economic perspective, a simultaneous increase of the number of economic dismissal 
and the unemployment rate is expected since firms in economic distress are forced to lay-off 
workers. An increasing number of non-economical request when the economy is down seems 
less straightforward. At the PES, noneconomic dismissal are mainly cases in which the employee 
concerned is ill. At the civil court, these noneconomic cases are mostly filed due to a disturbed 
relationship. From a normative point of view, being ill or performing badly should not be 
dependent on the state of the economy. In a different setting than the Dutch setting, however, 
we have already seen that a weak economy elicits an increase in the number of dismissal cases. 
Siegelman and Donohue III (1995) show that the number of employment discrimination disputes 
filed at court rise with the unemployment rate. They provide evidence, however, that the cases 
filed during recessions tend to be of weaker quality than those filed during nonrecessionary 
times. An equal finding is presented by Ichino et al. (2003) as they show that in regions where 
unemployment is high, the gravity of the cases going to trial tends to be higher than in other 
regions. In both the study of Ichino et al. and the study of Siegelman and Donohue III, the 
worker is the plaintiff and the employer the defendant. As such, their research concludes that 
the average plaintiff’s case is weaker in economic downturns than in economic upturns. We 
hypothesize that the recession induced cases that we observe in the Dutch system exhibit the 
same characteristic. If so, cases that are filed in recessionary periods have a larger likelihood of 
being rejected. Hence, we propose the following hypotheses: 
H1: The likelihood that dismissal permission is granted by the PES decreases with increasing 
unemployment rates. 
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H2: The likelihood that the employment contract is dissolved by the civil court decreases with 
increasing unemployment rates. 
These hypotheses are in line with results of Siegelman and Donohue III that show that recession 
induced cases are less often won by plaintiffs, simply because of the fact that they are of lower 
quality.164 Ichino et al. actually find that despite of the lower quality of recession induced cases, 
courts still decide in favor of the plaintiff. The authors argue that this is due to the fact that the 
legal standards of courts in Italy are influenced by unemployment.  Different from Ichino et al., 
we make the simple assumption that Dutch law defines such a narrow grid of prescriptions, so 
that there is no room for the judge to be influenced. In other words, under Dutch law the 
decision to terminate an employment contract is not dependent by any other factors than the 
severity of the dismissal case alone.  
6.4 Data and results 
In order to test our hypotheses, we use a unique dataset that is collected at the civil court and 
the PES. The complete data set we collected contains 1,162 PES dismissal cases and 2,390 civil 
court cases (See Chapter 3 and Appendices C and D). In order to conduct  this analyses only  part 
of the original data set is selected. Our definition of a dismissal cases is a dismissal dispute in 
which an employee requests for dismissal permission of one of his permanent employees. 
Hence, fixed term contracts and employees that have requested for the rescission of the 
contract are excluded. Furthermore, because our interest is in analyzing the decision of the 
judge, withdrawn cases and non-contradiction cases are left out. With respect to the PES alone, 
collective cases involving more than 19 employees are moreover excluded.165 As a result, the 
data used in this chapter contains 823 PES dismissal cases over the period 2006-2009 and 404 
civil court dismissal cases over the year 2003-2009. In our data, each case represents one 
individual employee and one individual firm. 
  
                                                        
164 The theoretical explanation for this finding is that when the unemployment rate rises, the duration of 
unemployment spells increases, which prompts for higher damages awarded when the employment discrimination 
case is won. These higher damage pays increase the expected value of a case and could induce low probability cases 
to file suit. The theoretical explanation for this finding is that when the unemployment rate rises, the duration of 
unemployment spells increases, which prompts for higher damages awarded when the employment discrimination 
case is won. These higher damage pays increase the expected value of a case and could induce low probability cases 
to file suit. 
165 Collective dismissals concerning more than 20 employees are excluded, because in all collective cases in our 
dataset dismissal permission is granted. The level of analysis in our data set is the individual case.  
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Panel A Unemployment versus monthly amount of dismissal requests. 
 
Panel B Unemployment versus 3-month moving average of number of monthly dismissal requests. 
 
Figure 2 The unemployment rate and number of dismissal request (PES, 2006-2009, n=1,162 total sample). 
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Panel A Unemployment versus monthly amount of dismissal requests. 
 
Panel B Unemployment versus 3-month moving average of number of monthly dismissal requests. 
 
Figure 3 The unemployment rate and number of dismissal request (Civil court, 2003-2009, n=2,390 total sample). 
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6.4.1 Hypothesis 1  
In order to test hypothesis 1, we use the PES data containing 823 dismissal cases that were filed 
at the PES in the period 2006-2009. Unemployment rates are adjusted for seasonality.166 Table 2 
gives an overview of all variables used and a description of those variables. Descriptive statistics 
are shown in Table 3 and Table 4.167 The average unemployment rate in the PES sample 
presented in this chapter equals 4.76% (Table 3). As seen in Figure 2, unemployment levels were 
highest in the beginning of the year 2006, decreased until 2008 and started peaking again in 
2009. With respect to the decision of the PES, 5 percent out of all request is granted. 
Furthermore, 64 percent of all dismissals is based on economic grounds.  
 Next, we fit a maximum likelihood probit model that explains whether dismissal permission 
is granted by the PES or not:  
 
Pr(݌݁ݎ݉݅ݏݏ݅݋݊	݊݋ݐ	݃ݎܽ݊ݐ݁݀ = 1) = 	∅	( ߚ଴ +	ߚଵܷܰܧܯܲܮ +	ߚଶ	ܧܥܱܰ +	ߚଷ	ܦܷܴ + ߚସ	ܳ +	ߚହܴ +	ߚ଺ܵ , 
 
where ∅ is the cumulative normal distribution. The independent variable is a dichotomous 
variable that indicates whether dismissal permission is granted or not (DISNGR; 1=not granted, 
0=granted). UNEMPL is the adjusted unemployment rate and ECON stands for economic 
dismissals. DUR is the duration of dismissal. Furthermore, Q is a set of variables that indicates 
whether parties receive legal assistance (EMPEONL, EMPRONL, BOTH, NOASSIS). R is a set of 
employee specific variables, such as Tenure (TEN), Age (AGE), Gender (MAN), Hourly wage 
(HOURW) and Working hours per week (WHOURS). Last, S includes the employer specific 
characteristics Industry (INDUS), Legal form (LIML, FOUND, OTHERL) and Size (LESS10, BT10-100, 
MORE100).   
 Table 5 presents the probit analyses with marginal effects (߲∅ ߲ݔ)⁄  at the means of all 
continuous variables (ݔ = ̅ݔ). For the dichotomous variables, ߲∅ ߲ݔ⁄  is for a discrete change of 
the dichotomous variable from 0 to 1. First, we included all variables as specified in our model 
above in Model 1. All employee-specific variables, the industry dummies, the quarterly dummies 
and employer size dummies, however,  have an insignificant effect. Furthermore, the legal form 
dummies fail to significantly affect our dependent variable.168 These findings indicate that the 
likelihood that dismissal permission is refused is not dependent on the wage, the tenure, the 
                                                        
166 First, we adjusted the total unemployed working population and the total working population for seasonality: 
 
1ܽ)	ܹ ௧ܲ = ∑ ߚ௜	ܦ௜௧ + ݁௧௦௜ୀଵ 																																															1ܾ)	ܹܲ	ܣܦܬ௧ = ܹܲതതതതത +	݁௧  
2ܽ)	ܷܹ ௧ܲ =෍ߚ௜	ܦ௜௧ + ݁௧
௦
௜ୀଵ
																																															2ܾ) = ܷܹܲതതതതതതത + ݁௧ 
 
Second, we calculated the adjusted unemployment rate by dividing the adjusted total unemployed working 
population by the adjusted total working population: 
 
3)	ܷܰܧܯܲܮ	ܣܦܬ௧ =
ܷܹܲ	ܣܦܬ௧
ܹܲ	ܣܦܬ௧  
 
167 With respect to the descriptive statistics, different chapters of this dissertation present different numbers. This is 
due to the fact that different selections were made, depending on the purpose of the analysis. 
168 The Wald test statistic for the joint significance of FOUND and OTHERL equals 4.32, with corresponding p-value of 
0.12. 
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age or the gender of an employee. Neither are the characteristics of an employer important in 
the decision of the PES to refuse dismissal permission. From a normative point of view, these 
findings reflect an enforcement of law that is desirable; employees nor employers that possess 
certain characteristics are being discriminated or given preference to. When excluding the set of 
employee-specific variables R and set of employer-specific variables S from Model 1, a more 
efficient model is achieved.169 The coefficient of the unemployment rate (UNEMPL) equals 0.02 
and is significant at a 5 percent level (p=0.040). This implies that a 1 percent increase in the 
unemployment rate leads to a 2% increase in the likelihood that dismissal permission is refused. 
Under the assumption that the decision process of the PES is an exogenous decision process, 
this result provides evidence that recession induced cases are of lower quality and allows for the 
acceptance of hypothesis 1. An additional result obtained from the probit analysis is that in 
cases where only the employee receives legal assistance (EMPEONL), the likelihood that 
dismissal permission is refused is higher than in cases where none of the parties receive legal 
help (NOASS). Results are insignificant for cases in which only the employer (EMPRONL) is 
assisted, or when both parties are assisted (BOTH). Last, the variable that indicates whether 
dismissal is based on economic grounds (ECON) is negative, but insignificant at a 5 percent level.  
Table 2 Description of variables, Hypothesis 1, PES data (continued on the next page).  
Variables Abbreviation Description  
Dependent variable  
Dismissal not granted DISNGR This variable indicates whether PES has not granted dismissal 
permission (dichotomous) – only available for the PES 
Continous variables  
Unemployment rate UNEMPL The monthly unemployment rate for the total Netherlands is adjusted 
for seasonality and calculated by dividing the total unemployed 
working population in the Netherlands by the total working population 
in the Netherlands. 
Duration procedure in 
months 
DUR Duration of the PES procedure, this is the time in between the 
registration date of the dismissal and the date of the PES decision. 
Age AGE100 Age in years divided by 100.
Tenure in months TEN100 Tenure in months divided by 100.
Hourly wage HOURW Hourly wage of the employee, excluding holiday pay and additional 
fees. 
Working hours per week WHOURS Number of working hours per week of the concerned employee. 
Categorical variables  
Economic dismissal ECON Reason for dismissal as indicated by the employer. ECON stands for 
economic dismissals (dichotomous) 
Non-economic dismissal NONECON Reason for dismissal as indicated by the employer. NONECON stands 
for non-economic dismissals (dichotomous) 
Legal assistance only for 
employee 
EMPEONL This variable indicates that only the employee receives legal assistance 
– only available for the PES (dichotomous). 
 
                                                        
169 The LR-test comparing model 1 tot model 2, which is the null model in our case, produces a χ2 value of 12.75 
(sig.=0.82). 
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Table 2 continued. 
Variables Abbreviation Description  
Legal assistance only for 
employer† 
EMPRONL This variable indicates that only the employer receives legal assistance 
– only available for the PES (dichotomous). 
Legal assistance for both 
employer and employee 
BOTH This variable indicates that both the employer and the employee 
receive legal assistance – only available for the PES (dichotomous). 
No legal assistance NOASSIS This variable indicates that neither the employer nor the employee 
receive legal assistance – only available for the PES (dichotomous). 
Industry INDUS The industry in which the employer operates (dichotomous variables 
for the different industries). 
Less than 10 employees LESS10 Size of firm (dichotomous).
Between 10 and 100 
employees 
BT10-100 Size of firm (dichotomous).
More than 100 employees MORE100 Size of firm (dichotomous).
Gender MAN This variable indicates whether the employee is male or female 
(dichotomous)  
Limited liability LIML Legal form the employer holds (dichotomous).
Foundation FOUND Legal form the employer holds (dichotomous).
Other OTHERL Legal form the employer holds (dichotomous).
Quarterly Q These are variables that indicate the different quarters in the year  
(dichotomous). 
† We made the assumpƟon that employers that employ more than 100 employees, have access to legal support, 
either internally or externally 
6.4.2 Hypothesis 2 
In order to test hypothesis 2, we use the civil court data with 404 contradiction cases. As 
mentioned earlier, non-contradiction cases and withdrawn cases are excluded. Table 6 reports 
all variables used and a description of those variables. Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 7 
and Table 8. Table 7 shows that the mean unemployment rate of 6 percent is higher for the civil 
court data than for the PES data. This is due to the fact that, the civil court data covers a larger 
time period. 
 We mentioned before in Chapter 4 that the likelihood that the civil court does not dissolve 
the employment contract is very small. Less than 1% is rejected. If we however, exclude pro-
forma or non-contradiction cases, the number of intended dismissals that is put to a halt by civil 
court is even larger than at the PES route of dismissal. Table 8 shows that out of 404 request, 7,5 
percent got rejected by the court. These findings provide us with some new insight because it is 
a common belief that the likelihood of success is larger at civil court than PES. Quote OECD 
Unemployment Outlook 2004 in the Netherlands: “Civil courts usually dissolve the employment 
contract but require relatively high severance payments. [ . . . ] On the other hand, no severance 
payment is required if the procedure is conducted by the PES [ . . . ].”(p 70, OECD, 2004)  
  In a next step, we fit a maximum likelihood probit model that explains whether the 
contract is dissolved or not.170 
 
                                                        
170 We use only contradiction cases because in non-contradiction cases the judge does not decide about the 
outcome.  
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Pr 	(ܥ݋݊ݐݎܽܿݐ	݊݋ݐ	݀݅ݏݏ݋݈ݒ݁݀ = 1) = 	∅	( ߚ଴ +	ߚଵܷܰܧܯܲܮ +	ߚଶ	ܧܥܱܰ	+	ߚଷܦܷܴ + 	ߚସܦܫܵܯܴܲ + ߚହܴ	
+	ߚ଺ܵ	), 
 
where ∅ is the cumulative normal distribution. The independent variable is a dichotomous 
variable that indicates whether the contract is dissolved or not (REFUSED; 1=not dissolved, 
0=dissolved) UNEMPL is the adjusted unemployment rate, and ECON stands for economic 
dismissals. DUR is the Duration of the civil court procedure . Furthermore, R is a set of employee 
specific variables, such as Tenure (TEN), Age (AGE), gender (MAN), Hourly wage (HOURW) and 
Working hours per week (WHOURS). Last, S includes the employer specific characteristics 
Industry (INDUS), Legal form (LIML, FOUND, OTHERL) and Size (LESS10, BT10-100, MORE100).   
Table 3 Descriptive statistics, Hypothesis 1, PES data (n=823, 2006-2009) 
 Unemploy-
ment rate 
(UNEMPL) 
Duration  
 
(DUR) 
Age   
 
(AGE) 
Tenure in 
months 
(TEN) 
Hourly wage  
 
(HOURW) 
Hours per week 
(WHOURS) 
Mean 4.76 1.50 45.25 123.81 € 13.07 30.72 
Median 4.96 1.25 46.00 87.75 € 12.10 36.00 
Std. Dev. 0.69 1.19 10.23 103.17 € 5.10 10.40 
Minimum 3.72 0.00 17.00 1.81 € 3.59 2.13 
Maximum 6.06 10.82 70.00 513.44 69.25 50.00 
 
Table 9 presents the probit analyses with marginal effects (߲∅ ߲ݔ)⁄  at the means of all 
continuous variables (ݔ = ̅ݔ.) For the dichotomous variables, ߲∅ ߲ݔ⁄ 	is for a discrete change of 
the dichotomous variable from 0 to 1. Model 1 presents the full model in which we have 
included all variables as reported in Table 6. The variable that indicates whether dismissal is 
requested for economic reasons (ECON) is insignificant, the same holds true for the set of 
employee specific variables (R) and for the variables legal form (FOUND, OTHERL) and size 
(LESS10, BT10-100). The joint effect of the industry dummies (INDUS) is significant (Wald test 
statistic = 18.38, p=0.005). In order to achieve a better model fit, we excluded ECON, TEN100, 
MAN, HOURSW, WHOURS, FOUND, OTHERL LESS10 and BT10-100, which resulted in model 2.171 
As in Model 1, Model 2 shows an insignificant effect of the unemployment rate (UNEMPL) on 
the likelihood that the contract is not dissolved. This result forces us to reject hypothesis 2. A 
remarkable result is seen for the effect of the industry in which an employer operates. 
Employees working in the transport, storage and communication sector have a 20% higher 
likelihood of not being dismissed than employees working in the industry sector. This 
percentage is quite substantial, which we are not able to explain with certainty. A possible 
explanation is that, in comparison to other sectors the industry sector was hit hard by the 
economic crisis in the period that our data covers. Employment figures in this sector have been 
decreasing over the last ten years (UWV, 2011).  
                                                        
171 A likelihood ratio test is conducted that compares model 2 to model 1. The LR χ2 equals 13 15 with corresponding 
p-value of 0.4364. 
.
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6.5 Discussion  
Following our earlier assumption that a judge’s decision is independent of the unemployment 
rate, the rejection of hypothesis 2 implies that the quality of cases that is submitted at the civil 
court is of constant quality. As such, our results provide evidence that the weaker recession 
induced cases are filed at the PES.  
 A limitation of this study is that we do not have access to a variable that measures the 
severity of a case. Hence, we cannot conclude with 100 percent certainty that the assumption 
we made in which we state that the way in which dismissals are evaluated are independent of 
the state of the economy applies for the civil court. For the PES this assumption seems very 
much valid, mainly because of the detailed checklist in the Dismissal Decree that stipulates all 
conditions that a fair dismissal must fulfill.  
 In order to better understand the reason behind the rejection of hypothesis 2 we looked 
for a different explanation of this rejection. As mentioned earlier, the civil court may verdict the 
employer to award the employee a severance payment. If high unemployment rates indeed 
induce the admission of lower quality cases, this is possibly reflected in the height of the 
severance payment. Instead of not dissolving the employment contract, the court might decide 
to award a relatively higher damage award to the concerned employee. We conducted several 
analyses to verify this idea. Significant proof, however, was not found. Another possible 
explanation for the rejection of hypothesis 2 is that civil court courts are more likely to decide in 
favor of employers when the economy is down. Further research is needed to shed light on this 
issue. Not only because it is important for policy makers to understand the dynamics behind the 
evaluation of dismissal disputes, but also because from a normative point of view, the law 
should not be dependent of the appointing authority, or of the situation in which these laws are 
enforced. We know from research conducted in different settings than the labor market that 
judicial independence is not always the norm. Besley and Case (1995) provide evidence that 
gubernatorial term limits significantly affect economic policy choices. Similar results are found 
by Huber and Gordon (2004) who predict that judges that face elections have a tendency to 
become more punitive. Related, Elling (1982), Thomas (1985) and Wright and Berkman (1986) 
predict that more liberal officials become more conservative when approaching elections. Hall 
(1992) shows that decisions made by state supreme court justices are strategic decisions to 
minimize electoral opposition. In labor economics, Ichino et al. (2003) show that in regions in 
Italy with higher unemployment judges are less likely to decide in favor of the firm. Using the 
1992 survey of Employment Tribunal Applications in Great Britain, Marinescu (2011) finds an 
opposite result. She shows that both the bankruptcy rates and the unemployment rate 
significantly decrease the likelihood that a judge decides in favor of the dismissed employee. 
Although the Dutch labor market and policy rules are very different from the Italian and the 
British, we should not rule out the possibility that Dutch courts are also influenced by the state 
of the economy. As mentioned earlier, further research is needed.  
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Table 5 Probit marginal effects “at the means”, Hypothesis 1, PES data (n=823, 2006-2009). 
Note 1: We have also run a linear probability model (LPM). The results are very similar: Model 1 in LPM form: 
coefficient for UNEMPL:0.025, sig. = 0.035. Model 2: coefficient for UNEMPL: 0.024, sig. = 0.032. 
Note 2: The Wald test that tests for the joint significance of the legal assistance dummies (EMPRONLY, EMPEONLY, 
BOTH)  gives the following result: Model 1: χ2=18.45, sig=0.00, Model 2:  χ2=19.36, sig=0.00,  
Note 3: As a robustness check we conducted the same analysis with the complete ARCOS PES data for the region 
Maastricht. We used another measure of the state of the economy, namely the vacancy rate. The vacancy rate is 
defined as the number of vacancies per one thousand jobs. We found that  increasing vacancy rates are associated 
with an increase in the likelihood that permission is granted. These results are similar to the results we present in this 
chapter. 
Note 4: Unemployment rates are given for each month in which the case is closed.  
*,**,***; reference categories are: NOASSIS, LIML, BT10-100, respectively. 
†The addiƟonal variables in Model 1 do not result in a staƟsƟcally significant improvement of our model fit. 
  
DV: Dismissal refused 
(DISNG) 
 Model 1    Model 2   X-bar 
Variables dy/dx St. Err. p-value dy/dx St. Err. p-value   
UNEMPL 0.018 0.009 0.041 0.020 0.010 0.040  4.76 
ECON -0.018 0.016 0.263 -0.032 0.017 0.060  0.64 
DUR 0.008 0.004 0.049 0.010 0.005 0.028  1.50 
EMPRONL* -0.018 0.017 0.289 -0.020 0.017 0.242  0.34 
EMPEONL* 0.089 0.039 0.023 0.091 0.039 0.021  0.14 
BOTH* 0.030 0.026 0.247 0.038 0.027 0.155  0.20 
AGE100 -0.020 0.062 0.742  0.46 
TEN100 -0.003 0.006 0.675  1.24 
MAN 0.007 0.016 0.662  0.54 
HOURW 0.001 0.001 0.602  13.07 
WHOURS 0.001 0.001 0.214  30.72 
FOUND** 0.064 0.059 0.282  0.16 
OTHERL** -0.030 0.013 0.016  0.14 
LESS10*** 0.009 0.018 0.604  0.24 
MORE100*** 0.017 0.028 0.556  0.13 
Industry Dummies Yes No   
Quarterly Yes No   
    
Log likelihood -148.979 -155.215   
N 823 823   
LR Χ2 (model 1 versus 
model 2)† 
12.47   
Sig. 0.82   
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Table 6 Description of variables Hypotheses 2, civil court data. 
Variables Abbreviation Description  
Dependent variables  
Contract not dissolved (H2) REFUSED This variable is the dependent variable in hypothesis 2. It has the value 
1 if the court has not dissolved the employment contract and 0 
otherwise.  
Continuous variables  
Unemployment rate UNEMPL The monthly unemployment rate for the total Netherlands is adjusted 
for seasonality and calculated by dividing the total unemployed 
working population in the Netherlands by the total working population 
in the Netherlands. 
Duration procedure in 
months 
DUR Duration of the civil court procedure, time in between registration 
date and the date of the court decision  
Age AGE100 Age in years divided by 100.
Tenure in months TEN100 Tenure in months divided by 100.
Hourly wage HOURW Hourly wage of the employee, excluding holiday pay and additional 
fees. 
Working hours per week WHOURS Number of working hours per week of the concerned employee 
Severance payment SEVP Indicates the amount of severance payment awarded to the employee 
– only available for the civil court. 
Categorical variables  
Economical dismissal ECON Reason for dismissal as indicated by the employer. ECON stands for 
economical dismissals  
Non economical dismissal NONECON Reason for dismissal as indicated by the employer. NONECON stands 
for non-economic dismissals 
New civil court formula NEWCC This variable indicates whether the new or the old Civil Court formula 
holds. The new formula is introduced Jan 1st 2009 (dichotomous). It is 
used for testing hypothesis 3 and 4. 
Industry INDUS The industry in which the employer operates (dichotomous variables 
for the different industries. 
Less than 10 employees LESS10 Size of firm (dichotomous)
Between 10 and 100 
employees 
BT10-100 Size of firm (dichotomous)
More than 100 employees MORE100 Size of firm (dichotomous)
Gender MAN This variable indicates whether the employee is male or female 
(dichotomous)  
Limited liability LIML Legal form the employer holds (dichotomous)
Foundation FOUND Legal form the employer holds (dichotomous)
Other OTHERL Legal form the employer holds (dichotomous)
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Table 7 Descriptive statistics, Hypothesis 2, Civil court data (n=404, 2003-2009). 
 Unemployment 
rate (UNEMPL) 
Duration 
(DUR) 
Age 
(AGE) 
Tenure in 
months 
(TEN) 
Hourly wage 
(HOURW) 
Hours per week 
(WHOURS) 
Mean 5.67 1.00 42.75 135.92 € 16.26 33.41 
Median 5.90 0.92 43.00 73.00 € 14.07 36.46 
Std. Dev. 0.83 0.84 10.78 137.52 € 8.70 7.99 
Minimum 3.72 0.00 21.00 2.10 € 6.53 4.85 
Maximum 6.67 9.47 63.00 536.25 € 81.64 44.61 
 
The idea that employers use economic slumps as an excuse to fire employees is related to the 
idea of moral hazard. The concept of moral hazard implies that people have the tendency to 
take risk because the costs that could incur are not felt by that person. They ignore the moral 
implications of their choice and will do what benefits them the most. In this specific situation, 
moral hazard emerges due to the fact that the employer does not take the full consequences of 
its firing decisions. As such, he has a tendency to dismiss a worker on unjustifiable grounds and 
let the Dutch taxpayer pick up the check of additional unemployment. Herewith, the employer 
leaves the Dutch society responsible for the consequence of his actions. Because risks at stake 
are larger during economic slumps, the risk of moral hazard increases in recessionary times. In 
times of economic upturn the need to layoff personnel without a reasonable cause is less 
persistent. Our analysis suggests that the lower quality recession induced cases are less likely to 
be granted by the PES. In other words, when the employer is not able to convince the PES that 
the dismissal is based on reasonable grounds, permission is not given. As such, the 
consequences of a firm’s moral hazard are reduced. These results are desirable because they 
indicate that an employer cannot just fire an employee without a reasonable cause. Without a 
check of the reasonableness of the dismissal and without the PES to put a halt to unfair 
recession induced dismissals, times of economic slumps will elicit an increase in the number of 
employees that are fired unfairly. The absence of a preventative check is a reality for all other 
OECD countries. In such a system, costs of moral hazard are higher.  
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RECESSION INDUCED REQUESTS AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS 
Table 9 Probit marginal effects “at the means”, Hypothesis 2, Civil court data (n=404, 2003-2009). 
DV: Dismissal 
refused 
(REFUSED) 
 Model 1    Model 2   X-bar 
Variables dy/dx St. Err. p-value.  dy/dx St. Err. p-value.   
UNEMPL 0.003 0.012 0.811 0.000 0.014 0.977  5.67 
ECON 0.002 0.022 0.912  0.25 
DUR 0.017 0.010 0.077 0.023 0.011 0.035  1.00 
AGE100 0.180 0.117 0.122  0.43 
TEN100 -0.009 0.010 0.368  1.36 
MAN 0.026 0.026 0.320  0.69 
HOURW 0.000 0.001 0.840  16.26 
WHOURS 0.002 0.002 0.282  33.41 
FOUND* -0.018 0.032 0.583  0.11 
OTHERL* -0.026 0.022 0.242  0.13 
LESS10** -0.037 0.022 0.092  0.18 
BT10-100** 0.011 0.024 0.631  0.32 
Industry***       
COMSVS -0.013 0.031 0.683 -0.023 0.031 0.466  0.13 
CONSTR 0.033 0.068 0.629 0.066 0.087 0.444  0.04 
HEALTHW 0.109 0.120 0.364 0.018 0.047 0.698  0.09 
TRANS 0.198 0.095 0.037 0.221 0.087 0.011  0.09 
WHOLE -0.027 0.026 0.290 -0.044 0.026 0.088  0.13 
OTHER 0.010 0.037 0.790 -0.016 0.030 0.604  0.18 
Quarterly 
Dummies 
Yes  No   
Log likelihood -86.08  -92.66   
N 404  404   
LR χ2 (Model 1 
versus Model 
2)† 
13.15    
Sig. 0.44    
Note 1: We have also run a linear probability model (LPM). The results of the LPM are the following: Model 1 in LPM 
form: coefficient for UNEMPL: 0.004, sig. = 0.801, Model 2 in LPM form: coefficient for UNEMPL:0.003, sig. =0.843. 
Note 2: The Wald test that tests for the joint significance of the industry dummies gives the following result: Model 1: 
χ2=18.38, sig=0.01, Model 2: χ2=22.79, sig=0.009. 
Note 3: Unemployment rates are given for each month in which the case is closed.  
, *,**,***; reference categories are: LIML, MORE100,INDUS respectively. 
†The addiƟonal variables in Model 1 do not result in a staƟsƟcally significant improvement of our model fit. 
6.6 Conclusion 
Dutch law regarding the termination of permanent employment contracts is unique in the 
world. Instead of applying a repressive check of dismissal as most countries do, the Netherlands 
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applies a preventative check of dismissal. This preventative check entails that an employer, 
when intending to dismiss a permanent worker, can ask for dismissal permission at the public 
employment service (PES) or he can request the civil court to dissolve the employment contract. 
When unemployment rates increase the number of requests filed at both the PES and the civil 
court increase. This holds true for both economic and non-economic dismissals. As shown 
earlier by Ichino et al. (2003) and Siegelman and Donohue III (1995) recession induced cases are 
of lower quality when seen from the plaintiff’s perspective. We theorized that these recession 
induced cases in the Netherland exhibit the same characteristic. If so, the likelihood that 
permission is granted or the contract is dissolved should decrease with increasing 
unemployment rates. This however, only holds true under the assumption that judicial decision 
making is independent of the state of the economy. 
 Under the above stated assumption that both routes act independently from the state of 
the economy, this paper provides evidence that recession induced cases filed at the PES are of 
poorer quality. These additional cases are not granted permission by PES. In other words, the 
PES acts as a barrier that only allows reasonable dismissal requests to be enacted. Unreasonable 
requests are not honored. As such, the PES prevents that costs of unemployment due to unfair 
dismissal are imposed on Dutch society. For the civil court we do not find that recession induced 
cases have a larger likelihood of being rejected. This either implies that the assumption of 
judicial independence is a too strong assumption for the civil court to make or that recession 
induced lower quality cases only end up at PES and that cases filed at the civil court are of 
constant quality over the business cycle. Further research has to shed light on this issue. Not 
only because it is important for micro economists and policy makers to understand the 
dynamics behind the evaluation of dismissal disputes, but also because the law should not be 
dependent of the appointing authority, or of the situation in which these laws are enforced.  
 We furthermore find that employer-specific and employee- specific characteristics do not 
influence the decision of the judge or the PES. From a normative point of view, these findings 
reflect a practicing of law that is desirable. Employers nor employees that possess certain 
characteristics are being discriminated or given preference to. The only aspect that is important 
for termination is the severity of the case. 
 From a macro perspective our research is important because it suggest that with higher 
unemployment rates firing decisions are made differently. Although this research is conducted 
in a Dutch setting it is not unlikely that these results are also applicable to other countries.  
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7.1 Introduction 
We mentioned in previous chapters of this dissertation that the duality of the Dutch 
employment protection legislation (EPL)172 has been under continuous attack. Over time 
different governments have tried to introduce a simpler, less rigid system. Central arguments 
used are that the Dutch EPL, with accompanying high firing costs, does not positively influence 
participation rates. Its procedures are overly complex and it does not ensure an optimal working 
of the labor market. It has made it difficult for employers to hire and fire employees and for 
outsiders, especially older people, to enter the labor market.173 Additionally, emphasis is put on 
inequalities in compensation and different treatment of similar cases due to the existence of 
two routes of dismissal.174 The system is characterized as inflexible. 
 One of the most recent attempts175 to modify the Dutch EPL is recorded in the Spring 
Agreement176 of May 2012, which was made by the Kunduz177 parties VVD, CDA, D66, 
GroenLinks and ChristenUnie. The central theme in the agreement with respect to EPL is the 
abolishment of the preventative check of dismissal. Before the general elections of September 
2012, political parties have put strong emphasis on the revision of EPL. They have either 
crystalized the proposal in their election programs, or have decided to leave EPL untouched.178 
The past repeats itself as political parties cannot come to an agreement.179 
  This chapter aims to provide an overview of our findings of previous chapters, to provide an 
outlook for future research and to give an overview of policy implications. In Section 2 of this 
chapter we present the Kunduz agreement in more detail. Section 3 sketches an overview of the 
reactions the agreement has provoked. We summarize a letter of protest that was sent by a 
delegation of scientist to the Upper Chamber on June 12th 2012. We furthermore present 
opinions from a workers’, employers’ and voters’ perspective. In Section 4 we express our own 
point of view. We explain that the findings of this thesis are in line with the arguments made by 
the delegation of scientists in the letter of June 12th. We furthermore argue that the arguments 
in favor of a modification are not convincing. In Section 4 we put strength to this expression by 
showing that the new proposal does not lead to a decrease in average firing costs. Using a novel 
sample of 878 requests filed at the civil court and 994 request filed at the public employment 
service (PES)180 over the years 2006-2009 we show that the proposal results in an increase in 
                                                        
172 In this chapter, EPL is used as an acronym for Employment Protection Legislation. 
173 See the Request for Advice that was send to the Corporation of Labor about the modification of the Dutch 
dismissal system, (In Dutch: “Adviesaanvraag”) of Minister Donner, dated July 3 2007 (AV/IR/2007/23064) and also 
the proposal of Koser Kaya, dated July 1 2011 (“Voorontwerp van een voorstel van wet tot wijziging van het 
ontslagrecht.” D66, 2011). 
174 This argument is stressed mostly in Koser Kaya’s proposal. 
175 This chapter is written before the publication of the Coalition Agreement of political parties PvdA and CDA at 
October 29th 2012. The Coalition Agreement does not follow the agreements made by the Kunduz parties. Therefore, 
we provide a small update in Chapter 8 of this dissertation. 
176 In Dutch: Lenteakkoord. 
177 Because of  an earlier mutual agreement to support the police training missing in the Afghan province of Kunduz, 
the media started referring to these parties as the Kunduz parties. In this chapter we will also use this name. 
178 Parties that are against the abolishment of the preventative check are the  SP, the PVV and the Socialistic Party. 
CDA, Democraten 66, GroenLinks, VVD are in favor of the abolishment of the preventative check. PvdA is in favor of 
a single preventative check via the civil court.  
179 In 2007 the political impasse about the modification almost lead to the fall of the government (See Chapter 2). 
180 In this chapter, PES is used as an acronym for public employment service. 
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firing costs for employers that originally selected the PES route of dismissal, would they have 
been exposed to the proposed legislation. We furthermore show that firing costs for employers 
that originally selected the civil court route of dismissal will decrease. We conclude this chapter 
by presenting our point of view on what policymakers can learn from this dissertation and on 
how to proceed in the future. 
7.2 The Kunduz proposal 
In the Spring Agreement of May 2012 the Kunduz-parties VVD, CDA, D66, GroenLinks and 
ChristenUnie proposed a new drastic revision of the current Dutch EPL. This proposal was 
revised and sketched in more detail by Henk Kamp, (outgoing) Minister of Social Affairs and 
Welfare and was sent to the Upper Chamber at the 18th of June 2012.181 The proposal contains 
three central elements:  
1. The current preventative check by the PES and the civil court is replaced by a single 
repressive check by the court. This implies that an employer is allowed to dismiss an 
employee without an a priori permission. A reasonable ground for dismissal should exist. 
Furthermore, a hearing procedure is introduced during which the employee is allowed to 
react. If the employee does not agree with the dismissal, he may file a lawsuit against the 
employer in court. If the court judges the dismissal to be unreasonable, it may re-establish 
the employment contract or it may award a compensation that equals half a monthly salary 
per year of employment, with a maximum of 12 months.182 
2. Severance payments are replaced by a transition budget that is used for schooling and other 
routes that stimulate a person’s capability for gaining and maintaining employment. These 
budgets are set to maximum of six months and equal a quarter of a monthly salary per year 
of employment. All workers that are dismissed involuntarily, both workers with fixed and 
permanent contracts, are entitled to receive a budget. 
3. Employers shall finance (at maximum) the first six months of the unemployment benefit of 
workers with a permanent contract and with a fixed contract. Part of the unemployment 
premium that is paid by employers is expected to be abolished.183 According to Minister 
Kamp, the technical details of this specific detail of this proposal will be further revised.184 
The period of notice is furthermore revised. It is no longer dependent upon the years of 
service, but equals 2 months for all workers. 
The proposed modification is supposed to lead to less inequality between workers with a fixed 
contract and workers with a permanent contract. It is moreover supposed to result in lower 
firing costs for older employees. As such, the cabinet argues that the offering of permanent 
                                                        
181 It is titled in Dutch: “Hoofdlijnen aanpassing ontslagrecht en ww.”  
182 The award is received on top of the severance budget that is received by the employee at dismissal. 
183 An employer pays a sector premium, which is dependent on the risk of unemployment in the sector in which the 
employer operates. This premium is expected to be abolished. The employer also pays a premium for the general 
unemployment fund (In Dutch: “ Algemeen werkloosheidsfond”  (WW-Awf)). This premium is not abolished. 
184 In the Spring Agreement (BZ/2012/283M)  it is stated that employers will finance one month per year of 
employment with a minimum of three months for workers with a permanent contract. Counted are only the years of 
employment with the concerned employee. The proposal of Minister Kamp remains silent about this issue.   
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contracts is stimulated and labor market mobility of the older generation is positively affected. 
Last, the financing of the first months of employment benefit by the employer will contribute to 
the recovery of the governmental fund (Voorjaarsnota, 2012, BZ/2012/283M). 
7.3 Reactions  
The scientific arena 
In an official letter to the Upper Chamber and all political parties involved, dated June 12th 2012, 
a group of 16 scientists185 affiliated to several universities in the Netherlands expressed their 
concerns about the proposals made regarding the modification of the financing of 
unemployment benefits and the employment protection system. According to the delegation, 
the plans of the government are based on untested assumptions, and will instead of positively, 
negatively affect the Dutch economy and labor market. The delegation of scientist argues that 
the Dutch EPL is not as inflexible as the government wants us to believe. A wide range of 
possibilities exists to hire flexible workers and the difficulty to fire permanent workers is 
overstated. As the delegation argues, most requests filed at the civil court and the PES are 
honored. They furthermore reason that in terms of the average OECD EPL-index, the 
Netherlands is an average performer and that there is no scientific proof for the idea that a 
more flexible EPL results in more employment. No general rule exists that countries with high 
protection have poor functioning labor markets. Examples mentioned are Luxembourg and 
Germany. These countries both have strict EPL but outperform many other countries that have a 
less rigid system.  
 Another instrument used by the delegation to oppose to the new modification is the 
research of Dekker and Kleinknecht (2008), Vergeer and Kleinknegt (2010) and Kleinknecht, 
Naastepad en Storm (2012). These authors present the idea that a more flexible EPL will 
negatively affect productivity and innovation. They argue that because of a larger outflow of 
personnel due to a more flexible EPL, employers are less willing to invest in schooling. The same 
holds for employees, who will be less willing to invest in job-specific schooling.  
 The delegation of scientist is against the idea to let the employer finance the 
unemployment benefit in the first months of unemployment. Eventually, the scientists argue, in 
times of economic downturn this may drive employers into bankruptcy, with disastrous 
outcomes for employment and the Dutch economy. The delegation furthermore claims that the 
new proposed modification will lead to a worsened labor market position of ‘outsiders’. These 
outsiders are often low skilled, older, or both, and will not be hired more easily, so claims the 
delegation. Instead, insiders within that specific group have a larger likelihood of being fired.  
 With respect with the proposal to put a halt to large severance payments, the delegation 
stresses the fact that the high bonuses that are often awarded are not based on the Civil Court 
Formula, but are the result of mutual agreements made by the employer and the employee. The 
proposal to maximize the severance payment will not put a halt to these practices. The scientists 
                                                        
185 These are: Prof. mr. dr. W.H.A.C.M. Bouwens, Prof. mr. dr. C.J. Loonstra, Prof. mr. dr. W.A. Zondag, Prof. mr. dr. 
F.J.L. Pennings, Prof. mr. dr. M.S. Houwerzijl, Prof. dr. K. Boonstra, Prof. mr. dr. A.R. Houweling Prof. mr. dr. E. 
Lutjens, Prof. mr. dr. A.P.C.M. Jaspers, Mr. dr. W.L. Roozendaal, Mr. dr. L. van den Berg, Mr. dr. S.F.H. Jellinghaus, Dr. 
R. Dekker, Mr. S.H. Kuiper Mr. I.R.W. Witte Mr. D.M.A. Bij de Vaate. 
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write in their letter that the differences in severance payments will only get larger as lower 
segment workers are not able to negotiate a large severance package and are forced to accept a 
less attractive legal maximum. 
 The delegation furthermore reasons that the introduction of a pure repressive system is 
beneficial for neither employers nor employees. Enforcement of the proposal will lead to a 
deteriorated legal position of employees as they are the ones that have to initiate the 
reasonableness check of the dismissal. For some, this is a high barrier to cross. For employers, 
moreover, a repressive system implies insecurity. Long after the dismissal has taken place, they 
may be confronted with the costs that result from a repressive procedure. In their letter, the 
delegation of scientists stresses that they do not oppose against a modification of the Dutch 
dismissal system per se. They plead for a repressive check of which the criteria are stipulated in 
a collective labor agreement. This check is supposed to be executed by a dismissal committee 
composed by employers, employers’ organizations and labor unions. If such an agreement does 
not exist, the PES should judge whether dismissal is based on reasonable grounds.186 The 
delegation furthermore stresses that the differences in dismissal awards are unjustifiable.  
  In the NRC Handelsblad of May 29, 2012, Boontje, Sick and Loonstra187,188 present a similar 
view as the delegation. They argue that the new proposed system is expensive and will lead to 
more bureaucracy and inequality. A repressive procedure will lead to additional (costly) lawsuits 
and insecurity. They furthermore sketch the possibility that the preventative hearing procedure 
will evolve in a PES-like procedure, but instead privatized. 
 Bartelsman, Gautier and De Wind (2012), express their disagreement with the arguments 
made by the delegation of scientists. First of all, Bartelsman et al. (2012). disagree with the 
statement that the Dutch EPL is not inflexible. As a counterargument they present the index for 
EPL for permanent workers, on the basis of which the Netherlands is marked with one of the 
strictest EPL of all OECD-countries. They furthermore argue that although the Netherlands 
performs relatively well in terms of unemployment, the burden of unemployment is carried by a 
small group of long term unemployed. Second, Bartelsman et al. (2012) are in the opinion that 
no proof exists that the group of outsiders, as defined by the delegation, that will be fired due to 
a more flexible EPL is large. They furthermore argue that it is misleading to present Germany as 
an example with very rigid EPL and not to mention Portugal, a country that has more rigid EPL. 
Third, Bartelsman et al. refer to their own research to oppose against the argument that a 
flexible EPL leads to lower productivity (Bartelsman, Gautier and De Wind, 2010, 2011). Herein, 
the authors illustrate that countries that have rigid employment protection are relatively 
unproductive and risk averse in investing in new technology.  
 
                                                        
186 The delegation of scientists do not describe their proposal in great detail.  They for instance, do not describe the 
position of the civil court in a new employment protection system.  
187 Paul Boontje and Pauline Sick are affiliated to Boontje Advocaten in Amsterdam. Cees Loonstra is Professor 
Employment Law at Erasmus University Rotterdam.  
188 Boontje, P., Sick, P., and Loonstra, C. “Wijziging ontslagrecht leidt tot veel juridische procedures” NRC Handels-
blad, May 29 2012. 
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Workers, employers and voters 
Worker unions do not agree with the Kunduz proposal. On its website189, FNV Bondgenoten 
encourages the Dutch people to vote against the proposed modifications made. CNV is also 
against a modification and stresses that the focus of a revised EPL should be on the transition of 
one job to another.190 
 Employers are generally in favor of a simplification. A survey performed by EenVandaag 
indicates that 84% percent of the employers approves of the simplification and 77% believes to 
profit from the proposed modification. Only 13% is against.191 Amongst employers’ unions the 
simplification is received with moderate enthusiasm. VNO NCW-chairman Bernard Wientjes is 
generally known to be in favor of a more flexible EPL192, but expressed to understand that the 
proposed modification is a sensitive topic for worker unions. He expressed to take this into 
account during the formation of the new government, when composing the Fall 
Agreement.193,194 Employers union MKB Nederland is also in favor of a modification, but is not 
enthusiastic about the content of the Kunduz proposal. According to Biesheuvel, chairman of 
MKB Nederland, the current repressive check of the PES is functioning properly. He does not 
expect that the proposed modification will positively affect the hiring of new personnel. To 
achieve that, he argues, an employer should be relieved from the obligation to continue wage 
payment during the first two years of sickness of an employee.195 
 A survey performed by TNS NIPO shows that the majority of the Dutch voters does not 
approve of the new proposed modifications. Two third of the respondents is against. Only 
amongst VVD voters a slight majority of 51 percent supports the new plans.196 Apparently, the 
government failed in persuading the Dutch people that an EPL reform is a necessary condition 
for the economic recovery of the Netherlands.  
 Today, it remains uncertain if the proposed modification is enforced. After the general 
elections of September 2012 a new government will decide if, and in what form a new system 
will replace the old one (See Chapter 8 for an update that is written after the general elections 
of September 2012).  
                                                        
189www.fnvbondgenoten.nl/mijnbranche/branches/bakkersbedrijf/artikelen/517856-ontslagrecht_versoepeld/, 
retrieved September 10th 2012. 
190 www.cnv.nl/blog/blog-category/ontslag, retrieved September 10th 2012. See also the interview with Jaap Smit on 
nu.nl of August 22nd 2012, www.nu.nl/economie/2889937/cnv-voorzitter-pislink-als-werknemers-vogelvrij.html, 
retrieved September 15th 2012. 
191 “Werkgevers: versoepeling ontslagrecht helpt.” August 17, 2012, http://opinie.eenvandaag.nl/uitslagen/41094/-
werkgevers_versoepeling_ontslagrecht_helpt, retrieved September 15th 2012. 
192 See for instance “Geen akkoord over ontslagrecht op Participatietop” Volkskrant June 26th, 2007 
www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2686/Binnenland/article/detail/850534/2007/06/27/Geen-akkoord-over-ontslagrecht-op-
Participatietop.dhtml, retrieved September 15th 2012. 
193 In Dutch: “Najaarsakkoord”. 
194 In “Draagvlak voor ontslagversoepeling brokkelt snel af.” Het Financieele Dagblad August 23, 2012. http://fd.nl/-
economie-politiek/228333-1208/draagvlak-voor-ontslagversoepeling-brokkelt-snel-af, retrieved September 15th 
2012. 
195 “MKB: Timing soepeler ontslagrecht slecht. ” Trouw July 3, 2012. 
www.trouw.nl/tr/nl/4504/Economie/article/detail/3281018/2012/07/03/MKB-timing-soepeler-ontslagrecht-
slecht.dhtml, retrieved September 15th 2012. 
196 TNS NIPO by order of Het Financiële Dagblad, in “Draagvlak voor ontslagversoepeling brokkelt snel af.” Het 
Financiële Dagblad (www.fd.nl),  August 23, 2012. 
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7.4 Our point of view 
Points of view against or in favor of a more flexible EPL are based on expectations. Employers 
expect that a more flexible employment protection system will facilitate hiring, employees are 
afraid to be fired without a cause. A more flexible EPL is supposed lead to a decrease in firing 
costs, those that benefit from the proposed modification are in favor, those that are harmed are 
against. Arguments used to defend a certain statement can always be found. An example is 
presented above; the delegation of scientists is against the proposed modification and uses the 
research of Kleinknecht as a proof to show that a more flexible EPL leads to lower labor 
productivity. Bartelsman, Gautier and De Wind (2012) express their disagreement with the 
delegation and use their own research that shows that a more flexible EPL leads to higher 
productivity. Differences in outcomes of these authors, and of any scientific research in general, 
are due to the fact that used samples, methodologies, and measures of flexibility are different. 
Dekker and Kleinknecht (2008) use a sample of Dutch companies.197 Flexibility is defined as the 
percentage of persons with a flexible contract.198 Bartelsman, Gautier and De Wind (2010) use a 
dataset covering industries in the Market Sector199 in the EU and the US. Flexibility is measured 
using firing cost indicators of the OECD and of the World Bank. One may argue about the 
applicability of both studies to the Dutch situation. The measure of EPL used by Dekker and 
Kleinknecht does not cover the complete range of employment protection laws in the 
Netherlands. The studies of Vergeer and Kleinknecht (2010) and Bartelsman et al. (2010) 
compare countries on the basis of an EPL indicator, which has its drawbacks because one may 
fail to take into account country specific information that may influence the results.  
 We agree to a great extent with the arguments against the Kunduz proposal that in are 
written in the letter sent by the delegation of scientists to the Upper Chamber and all political 
parties involved, on June 12th 2012. First of all, we agree that the proposed modification is a 
result of untested premises. The research of Kleinknecht that is used to support this argument, 
however, is easy to contradict (See Bartelsman et al. (2010), but also Autor, Kerr and Kugler 
(2007)).200 We showed that research on the effect of EPL on different labor market outcomes is 
ambiguous as different authors present different outcomes. This argument is difficult to dispute. 
Although it does not allow us to make predictions about the effect of EPL, for policymakers this 
implies that conclusions that have important implications for the Dutch situation should be 
drawn with great care.  
 Second, we agree with the statement that the Dutch EPL is not as rigid as the government 
claims it to be as over 90% of all requests is honored (See Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 of this 
dissertation). It is not impossible for employers to dismiss their employees as long as they 
provide the court or the PES with proof that dismissal is reasonable. The two routes together 
                                                        
197 The authors used the OSA panel. 
198 The authors distinguish  between a measure of external flexibility and internal flexibility. External flexibility is 
defined as the percentage of persons with a flexible contract. Internal flexibility is defined as the percentage of 
persons that switched department or job within the company in the last year. Using OLS, the authors found that 
external flexibility has a negative effect on productivity. Internal flexibility on the other hand has positive effect. 
199 The market sector includes industries in manufacturing, trade, finance and business services, but excludes 
agriculture, government and services. Utilities and nuclear fuel production are moreover excluded. 
200 Using the same argument, one may also contest against the argument made by Bartelsman et al. and refer to 
studies that find a positive effect. 
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add to the flexibility of the system. Before deciding what route to follow, employers make a 
strategic choice by taking into account the likelihood of success and the costs. Most employers 
decide correctly, seen by the large number of requests that is honored. By definition, an EPL 
system without any check of dismissal (preventative or repressive) is more flexible. In such a 
system, firing costs are low and judicial procedures do not exist. An employee may be dismissed 
at will. Such a system however, provokes situations in which an employer dismisses at will. A 
worker may be dismissed because of differences in beliefs or preferences. In the current system, 
these cases are not filed at PES or civil court because of a high likelihood of being rejected.201  
 Third, with respect to the statement made that the Netherlands is just an average 
performer, the delegation of scientists presents a different angle than we do. The scientists 
present the average OECD-index. In Chapter 5 of this dissertation we focus on the permanent 
component of the EPL-index and conclude that although the Netherlands scores relatively high 
on the index, they outperform many other EU15 countries. The conclusion, however, that may 
be drawn from these two different points of view is a similar one, namely that the Netherlands 
does not perform badly at all.  
 The delegation of scientists also stresses that in some cases severance payments that are 
awarded are not based on the civil court formula, but are the result of mutual agreements made 
between employer and employee. We may carefully support this argument with our data. Out 
of 878 requests granted at the civil court in the period 2006-2009, eight requests involved 
severance payments that were between 3 and 4 times larger than a neutral severance 
payment.202 Six requests involved severance payments that were between 4 and 6 times larger 
than a neutral severance payment. Moreover, five requests involved severance payments that 
were over 6 times larger than a neutral severance payment.203,204 These higher severance 
payments are mostly awarded to dismissed workers with relatively short tenure and in pro-
forma cases.205  
 Furthermore, we agree with the delegation that a pure repressive system is not beneficial 
for neither employers nor employees. First of all, a repressive system is not per definition more 
flexible. It might be easier to dismiss a worker, but without a preventative check of dismissal it is 
likely that a worker fights back in court. Using data of a large Italian bank in Italy –Italy only 
applies a repressive check of dismissal– Ichino et al. (2003) show that 86 out of 409 workers 
(this is 21%!) file a case in court because of unfair dismissal after being dismissed by their 
employer. In 17 cases, which is 17% of total, the court overrules the firing decision. The current 
preventative system in the Netherlands encourages employers to carefully motivate the 
dismissal intention, without such a preventative check it is not unlikely that the Netherland will 
                                                        
201 We assume that if these cases would make it to PES or to court, rejection rates would be much higher. 
202 By this we mean a severance payment with a C-factor of 1. 
203 The civil court formula is the following:  A x B x C, where A is the weighted years of service, B is the gross monthly 
wage including additional benefits and C is the correction factor, which is usually set between 0 and 2. The civil court 
data collected does not contain the actual correction factor (factor C). We do observe factor A, factor B and the 
severance pay that is awarded. These numbers allow us to estimate factor C.  
204 We may have overstated this number because of the fact that our wage variable only includes the actual gross 
wage plus an 8% holiday payment, the wage variable does not include additional benefits. 
205 The average tenure of workers in the 19 above mentioned cases is 1.4 years, the maximum tenure is 3.5 years 
and the minimum tenure is .09 years. 
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witness a similar situation as in Italy. In a letter to Koşer Kaya206, in connection with the earlier 
2011 proposal to introduce a single repressive system, the Dutch Judicial Council207 pointed out 
that it expects that civil courts in the Netherlands will witness an increase in the number of 
employment law cases of over 15,000. Estimated additional costs equal €25 million.208 This is 
not taken into account in the proposal. 
 We moreover argue that the existence of the preventative check by the PES and the fact 
that employers are relieved from severance payments when following the PES route of dismissal 
have resulted in a unique system that reduces the costs of moral hazard that are imposed upon 
the Dutch society. The concept of moral hazard in this specific situation implies that employers 
will take the risk to unlawfully fire their employees if they have a reason to do so and ignore the 
moral implications of their choices. In times of economic downturn employers have an incentive 
to unlawfully fire an employee, without following the legal route (see Chapter 6), in order to 
prevent severance payment. The PES offers employers that are truly in economic distress the 
option to dismiss the employee without the obligation of severance payment. This makes the 
Dutch system unique and cost-effective since unemployment contributions may exceed the 
costs of the government relieving firms from severance payment (see Chapter 5).  
7.5 Some cost calculations: the current system versus the newly proposed 
system 
What if all employees in our sample of 994 PES dismissals and 878 civil court dismissals are fired 
under the new rules?209 Table 1 below shows the theoretical differences in costs of the current 
and of the new proposed system. 
  
                                                        
206 Koser Kaya is a member of the political party Democrats 66, who proposed a similar modification of employment 
law in 2011. 
207 In Dutch: “Raad voor de Rechtspraak”. 
208 See the letter titled: “Advies Voorstel van wet van het lid Koşer Kaya tot wijziging van het Buitengewoon Besluit 
Arbeidsverhoudingen 1945, het Burgerlijk Wetboek en enkele andere wetten ter verbetering van de 
rechtsbescherming bij ontslag”  that was sent by the council to Koşer Kaya at December 22nd, 2011. 
209 Herewith, we realize that different firing costs may result in a different selection of employees to be dismissed. As 
such, we do not claim that a similar selection of employees is dismissed in the new proposed system. For example, 
our calculations show that employers that selected the PES route are confronted with dismissal costs that are twice 
as high when using the proposed firing rules. These employers may depart from dismissing certain employees for 
which firing costs increase in the new system. Our purpose in this chapter is only to show how the new rules may be 
applied, ceteris paribus. 
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Table 1 Costs of the current system and of the new proposed system.210 
 Current EPL system New proposed EPL system 
Severance payment Civil court: According to the civil court 
formula (A x B x C) PES: Severance pay is 
not awarded 
All: Budgets instead of severance payments. 
These budgets are set to maximum of six 
months and equal a quarter of a monthly salary 
per year of employment. Both permanent and 
flexible workers are entitled to receive the 
budget. 
 
Period of notice (PoN) Civil court: None, the date of 
termination of the contract is 
determined by court. Ongoing wage 
costs are incurred during this period. 
PES: 1 to 3 months, dependent on years 
of employment with the concerned 
employer. Ongoing wage costs during 
the PoN are incurred. Ongoing wage 
cost are also incurred during the time in 
between date at which the case is 
closed and the date at which the PoN 
commences (see Chapter 4). 
 
All: 2 months for all dismissed workers. Ongoing 
wage costs are incurred during the PoN. 
Costs of preventative 
procedure 
Civil court: Ongoing wage costs are 
incurred during the duration of the 
procedure.  
PES: Ongoing wage costs are incurred 
during the duration of the procedure 
All: The preventative check is abolished.  
A hearing procedure is introduced. The exact 
details of the hearing procedure are not 
stipulated; as such we are not able to draw 
conclusions about the costs that are incurred 
due to this procedure.  
 
Costs of repressive 
procedure 
Repressive procedures are not often 
followed in the current system†. 
Repressive procedures are likely to be followed 
more often. Costs include a damage award or 
the reemployment of the employee.  
 
Costs of unemployment 
benefit 
All: Employers pay an unemployment 
premium for all their employees. 
Employers do not finance the first 
months of the unemployment benefit. 
All: Employers will finance at maximum the first 
six months of the unemployment benefit. In the 
Spring Agreement (BZ/2012/283M) it is stated 
that employers will finance one month per year 
of employment with a minimum of three 
months for workers with a permanent contract. 
Counted are only the years of employment with 
the concerned employee. The proposal of 
Minister Kamp remains silent about this issue. 
†For the period 2003-2009 an average of 35 repressive cases was filed in the Maastricht district. 
In Chapter 4 we have calculated the costs of dismissal of the current system for both the PES 
route and the civil court route. In the current EPL system average total costs equal € 7,480 for 
dismissal via the PES and € 30,982 for dismissal via the civil court (see Chapter 4). When 
calculating the total average dismissal costs for the PES and the civil court together, we use the 
following rule: 
                                                        
210 We do not take into account lawyer fees (see also Chapter 4). 
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,where n equals 1,872, which is the total number of cases granted at PES and at civil court in the 
years 2006-2009 (994 + 878, see Chapter 4). Table 2 shows that the average total dismissal costs 
of the current system equal €18,503 per dismissed employee. 
 
Table 2 Total average costs for PES and civil court together, current system (n=1,872, 2006-2009). 
Mean  € 18,503
Median  € 8,052
Std. Dev. € 39,530
Minimum  € 97
Maximum € 683,947
 
If the same sample of employees would have been fired under the new proposed measures, the 
following average firing costs would have been obtained:  
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, where n equals 1,872 and i is the ith worker in our sample.  
 
                                                        
211 Total costs for the PES procedure include: costs of procedure, costs of time to notice and the costs of the period 
of notice. Total costs for the civil court procedure include: court fee, costs of procedure, costs time to termination 
and the severance payment (see Chapter 4). 
212 The new proposed severance payment is calculated as follows:  
Proposed severancei = ¼ x Gross monthly salaryi x Tenurei,   for Tenurei <=24 years 
Proposed severance = 6 x Gross monthly salaryi,   for Tenurei > 24 years 
The costs for the period of notice are calculated as follows: 
Costs period of noticei = Period of noticei (equals 2 for all workers) x Gross monthly salaryi including 8% holiday fee. 
The costs of the unemployment benefit are calculated as follows: 
Costs unemployment benefiti = Unemployment historyi x Gross monthly salary constrained to a maximumi x A 
discount factori. , where Unemployment historyi is set to a maximum of 6 months. 
When calculating the unemployment history we follow the proposal as stipulated in the Spring Agreement 
(BZ/2012/283M): An employer will finance one month per year of employment with a minimum of three months for 
workers with a permanent contract. Counted are only the years of employment with the concerned employee. 
In our cost calculations we used the discount factors such a currently used in the calculation of the unemployment 
benefit. It equals 0.75 for the first two months of the unemployment benefit, and 0.70 after the first two months. 
The gross monthly salary is constrained to a legal maximum, which equaled 168 € a day for 2006 
(UB/K/2006/50248). Using the Consumer Price Index (2006=100) we calculated the real value of this amount for all 
other years. In order to calculate the (gross) daily salary we divided the (gross) yearly salary by 261. All daily salaries 
above the maximum value were set at the maximum value. Daily salaries are converted to monthly salaries and are 
expressed in 2006 constant prices. 
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In the costs calculations of the new proposed system we assume that the employer does not 
incur ongoing wage costs before the period of notice commences. This is assumed because the 
abolishment of a preventative procedure. Table 3a shows the results of our calculations. 
 
Table 3a Dismissal costs new proposed measures (n=1,872, 2006-2009). 
 Proposed severance Costs PoN Costs unemployment 
benefit 
Total costs 
Mean € 6,136 € 4,672 € 7,788 € 18,596 
Median € 3,588 € 4,236 € 7,564 € 15,545 
Std. Dev. € 7,101 € 2,927 € 3,928 € 12,584 
Minimum € 15 € 185 € 269 € 549 
Maximum € 86,521 € 34,258 € 15,652 € 136,359 
Table 3b PES sample (n=994, 2006-2009). 
 Proposed severance Costs PoN Costs unemployment 
benefit 
Total costs 
Mean € 5,833 € 4,128 € 7,441 € 17,401 
Median € 3,688 € 4,044 € 7,266 € 15,207 
Std. Dev. € 5,825 € 2,173 € 3,800 € 10,847 
Minimum € 15 € 185 € 269 € 549 
Maximum € 51,370 € 22,830 € 15,652 € 84,145 
Table 3c Civil court sample (n=878, 2006-2009). 
 Proposed severance Costs PoN Costs unemployment 
benefit 
Total costs 
Mean € 6,480 € 5,287 € 8,180 € 19,948 
Median € 3,462 € 4,494 € 7,774 € 16,093 
Std. Dev. € 8,303 € 3,496 € 4,035 € 14,183 
Minimum € 39 € 444 € 487 € 1,033 
Maximum € 86,521 € 34,258 € 15,652 € 136,359 
 
With an average total cost of € 18,596, Table 3a shows that the costs of the new proposed EPL 
are not lower than the costs of the current system (t-statistic=0.10, p=.93).213 The financing of 
the first months of unemployment are the largest cost component of these total costs. A smaller 
standard deviation indicates that the uncertainty in costs is lower in the new proposed system.  
 Table 3b and Table 3c split the total sample of requests into requests that were originally 
filed at the PES and requests that were originally filed at the civil court. Table 3b shows that 
employers that originally selected the PES route will incur costs that are more twice as large (€ 
17,401 vs. € 7,480) if the concerned dismissed employees would have been fired using the firing 
rules in the new system. Table 3c shows that employers that originally selected the civil court 
route incur lower costs (€ 19,948 vs. € 30,982). The relatively high costs of the period of notice 
                                                        
213 Unequal variances assumed.  
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and the unemployment benefit are offset by the relatively low cost of the new severance 
payment.  
 Figure 1 shows the relationship between age and costs in the current system and in the 
new proposed system. Total dismissal costs for employees around the age of 55 are indeed 
lower in the new proposed system than in the current system. Both systems however, show that 
dismissal costs are a concave function of age, with a peak in dismissal costs of around the age of 
55.  
 
Figure 1 Age and average total costs, current system versus new proposed system (n=1,872†, 2006-2009). 
† We are careful in interpreƟng averages of employees below 23 and above 63 as the number of employees in those 
age categories are small. 
 
The costs calculations in Table 3a-c and Figure 1 do not take into account the sector premium 
for the unemployment benefit fund that is suggested to be abolished after the modification. 
Because these costs are saved nevertheless and for all employees, we assume that these costs 
do not play a role in the firing decision itself.214 Moreover, both costs calculations of the current 
EPL (Table 2) and of the proposed EPL (Table 3a-c, Figure 1) do not take into account the 
possibility that an employee goes to court to protest against the dismissal. The possibility, 
however, that an employee files a lawsuit against his employer because of being unreasonably 
dismissed, is much larger in the new proposed system than in the current system because of the 
abolishment of the preventative check. Additionally, the cost calculations of the proposed 
                                                        
214 We did calculate the average monthly costs that are saved because of the abolishment of this premium. Using the 
average sector premiums of 2009, employers in our sample will save an average of €23 a month. Premiums differ 
per sector of employment. Not to complicate matters, we used the average premium of all sectors, which equals 
1.05% of the gross salary, which is constrained to a maximum. As such, this €23 per month is a rough indication.  
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system do not take into account the costs of the hearing procedure, of which the exact form and 
execution is not stipulated yet. On top of that, the expiry of a flexible contract will be costly for 
employers as also flexible workers are entitled to receive a budget. Additionally, the financing of 
the first months of unemployment benefit for flexible workers is incurred. As such, the costs of 
the new proposed system are expected to be even higher than presented here.  
7.6 Policy implications 
This dissertation has provided some useful insights in understanding the consequences of a 
possible modification and in showing that the plans of the government to modify EPL are based 
on untested premises. We provide a document that has some important policy implications. We 
object to the abolishment of the preventative check by the PES and the civil court and we advise 
the government to abandon the proposal to introduce a single repressive check by court.  
 First of all, we showed that over 90% of the requests that are filed at the PES and at the 
civil court are honored. This implies that the Dutch labor market is not as inflexible as believed. 
This high likelihood of success also indicates that over 90% of requests that are filed at the PES 
or at the civil court are based on reasonable grounds. This given, we argue that the preventative 
check acts as a barrier to put a halt to unfair dismissals. Policy makers should also realize that 
without a preventative check of dismissal employees are much more likely to file a repressive 
check.215 A higher possibility that a dismissed employee starts a repressive case in court, with 
the possible outcome of reestablishment of the employment contract or a damage award, 
results in higher insecurity for employers. This argument becomes even stronger when 
considering that it is possible to make an appeal against the decision of the court. As a result, 
employers may be confronted with costs years after the dismissal has taken place.216 Policy 
makers should additionally realize that in comparison to a repressive procedure, the current 
preventative procedure is a relatively fast and cheap procedure.217 
 The findings of Chapter 6 of this dissertation are in agreement with our earlier argument 
that the preventative check of dismissal acts as a barrier for unfair dismissals. We showed that 
recession induced cases that are filed at PES are weaker cases, and are less likely to be won by 
the employer.218 Without a preventative check to put a halt to these dismissals, times of 
economic slumps will elicit an increase in the number of workers that is dismissed unfairly and 
additional costs of unemployment are imposed on the Dutch society. 
 In Chapter 5 we argue that the Dutch dual system can be described as a system of a 
possibility of severance pay exemption for firms in economic distress. The government can 
decide to relieve firms from the obligation of severance payments during periods of economic 
contraction. The general point for policymakers to understand is that during periods of 
contraction the costs of unemployment contributions may exceed the costs of the government 
                                                        
215 See also the research of Ichino et al.(2003) in which 21 % of all dismissed employees at a large Italian bank file a 
lawsuit against their employer, but also the letter of the Legal Council as described on page 138 above. 
216 See also the letter of the delegation of scientists. 
217 The duration of a repressive procedure is long (see for instance www.specialistenplan.nl/artikel/vragen-inzake-
ontslag and http://www.kroon-partners.nl/Teksten/faq_tekst.html), retrieved October 2nd 2012. 
218 We define a weaker case as a case that does not, partly or fully comply with the definition of a fair dismissal as 
stipulated in Dutch law. 
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relieving firms from severance pay. Combined with the notion that the existence of two routes 
of dismissal is on itself is a sign of flexibility, we argue that the duality of the Dutch system has 
some positive side-effects that are not directly visible and therefore not taken into account in 
the political discussion about the modernization of Dutch EPL. 
 The latest proposal states that the new modification will result in an increase in firing costs 
for some employers and in a decrease for others. This chapter shows that employers that 
originally selected the PES route will incur costs that are more than 2 times higher (€ 17,401 vs. 
€ 7,480) in the new proposed system. Employers that originally selected the civil court route 
incur lower costs (€ 19,948 vs. € 30,982). We show that the average costs of dismissal are not 
expected to decrease (€ 18,596 vs. €18,503). This given, and if we use the definition of the OECD 
that expresses flexibility in terms of costs (OECD, 2004), we present the notion that the new 
proposed system is not more flexible. Furthermore, since smaller employees are more likely to 
follow the PES route, the costs of the new system will be mostly carried by this group. The 
proposal of minister Kamp does suggest that smaller employees may be exempted from the 
obligation to finance the first months of the unemployment benefit. The definition of smaller 
employees however, is not given. Furthermore, if costs increase with the number of employees 
employed, due to the fact that smaller employers are exempted from certain payments, 
employers may intentionally decide to keep their personnel record small. This will have negative 
consequences for economic growth.  
 Furthermore, minister Kamp argues that a decrease in firing costs for older employees will 
result in improved labor market mobility for this specific group. Minister Kamp fails to provide 
evidence for this argument. The opposite scenario is likely to occur. Due to a decrease in firing 
costs, older workers are more easily fired and replaced by younger workers. Since the proposed 
system also presents firing costs as an increasing function of age (see Figure 1), firing a younger 
employee remains less costly than firing an older counterpart.219  
 This dissertation helps policymakers to understand that arguments in favor and against a 
modification can always be found.  After reading this dissertation it may be decided to follow 
the political mass and to introduce the new proposed measures, of which the costs and the 
consequences are unforeseeable. We however would strongly recommend to revise the 
proposal made and to abandon the abolishment of the preventative check. Additional 
arguments to take into consideration are the years of experience of both the PES and the civil 
court in dealing with dismissal affairs. The proposed EPL does not seem to be more flexible in 
terms of costs but also not in terms of procedural inconveniences. The judicial consequences of 
the hearing procedure are unknown. For a hearing procedure to function properly, however, 
one should not rely upon ad hoc arrangements but one should rather document the rules 
regarding this procedure in some source of law. In such a procedure both the employee and the 
employee will call in the advice of a lawyer. Before one realizes, a new privatized preventative 
check is created. This new check however, is merely an advisory check. It is not decisive for the 
outcome of the dismissal dispute because it is only the court that decides post hoc whether the 
dismissal is based on reasonable grounds.  
 Last, the fact that we outperform many other countries in terms of employment, 
participation and productivity despite of being marked with one of the strongest EPL for 
permanent workers should be taken into account. On the basis of the comparisons we made in 
                                                        
219 Herewith we do not claim that firing costs should not be an increasing function of age (tenure).  
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Chapter 5 of this dissertation it does not seem to be unreasonable to state that the Dutch labor 
market is an example that challenges modern theories of unemployment and worker 
protection. 
7.7 Outlook for future research 
We propose an outlook for further research. On the basis of Chapter 4 of this dissertation we 
propose to formulate a model that explains the strategic choice of employers. The expected 
costs of both procedures are used as input for this model. This model can be used for sensitivity 
analysis to assess the impact of a modification of EPL on the firing decision of employers.  
 We furthermore suggest on the basis of Chapter 5 of this dissertation to design a dynamic 
general equilibrium search model as in Landais et al. (2012). Such a model extended with cyclical 
severance pay exemption governmental policy is necessary to perform analyses of the influence 
of government policy on job protection during periods of economic expansion and recession 
separately. 
 Additionally, we propose further analyses to provide additional insights into the effect of 
the proposed modification more specifically. Important questions to be answered are: 
Do the high firing costs of older employee result in lower labor market mobility of this specific 
group or are there other factors that play a role?  
To what extent is the high performance of the Dutch labor market due to the fact that the 
Netherlands has very flexible rules for workers with flexible contracts?  
What is the effect of an increase in firing costs for workers with a flexible contract? Will an 
increase in costs result in a larger proportion of workers with a permanent contract or will an 
increase in costs lead to more unemployment? 
What is effect of the abolishment of the preventative check on the number of workers that file a 
lawsuit against their employers in court after being dismissed? 
What are the costs of such a lawsuit for the employer?  
To what extent do schooling and other routes that stimulate a person’s capability for gaining 
and maintaining employment affect the influx of unemployed workers into employment? 
To our view it is imperative to find answers to these questions. From a micro-perspective, this is 
essential because it allows for a deeper understanding of how firing and hiring decisions are 
made by the individual employer. The answers to question 4 and 6 provide insight into how 
individual employees find their way back to work after being dismissed. More specifically, an 
answer to question 4 shows how much employees are willing to file a case against their 
employer after being dismissed. It can furthermore be used to estimate the additional workload 
of the civil courts due to an extra inflow of repressive cases. With respect to question 6, we 
argue that it is naïve to believe that a budget of a maximum of six months of the gross monthly 
salary to spend on schooling will significantly improve the labor market position of workers. 
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Especially for older workers that have a long employment history with their previous employer 
this seems implausible.   
 From a macro-perspective, these questions are important because they test the critical 
assumptions on which the new proposal is based and allow for a better understanding of the 
effect of EPL on the functioning of the Dutch labor market.  
 Because the Dutch situation is unique, policy implications of research that is conducted in a 
different setting than the Dutch should be judged critically. Not only because the consequences 
of the new proposal are large: 1) The PES and the civil court preventative check are abolished, 
which will result in the destruction of PES and civil court jobs. 2) The law is modified. Dutch Law 
is a web of rules that are all carefully connected to each other. Proposing a new laws is 
complicated and time-consuming. 3) The new system introduces new costs as employers are 
made responsible for the financing of the first months of the employment benefits. As such, 
firing decisions will be made differently, especially for smaller employers for whom firing costs 
will rise. 4) Because the new severance budget is supposed to be used for schooling and other 
routes that stimulate a person’s capability for gaining and maintaining employment, the 
spending of the budget has to be monitored. Monitoring is again costly.  
 Care with the implementation of new policies is also a must because it is difficult to undo 
the measures once implemented. Especially in times of economic downturn we advise 
policymakers not to ‘experiment’ with EPL and social welfare.  
7.8 Conclusion 
The discussion about the modification of the Dutch EPL should not be about decreasing 
employment protection on itself; it should be about the question which policies will ensure an 
optimal functioning of the Dutch labor market. Herewith one should take into consideration the 
society as a whole. We understand that employers would prefer to see firing costs decrease and 
that employees are in favor of gaining more protection. We also understand that political 
parties use the topic of EPL to win votes. Left-wing parties are expected to protect the rights of 
the worker or the weaker party, whereas the more right-wing and liberal parties are expected to 
be in favor of a relaxation of EPL.  
 We however, are against the abolishment of the preventative check. The analyses 
conducted in this dissertation learn that: 
The Dutch system is more flexible than the government presents it to be as over 90% of all 
dismissal requests is honored. 
The Netherlands outperforms other EU countries in terms of high participation, low 
unemployment and high productivity. 
A repressive check leads to additional procedural inconveniences for employers because of the 
uncertainty of being sued post hoc. As such, a repressive system is not by definition a more 
flexible system.  
Preventive dismissal checks put to halt to recession induced cases that have no reasonable 
ground. 
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Preventative dismissal checks restrain firms to seek reduction of severance payments on 
unjustifiable grounds. Consequently, firms are discouraged to shift private costs to society on 
considerations of self-interest alone. Costs of moral hazard are reduced. 
The unique Dutch system of severance pay lenience for firms in distress is cost effective, implying 
that a labor market policy with severance payment exemption is less costly than the alternative 
of additional employment benefits.220  
The proposed system will not lead to a decrease in firing costs. 
Political parties rely upon a modification of EPL as a medicine to stimulate economic recovery. 
They focus on short-term effects and are driven by sentiment. Criticism against the abolishment 
of the preventative check is not taken into account and plans are not revised because of fear of 
being condemned for a lack of political backbone.  
 
 
  
                                                        
220 We showed that this holds true when the wage elasticity of demand does not exceed the inverse of the 
replacement ratio.  
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8.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter we have commented on the proposed modifications of the Kunduz 
parties VVD, CDA, D66, GroenLinks and ChristenUnie. Recent political developments have 
motivated us to write a brief update. As mentioned in the previous chapter of this dissertation, 
a general election was held on September 12th 2012. The VVD received the majority of the 
votes, followed by the PvdA. The Coalition Agreement of the 29th of October 2012 that was 
formed by both parties deviates from the proposed modifications as presented earlier by the 
Kunduz parties. In short, the most important measures in the Coalition Agreement for dismissal 
protection are: 
1. The preventative check of dismissal by the public employment service (PES)221 is 
maintained222, the parallel preventative check by the civil court is lapsed. Criteria for 
reasonable dismissal are being accurately described.223 The duration of the PES procedures 
is shortened with two weeks. The dismissal permission of the PES is replaced by a dismissal 
advice, which is not binding. 
2. The civil court preventive route is followed in the event of the existence of a dismissal 
prohibition.224 
3. In the event of a dismissal or the decision not to renew a temporary employment contract 
for at least a year the employer is obliged to pay a transition budget for training, unless the 
dismissal is driven by financial reasons and the employer runs the risk of bankruptcy when 
complying with that obligation. The transition budget equals a quarter of a monthly salary 
for each year employed and is constrained to maximum of four monthly salaries.225 
4. Dismissed employees may apply to the civil court (repressive check).226 If the court finds the 
dismissal unreasonable, it may award a compensation which equals half a monthly salary, at 
most, for each year of service. It has an upper limit of 75,000 euros gross. If the employer 
has not followed a negative advice of the PES, the court may recover the employment 
relationship. There is no appeal possible against the court decision. 
5. The maximum eligibility period for unemployment benefits is 24 months.227 Unemployment 
premiums will increase. 
6. The legal period of notice of 1 to 4 months, dependent on years of employment, is 
maintained.  
The proposed measures in the Coalition Agreement of October 2012 are less drastic than the 
measures proposed by the Kunduz political parties in May 2012. Following our reasoning in 
                                                        
221 In this chapter PES is used as an acronym for public employment service.  
222 The obligation of a preventative check does not apply when the collective bargaining agreement provides a 
similar procedure. 
223 The current dismissal criteria for economic dismissals are being upheld. 
224 An employer may also turn to court when intending to terminate a fixed term contract when the option of 
termination is not included in the employment contract. 
225 The transition budget is also awarded when not extending a fixed term contract of at least one year.  
226 The advice of the UWV is strongly considered. Dismissal criteria of the civil court will be identical to the dismissal 
criteria of the PES. 
227Of which 12 months are related to the most recent wage and 12 months are related to the statutory minimum 
wage. 
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Chapter 5 to 7 of this dissertation, we agree with the maintenance of the preventative check of 
dismissal and the exemption of severance payment for firms in financial distress. First, because 
a preventative check puts a halt to unfair dismissals, and second, because a system of severance 
pay lenience for firms in economic distress is cost-effective (see Chapter 5). We also argue that 
the proposed measures have some drawbacks.  
 This short chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 shows a calculation of costs of the 
measures proposed in the Coalition Agreement. In Section 3 we present our own point of view. 
Section 4 concludes.  
8.2 Some cost calculations 
Following Chapter 7, Section 5 of this dissertation we calculate the costs of the measures 
proposed in the Coalition Agreement, using our sample of 994 PES dismissals and 878 civil court 
dismissals.228 Table 1 shows a schematic overview of the differences in costs of the current and 
of the new proposed system. Average dismissal costs of the Coalition Agreement measures are 
calculated as follows: 
 
ܣݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁	݀݅ݏ݉݅ݏݏ݈ܽ	ܿ݋ݏݐݏ																																																																								
= ∑ ((ܣ1௜ + ܣ2௜ + ܣ3௜)݈ܵܽܽݎݕ௜ +	ܶݎܽ݊ݏ݅ݐ݅݋݊	ܾݑ݀݃݁ݐ௜)
௡௜ୀଵ
݊ 	 
 
,where n equals 1,872 and i is the ith worker in our sample. A1 refers to the duration of the PES 
procedure. A2 refers to the time to notice, and A3 to the period of notice (see Chapter 4 for a 
more detailed description of A1, A2 and A3). Salary is the gross monthly salary including a 
holiday payment of 8%.  
 Table 2a shows that the costs of the Coalition Agreement measures are € 11,166. These 
costs are lower than the € 18,503 average costs of the current system. The ongoing wage costs 
during the extended period of notice are the largest cost component. Because the transition 
budget is not an obligatory payment for firms in financial distress, total costs for economic 
dismissals are lower than for non-economic dismissals (€ 8,754 vs. € 13.619, respectively. Not 
presented in table).229 
  
                                                        
228 Herewith, we realize that different firing costs may result in a different selection of employees to be dismissed. As 
such, we do not claim that a similar selection of employees is dismissed in the new proposed system. For example, 
our calculations show that employers that selected the PES route are confronted with dismissal costs that are twice 
as high when using the proposed firing rules. These employers may depart from dismissing certain employees for 
which firing costs increase in the new system. Our purpose in this chapter is only to show how the new rules may be 
applied, ceteris paribus. 
229 When calculating the costs for economic dismissals we set all transition budgets equal to zero. 
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Table 1 Overview of cost differences of current system and measure in the Coalition Agreement. 
 Current employment protection 
legislation (EPL)  
Measures as proposed in the Coalition 
Agreement 
Severance payment Civil court: According to the civil court 
formula (A x B x C) PES: Severance pay is 
not awarded 
All: Budgets instead of severance payments. 
These budgets are set to maximum of four 
months and equal a quarter of a monthly salary 
per year of employment. Both permanent and 
flexible workers are entitled to receive the 
budget. 
Period of notice (PoN) Civil court: None, the date of 
termination of the contract is 
determined by court. Ongoing wage 
costs are incurred during this period. 
PES: 1 to 3 months, dependent on years 
of employment with the concerned 
employer. Ongoing wage costs during 
the PoN are incurred. Ongoing wage 
cost are also incurred during the time in 
between date at which the case is 
closed and the date at which the PoN 
commences (see Chapter 4). 
All: The statutory period of notice (PoN) of 1 to 
4 months is used. The PoN is dependent upon 
the years of service (see Chapter 2, Table 2). 
Ongoing wage costs during the PoN are 
incurred. Ongoing wage cost are also incurred 
during the time in between date at which the 
case is closed and the date at which the PoN 
commences (see Chapter 4). 
Costs of preventative 
procedure 
Civil court: Ongoing wage costs are 
incurred during the duration of the 
procedure.  
PES: Ongoing wage costs are incurred 
during the duration of the procedure 
All: Ongoing wage costs are incurred during the 
duration of the procedure. 
 
Costs of repressive 
procedure 
Repressive procedures are not often 
followed in the current system. 
Repressive procedures are likely to be followed 
more often. Costs include a damage award or 
the reemployment of the employee.  
Costs of unemployment 
benefit 
All: Employers pay an unemployment 
premium for all their employees. 
Employers do not finance the first 
months of the unemployment benefit. 
All: Employers pay an unemployment premium 
for all their employees. These premiums will 
increase. 
 
Tabel 2a Total average costs for PES and civil court together, Coalition Agreement (n=1872, 2006-2009). 
 Wage costs 
duration process 
Wage costs time 
to notice Wage costs PoN Transition budget Total costs 
Mean € 2,248 € 907 € 5,591 € 2,421 € 11,166 
Median € 1,792 € 754 € 4,027 € 0 € 8,632 
Std. Deviation € 2,351 € 698 € 5,163 € 4,481 € 10,227 
Minimum € 0 € 9 € 93 € 0 € 206 
Maximum € 28,711 € 6,749 € 68,374 € 68,374 € 159,571 
  
 
Table 2b shows that employers that originally selected the PES route will incur costs that are 
equal to €9,254. Total costs for economic dismissals and for non-economic dismissals equal € 
8,096 and € 12,327, respectively (not presented in table). In Chapter 4 of this dissertation we 
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showed that average dismissal costs via the PES route in current system equal € 7,480. Costs for 
economic and non-economic dismissals equal € 7,532 and € 7,339, respectively. As such, the 
measures of the Coalition Agreement will lead to an increase in costs for employers that 
originally followed the PES route. These employers are generally smaller in size than those that 
follow the civil-court route.  
Table 2b PES sample (n=994, 2006-2009). 
 
Wage costs 
duration process*
Wage costs time 
to notice Wage costs PoN Transition budget Total costs 
Mean € 2,036 € 787 € 5,247 € 1,185 € 9,254 
Median € 1,198 € 583 € 4,032 € 0 € 7,296 
Std. Deviation € 2,815 € 685 € 4,197 € 2,744 € 7,468 
Minimum € 0 € 9 € 93 € 0 € 206 
Maximum € 28,711 € 3,948 € 34,246 € 21,316 € 66,335 
* In order to calculate the duration of the process, we used the average duration of the PES procedure as presented 
in Chapter 4a, and subtracted 14 days. 
Table 2c Civil court sample (n=994, 2006-2009). 
  
Wage costs 
duration 
process* 
Wage costs time 
to notice** Wage costs PoN 
Transition 
budget Total costs 
Mean € 2,488 € 1,042 € 5,980 € 3,820 € 13,330 
Median € 2,115 € 885 € 4,022 € 2,032 € 9,636 
Std. Deviation € 1,645 € 689 € 6,053 € 5,533 € 12,294 
Minimum € 209 € 88 € 222 € 0 € 519 
Maximum € 16,123 € 6,749 € 68,374 € 68,374 € 159,571 
* In order to calculate the duration of the process, we used the average duration of the PES procedure as presented 
in Chapter 4a,  and subtracted 14 days. 
** For the time to notice we used the average PES time to notice.  
In the current system average total costs for employers that followed the civil court route are € 
30,982. Costs for non-economic dismissals and economic dismissals are € 26,918 and €42,994 
respectively. Table 2c shows that total costs for employers that followed the civil court route in 
the current system will decrease to €13,330. Costs for non-economic dismissals and economic 
dismissals are €14,154 and €10,895, respectively. This given, costs for employers that originally 
followed the civil court route of dismissal will decrease because of the measures proposed in 
the Coalition Agreement. 
8.3 Our point of view 
In our point of view the proposed measures in the Coalition Agreement are an improvement of 
the measures that were presented by Minister Kamp (See Chapter 7 for an overview these 
measures). We, however, also argue that the newly proposed measures have some drawbacks. 
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First, because high severance awards are being replaced by relatively low transitory budgets and 
unemployment benefits are being heavily reduced, the likelihood that employees apply to court 
for dismissal compensation is highly likely to increase. This likelihood moreover increases due to 
the fact that the dismissal permission of the PES is replaced by a dismissal advice, which is not 
binding.230 
 Second, as we have presented in Chapter 5 of this dissertation, the PES and the civil court 
are specialized in handling cases with different backgrounds. The PES mainly processes 
economical cases and cases due to long-term illness. The civil court mainly deals with dismissal 
disputes that are due to a disturbed relationship. A reason that the civil court is more specialized 
in disturbed relationships is because the criteria for the reasonableness of such dismissal are 
less obvious than those for economic dismissals. The PES has strict dismissal criteria to follow, 
the set of rules followed by the civil court is broader and more generic and thus leaves more 
room for interpretation. Moreover, the civil court may increase the severance payment if it 
judges the employer to be culpable. Additionally, the PES procedure is a procedure in writing. 
Judgment of disturbed relationship disputes is difficult in such a procedure. Court hearings are 
more informative in this respect. The new proposed measures as such require a modification of 
the current PES route. Furthermore, as Adam Smith recognized long time ago, specialization in 
general leads to more efficiency. As such, abolishing the dual system is inefficient. 
 Third, a dismissal permission for cases due to a disturbed relationship requires detailed 
evidence. And, as we mentioned above, cases of disturbed relationships are more difficult to 
capture in criteria. In the current system, dismissal cases that do not exactly comply with the 
PES-criteria end up at court (with accompanying higher severance payments). This is no longer 
an option in the new system. From the perspective of creating a more flexible EPL, dismissal in 
such cases will be more difficult instead of less difficult.  
 Fourth, cost will not decrease for all employers. As we have showed in Table 2b of this 
chapter, costs for employers that originally followed the PES route will increase. As such, costs 
of the new system will mainly be carried by smaller employers.  
8.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has given a brief update of the proposed measures as presented in the Coalition 
Agreement of the 29th of October 2012. Although the measures of the Coalition Agreement are 
less drastic than the measures proposed by the Kunduz parties that we described in Chapter 7 of 
this dissertation, the newly proposed measures have some drawbacks. These drawbacks are 
mostly related to the option of choice that employers have in the current system. If the newly 
proposed measures will be transformed into law, this option of choice disappears. As we argued 
earlier, the existence of two routes of dismissal on itself is a sign of flexibility. Abolishing this 
option of choice leads to less flexibility because decisions have to be made under stricter 
requirements. Furthermore, we would like to stress the fact that both institutes are specialized 
                                                        
230 Additionally, recovery of the employment contract by the court is only possible after a negative PES advice. After 
a positive PES advice the concerned employee may only be awarded a compensation. This seems unfair in the event 
that the PES has mistakenly given a positive advice. This event will be rare, but one should not forget that the 
assessment of dismissal cases is a human job. 
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in assessing a different type of case. The PES mainly reviews economic dismissals and dismissals 
due to illness. The civil court mainly deals with cases of disturbed employment relationships. 
Economic theory predicts that specialization in general leads to efficiency. Also important to 
note is that one will destroy a system that has functioned relatively well and that has developed 
itself over the past 60 years. Over time adaptations have been made to improve the legal 
system as founded in 1838. A new proposed system is likely to lead to new unforeseen 
drawbacks.  
 In the new system, because the PES advice is a non-binding advice, a large responsibility is 
shifted to the employee. If an employer decides to fire a employee despite of a negative 
dismissal advice, the employee has to take the initiative to apply to court to be re-employed or 
to receive a compensation. For some employees this is a high barrier to cross, and some will lose 
their job unfairly.  
 Because the proposed measures are not described in great detail the Coalition Agreement 
provokes many questions, such as: What if employers fire an employees without an advice of 
the PES? What will happen to the pro-forma procedure that is now often followed at the civil 
court? Will the regulation regarding summary dismissal be modified?  
 The newly proposed measures also contain some positive aspects. First, the inequality of 
severance payments disappears. In the proposed system, receiving severance payments is not 
dependent upon the route of dismissal and is equal for all employees with the same background 
in terms of tenure and reason for dismissal. Most important, the preventative check of dismissal 
does not disappear. As we mentioned earlier throughout this dissertation, we are a strong 
advocate of such a check.  
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The Dutch employment protection legislation is unique in the world. It so happens that firms in 
the Netherlands have two different possibilities to seek to dissolve a tenured worker contract. 
One possibility is to ask for permission from the public employment service (PES)231. The other 
possibility is to request the universal civil court for a dismissal permission232. The PES is a 
governmental institution, and remains from a decree that has been enforced during the 
occupation of the Netherlands during World War II. After the war a provisional law was 
proclaimed to maintain the decree and the uniqueness of it is that it still exists. The OECD refers 
to the Dutch system as a dual system of dismissal. 
 In Chapter 2 of this dissertation we sketch a short overview of the history of Dutch 
employment protection legislation (EPL)233. We explain that the first route of dismissal, the civil 
court route, exists since the introduction of article 1639w, which was part of the Law on 
Employment Contracts of 1907. After some modifications that broadened the possibilities of the 
civil court to dissolve a contract, article 1639w (old CC) would later become article 7:685 (CC), 
the article on which the current civil court route is based. The PES route of dismissal found its 
origin some 50 years later when the Dutch government upheld a decree of the occupying 
Germans, which recorded a dismissal prohibition. This prohibition stipulated that an employer 
could not dismiss an employee without the approval of the Labor Inspectorate. For dismissal a 
reasonable cause was required. If the Labor Inspectorate judged dismissal to be unreasonable, 
permission to terminate the employment contract was not given. Today, the task of the Labor 
Inspectorate is performed by the PES, for which the Dutch official name is the 
Uitvoeringsinstituut Werknemersverzekeringen (UWV). Uniquely, and after several attempts of 
abolishment, the Dutch system still exists today.  
 The idea for this dissertation stems from one of the latest attempts to modify the Dutch 
system. With the need to increase labor participation, former Minister of Social Affairs and 
Employment, Minister Donner, proposed a simplification of the Dutch system in 2007. According 
to the Minister, the Dutch EPL inhibits employers from employing new employees. One of the 
most important suggestions made is that prior approval from the UWV and the civil court is not 
needed.234 Minister Donner’s proposal led to a political impasse. Dutch EPL is left untouched. 
 We argue that an important cause for the fact that the dual system still exists today is that 
it is difficult to predict what will happen if the Netherlands converts to another dismissal system. 
In fact, we do not know what is the effect of EPL on labor market outcomes. See for instance the 
overview of Addison and Teixeira (2003) to understand how many different conclusions are 
drawn. We furthermore observed that the Dutch system deserves some special attention. The 
unique aspects of the system have received too little attention. First of all, we argue that the 
existence of two routes of dismissal on itself is a sign of flexibility. Employers have the option to 
choose. Abolishing this option of choice leads to less flexibility because decisions have to be 
made under stricter requirements. Moreover, we noticed that the Dutch labor market, despite 
of being marked with one of the strongest regulations for workers with a permanent contract, 
                                                        
231 In this chapter PES is used as an acronym for public employment service.  
232 As mentioned earlier, an employment contract may also be terminated at will during the trial period, by mutual 
consent, by operation of law and by summary dismissal. These options are beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
233 EPL is used as an acronym for employment protection legislation.  
234 Without prior approval, however, a damage pay for the dismissed employee is made obligatory. When dismissal 
is due to economic grounds, the employer is relieved from the obligation to award the employee a damage pay, but 
only when the PES has granted a priori approval. 
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outperforms most other EU15 countries, in terms of unemployment, labor participation and 
worker productivity. A last reason to work on this topic, is that we noticed that although the 
Dutch discussion on labor market flexibility is mainly a discussion about firing costs, an up-to-
date overview of such costs is not available.  
 During the process of writing this dissertation we have collected a unique sample of 3,391 
individual dismissal cases, of which 1,134 requests are filed at the PES in the period 2006 to 
2009 and 2,257 requests are filed at the civil court in the period 2003 to 2009. Using this novel 
data set, this dissertation has quantified some of the major unique aspects of the Dutch system. 
First, in Chapter 4 we show that the average firing costs for the civil court procedure are four 
times larger than the average firing costs at the PES. The median costs are twice as large. The 
most striking difference, however, is found in the uncertainty of the outcomes between the two 
procedures. The standard deviation of the firing costs through the civil court is 10 times larger 
than for the PES. Thus the uncertainty (variance) associated with PES firing costs is one percent 
of the uncertainty for the cases that are judged by the courts.  
 In Chapter 5, we use Eurostat data to show that the Netherlands outperforms most other 
European countries in terms of unemployment, labor participation and productivity. This is 
contrary to the common belief that modern labor markets with strict protection laws for 
workers with permanent contracts have high unemployment, low labor participation, and low 
worker productivity. Next, we introduce the idea that the dual Dutch system can be typified as a 
system of government transfers to firms in demise, since firms that are granted permission of 
the PES are relieved from the obligation of severance pay. The PES checks if a dismissal request 
is reasonable. This provision of the PES is one the most important disciplinary instruments 
currently available for the Dutch labor market as it prevents firms in demise to seek a reduction 
of severance payments for unjustifiable reasons, and it reduces the costs of a firm’s moral 
hazard to lay-off a worker at will. Last, we present a simple theoretical equilibrium model. The 
model predicts that as long as the wage elasticity of labor demand does not exceed the inverse 
of the replacement ratio a system of governmental transfer is less costly than additional 
unemployment benefits. We show that the likelihood for this condition to hold is high and 
increases when a firm is hit by a negative shock. 
 In Chapter 6 we show that recession induced cases that are filed at the PES are weaker 
cases from a plaintiff’s perspective. These weaker cases, however, have a larger likelihood of 
being rejected. These results are desirable because it prevents a firm to dismiss without a 
reasonable cause. 
 In Chapter 7 we discuss the latest Kunduz proposal for the revision of the Dutch EPL.235 
History repeats itself as the abolishment of the preventative dismissal check is suggested. We 
sketch an overview of the reactions the new proposal has provoked. Amongst those reactions 
was a letter of protest that was sent by a delegation of scientist to the Upper Chamber on June 
12th 2012. We moreover present opinions from a workers’ employers’ and voters’ perspective. 
Employers expect that a more flexible employment protection system will facilitate hiring, 
employees are afraid to be fired without a cause. 
                                                        
235 In the Spring Agreement of May 2012 the Kunduz-parties VVD, CDA, D66, GroenLinks and ChristenUnie proposed 
a new drastic revision of the current Dutch EPL. This proposal was revised and sketched in more detail by Henk 
Kamp, (outgoing) Minister of Social Affairs and Welfare and was send to the Upper Chamber at the 18th of June 
2012. The most important measure introduced is the abolishment of the preventative check of dismissal (See 
Chapter 7).  
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To our view, the dual preventative check should not be abolished and be replaced by a 
repressive check.  First of all, we argue that the arguments used to modify the Dutch EPL are 
based on untested premised. As mentioned earlier, little is known about the effect of a possible 
modification. Second, a system with only a repressive check is not per definition less rigid. A 
repressive check itself is also costly. It might be easier to dismiss a worker, but this worker is 
likely to fight back in court. We know from the Italian system that 21% of all workers file a 
lawsuit against their employer after being dismissed (Ichino, Pollo and Rettore, 2003). Without 
the preventative check the Netherland might face similar post hoc suing rates as Italy.  
Moreover, Ichino et al. found that employees are more likely to file a lawsuit against their 
employer during recessions. These cases tend to be weaker236. This is not a desirable 
phenomenon as judicial costs for lawsuits then rise during recessions. Because of the possibility 
of post hoc law suits, repressive checks lead to uncertainty as both employers and employees 
may be faced with costs long after the dismissal has taken place. Third, a repressive check 
stimulates a firm to fire without a reasonable cause as not all unrightfully dismissed employees 
will file a lawsuit against their employer after being dismissed. The current preventative check 
encourages employers to carefully motivate the dismissal intention. A halt is put to unfair 
dismissals and it restrains firms to seek a reduction of severance payment on unjustifiable 
grounds. Fourth, we showed that the unique Dutch labor market policy with severance payment 
exemption by the PES is less costly than the alternative of additional employment benefits.237 It 
moreover reduces the costs of a firm’s moral hazard. Fifth, the proposed system will not lead to 
a decrease in firing costs.  
 Last, Chapter 8 presents a brief update of recent political developments. The Coalition 
Agreement of the 29th of October 2012 that was formed by political parties VVD and PvdA, who 
received the majority of the votes during the general elections of September 2012, deviates 
from the proposed modifications as presented earlier in Chapter 7. The proposed measures in 
the Coalition Agreement of October 2012 are less drastic than the measures proposed by the 
Kunduz political parties in May 2012.238 We argue that we agree with the maintenance of the 
preventative check of dismissal of the PES and with the exemption of severance payment for 
firms in financial distress. We agree with the former measure because a preventative check puts 
a halt to unfair dismissals. We agree with the latter measure because of our earlier mentioned 
argument that a system of severance pay lenience for firms in economic distress is cost-effective 
(see Chapter 5). We also argue that the proposed measures have some drawbacks. The option 
of choice disappears and a system in which both the PES and the civil court specialize in 
handling specific types of requests is abolished. The PES mainly deals with cases of long-term 
illness and economic circumstances. The civil court mainly processes cases of disturbed 
                                                        
236 The theoretical explanation for this finding is that when the unemployment rate rises, the duration of 
unemployment spells increases, which prompts for higher damages awarded when the employment dispute is won. 
These higher damage pays increase the expected value of a case and could induce low probability cases to file suit 
(Ichino et al., 2003). 
237 We showed that this holds true when the wage elasticity of demand does not exceed the inverse of the 
replacement ratio.  
238 The most important measures presented in the agreement are 1) the maintenance of the preventative PES check 
of dismissal and the abolishment of the civil court preventative check, and 2) the obligation of the employer to 
award the employee a transition budget, unless he runs the risk of bankrupt by complying with that obligation.  
3)The maximum eligibility period for unemployment benefits is reduced.  (For a more detailed description of all 
measures that are recorded in the agreement see Chapter 8) 
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relationships. The qualification of the PES to decide in cases of long-term illness and economic 
circumstances has a long history. The same holds true for the qualification of the civil court to 
decide in situations of disturbed relationships. From economic theory we know that 
specialization leads to efficiency. As such, abolishing the dual system is inefficient. Furthermore, 
because of the relatively low transitory budgets and the heavily reduced unemployment 
benefits in the new system, the likelihood that a repressive check is followed is likely to increase 
as compared to the current situation. Moreover, for some dismissals it is hard to capture a 
reasonable dismissal into strict criteria (e.g. dysfunctional behavior). In such cases the civil court, 
who applies broader criteria, provides a good alternative for the PES, who applies much stricter 
criteria.  
 On the basis of this dissertation, we propose an outlook for further research. On the basis 
of Chapter 4 we propose to formulate a model that explains the strategic choice of employers. 
This model is to be used for sensitivity analysis to assess the impact of a modification of EPL on 
the firing decision of employers. On the basis of Chapter 5 of this dissertation we propose to 
design a dynamic general equilibrium search model as in Landais et al. (2012) to perform 
analyses of the influence of government policy on job protection during periods of economic 
expansion and recession separately. Additionally, we suggest to perform additional empirical 
analyses to study the consequences of the proposed modifications more specifically.  
 This dissertation has its limitations. We only witness dismissal cases via the PES and the civil 
court route. Instead of going to court or the PES, the contract of a worker can also be 
terminated by mutual agreement. These cases we do not observe. We furthermore do not 
observe the decision making process preceding the decision to file a case at court or at the PES. 
We only observe that the PES route is the cheapest route to follow. From an economic 
perspective and taking into account only these costs, one would expect all firms to follow the 
PES procedure. As we have shown in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, for a specific individual case, 
however, the civil court route might be a cheaper route to follow. When deciding to file a 
request at either the civil court or the PES, a firm makes a strategic choice and will follow that 
route that has the lowest expected costs. The unobservable characteristics of a dismissal 
request play a large role in this decision. As we do not have information on these unobservable 
characteristics, we were not able to model the decision process of firms. Such a model would 
allow for a better understanding of the working of the Dutch system. The notion however, that 
the Dutch system allows firms to choose strategically is an additional indication of labor market 
flexibility.  
 We would like to conclude with the notion that we are not against a modification of Dutch 
EPL in general. Harmonization with the European (repressive) model is however dangerous as 
the efficiency of the Dutch model might suffer from modifications that are based on opinions 
instead of scientific proof. This mentioned, we recommend to leave the dual basis of the Dutch 
system untouched. This dual basis, together with a preventative check might be a blessing in 
disguise and an example for other European countries. 
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NEDERLANDSE SAMENVATTING  
(DUTCH SUMMARY) 
Een werkgever in Nederland heeft twee mogelijkheden om een arbeidsovereenkomst te 
beëindigen. Enerzijds kan hij de kantonrechter verzoeken de arbeidsovereenkomst te 
ontbinden. Als alternatief is er de mogelijkheid tot het aanvragen van een ontslagvergunning via 
het UWV WERKbedrijf.239 Dit stelsel wordt ook wel een duaal stelsel genoemd en is uniek in de 
wereld. De ontslagaanvraag wordt voorafgaand aan het ontslag getoetst en is dus een 
preventieve toets. Als gevolg zijn het UWV WERKbedrijf en de kantonrechter in een relatief 
vroege fase bij het ontslag betrokken. Als een werkgever heeft gekozen voor de UWV-route en 
het UWV verleent geen toestemming, kan hij zich altijd nog kan wenden tot de kantonrechter, 
en vice versa. 
 Het UWV WERKbedrijf volgt de regels die zijn opgenomen in het Buitengewoon Besluit 
Arbeidsverhoudingen (BBA) 1945 en het Ontslagbesluit. Een ontslagvergunning wordt afgegeven 
als het voorgenomen ontslag redelijk is bevonden. Voorbeelden van redelijke gronden voor 
ontslag zijn slechte bedrijfseconomische omstandigheden, langdurig ziekteverzuim en 
disfunctioneren. De kantonrechter hanteert de regels zoals beschreven in het Burgerlijk 
Wetboek. Hij ontbindt de arbeidsovereenkomst als er een gewichtige reden bestaat. Dit kan zijn 
een dringende reden, zoals bij een ontslag op staande voet, of een verandering van 
omstandigheden, zoals bijvoorbeeld slechte bedrijfseconomische omstandigheden, langdurige 
arbeidsongeschiktheid, of een verstoorde arbeidsverhouding. Een belangrijk verschil tussen het 
UWV WERKbedrijf en de kantonrechter is dat het UWV WERKbedrijf de werkgever niet 
veroordeelt tot het betalen van een ontslagvergoeding. De kantonrechter mag dit wel. 
 Na publicatie van de studies “Regulation or deregulation of the labour market. Policy 
regimes for the recruitment and dismissal of employees in industrialized countries” van Michael 
Emerson (1988), “Job security provisions and employment” van Ed Lazear (1990), en “Job 
security, employment and wages” van Guiseppe Bertola (1990) ontstaat er een grote interesse 
bij beleidsmakers om de mate van rigiditeit van ontslagbescherming te bepalen. Sindsdien 
berekent de OECD voor een groot aantal van haar lidstaten een Employment Protection 
Legislation index (EPL-index). Volgens deze index is de Nederlandse arbeidsmarkt voor 
werknemers met vaste contracten strikt, alleen het Portugese en het Duitse ontslagbeleid wordt 
gekarakteriseerd als strikter. 
 Een veelgehoorde theorie is dat een strikt ontslagbeleid geassocieerd is met het falen van 
West-Europese arbeidsmarkten zich aan te passen aan veranderende economische 
omstandigheden (OECD, 1994; Bertola and Rogerson, 1996; Bentolila and Bertola, 1990). Als een 
reactie op deze theorie hebben verschillende Europese instituten hun lidstaten geadviseerd hun 
ontslagrecht te flexibiliseren (zie onder andere de OECD Jobs Study, 1994, p50). Als gevolg heeft 
                                                        
239 Ander manieren om een arbeidscontract te beëindigen zijn op met wederzijds goedvinden, van rechtswege, 
tijdens en bij eindiging van de proeftijd en op staande voet. Deze manieren vallen buiten het bereik van dit 
proefschrift. 
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Nederland een aantal malen geprobeerd het ontslagsysteem drastisch te wijzigen.240 Eén van 
deze meeste recente pogingen, door toenmalig Minister van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 
Piet Hein Donner, was de aanleiding tot het schrijven van dit proefschrift. In een 
adviesaanvraag, gedateerd op 3 juli 2007, brengt Minister Donner de Stichting van de Arbeid op 
de hoogte van de regeringsplannen voor de wijziging van het ontslagstelsel. Eén van de 
belangrijkste onderdelen van het voorstel was de overgang naar een enkelvoudige regeling in 
het Burgerlijk Wetboek. Volgens de minister leidt het relatief strikte Nederlandse ontslagrecht 
tot een slecht functionerende arbeidsmarkt. Een meer flexibel systeem waarin ontslagkosten 
lager zijn zou moeten leiden tot een verhoogde arbeidsparticipatie, vooral onder oudere 
werknemers, jongere werknemers en vrouwen (AV/IR/2007/23064). De plannen van de minister 
worden uiteindelijk, na het instellen van de Commissie Bakker in december 2007, van tafel 
geschoven. Wij waren toen van mening, en dat zijn we nog steeds, dat de discussie over de 
wijziging van het Nederlandse ontslagrecht is gebaseerd op ongetoetste aannames. De te 
verwachte uitwerking van voorgestelde wijzigingen zijn niet of nauwelijks te verifiëren. Studies 
over het effect van ontslagrecht op de werking van de arbeidsmarkt leveren geen eenduidige 
resultaten, mede doordat de manier waarop de mate van ontslagbescherming gemeten wordt 
verschilt per studie. Ook zijn de situaties die worden onderzocht nogal verschillend van elkaar. 
Bovendien is de optie om te kiezen voor één van beide routes op zichzelf al een vorm van 
flexibiliteit. Hierover horen we echter zelden of nooit iets terug in de debatten over de sociale 
innovatie van de arbeidsmarkt. We horen sowieso weinig over de positieve aspecten van het 
Nederlandse ontslagrecht. De indeling van dit proefschrift is als volgt: 
 Hoofdstuk 2 start met een beschrijving van het Nederlandse ontslagsysteem. Allereerst 
beschrijft het hoofdstuk de regels voor ontslag via het UWV en de kantonrechter. Daarnaast 
geeft Hoofdstuk 2 een gedetailleerde beschrijving van de geschiedenis van het Nederlandse 
ontslagrecht. Een belangrijk vertrekpunt voor de ontwikkelingen in het Nederlandse systeem is 
de invoering van het Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW) in 1838. Ook al was er van ontslagrecht nog geen 
sprake, wel bevatte dit wetboek enkele wetsartikelen betreffende de ‘huur van dienstboden en 
werklieden’. Regels inzake de arbeidsrelatie waren opgenomen in het algemene 
overeenkomstenrecht waarin contractsvrijheid aan de basis stond. Deze contractsvrijheid hield 
in dat werknemers niet langer - in tegenstelling tot het eerdere gildensysteem - gebonden 
waren aan hun werkgevers. De Wet op de Arbeidsovereenkomst van 1907 introduceerde de 
eerste beschermende ontslagbepalingen ten gunste van de werknemer. Een belangrijk element 
in deze wet was dat een contract voor onbepaalde tijd niet mocht worden beëindigd zonder 
inachtneming van een opzegtermijn.  Door de invoering van artikel 1639w kreeg de rechter de 
bevoegdheid een arbeidsovereenkomst te ontbinden. Dit kon alleen indien voor ontbinding een 
gewichtige reden bestond. Het Nederlandse ontslagrecht bleef op hoofdlijnen ongewijzigd 
totdat het Duitse bewind in 1940 het Eerste Uitvoeringsbesluit uitvaardigde. Dit besluit bevatte 
een ontslagverbod. Als gevolg daarvan konden werkgevers hun werknemers niet ontslaan 
zonder voorafgaande toestemming van de toenmalige Arbeidsinspectie. Voor ontslag was een 
redelijke grond noodzakelijk en toestemming werd alleen gegeven als het ontslag een toetsing 
op redelijkheid kon doorstaan. Na de oorlog werden de Duitse maatregelen door de 
Nederlandse regering gecontinueerd in het Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen (BBA) 
1945. De rol van de Arbeidsinspectie werd overgenomen door het Gewestelijke Arbeidsbureau 
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en later door het UWV WERKbedrijf. Echter, artikel 1639w in het Burgerlijk Wetboek bepaalde 
dat ook de rechter de bevoegdheid had een arbeidsovereenkomst te ontbinden. Er bestonden 
nu dus twee wettelijke wegen om een arbeidscontract te beëindigen. Het duale ontslagstelsel 
was een feit. Hoofdstuk 2 sluit af met een internationale vergelijking op basis van de OESO 
index241.  
 Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft hoe wij een unieke dataset242 hebben verzameld met informatie over 
2.257 ontbindingsprocedures bij de kantonrechter voor de periode 2003-2009 en 1.134 
ontslagprocedures bij het UWV voor de periode 2006-2009. Dit was geen eenvoudige taak 
omdat niet alle benodigde informatie digitaal is opgeslagen. Als gevolg hebben wij een groot 
deel van deze informatie uit papieren ontslagdossiers overgenomen en verwerkt. 
 Hoofdstuk 4 vervolgt met een vergelijkende analyse van ontslagkosten bij het UWV 
WERKbedrijf en de kantonrechter. Dit hoofdstuk toont aan dat het ontslag van een gemiddelde 
werknemer 18,5 duizend euro kost. Voor werkgevers die de kantonrechter-route volgden is dit 
31 duizend euro. Werkgevers die UWV-route volgden werden geconfronteerd met een 7,5 
duizend euro aan kosten. Eerder schatten Hassink Reitsma en Roorda (1998) en Knegt en Tros 
(2007) de kosten van ontslag via beide routes. Het overzicht van kosten in Hoofdstuk 4 geeft een 
meer recentelijk beeld. Bovendien rapporteren wij kosten zoals genoteerd in de daadwerkelijke 
ontslagdossiers van het UWV en de kantonrechter. De studies van Hassink e.a. en Knegt en Tros 
maken gebruik van vragenlijsten. Onze methode leidt tot een meer precieze inschatting. 
 Hoofdstuk 5 presenteert de stelling dat de Nederlandse arbeidsmarkt bewijst dat de 
aanname dat een rigide ontslagrecht leidt tot een slecht functionerende arbeidsmarkt niet per 
definitie juist is. In vergelijking met de andere EU15 landen is de Nederlandse arbeidsmarkt voor 
werknemers met vaste contracten strikt. Alleen Duitsland en Portugal scoren hoger op basis van 
de OESO index. Internationaal gezien scoort Nederland echter erg goed op verschillende 
arbeidsmarktindicatoren: Nederland kent de laagste werkloosheid van alle EU15 landen, op 
Oostenrijk na. Op het gebied van arbeidsparticipatie neemt Nederland de eerste plaats in en 
ook op productiviteit scoort Nederland ruim boven het gemiddelde. Vervolgens laat Hoofdstuk 5 
zien dat grote werkgevers vaker naar de kantonrechter stappen dan kleinere werkgevers. 
Bovendien behandelt de kantonrechter met name ontslagen waaraan het disfunctioneren van 
de werknemer ten grondslag ligt. Het UWV beoordeelt vooral zaken met een economische 
achtergrond en langdurig zieken.  
 We vervolgen Hoofdstuk 5 met de stelling dat het Nederlandse systeem kan worden 
getypeerd als een systeem waarin werkgevers die een arbeidsovereenkomst vanwege 
economische noodzaak willen beëindigen kunnen worden gevrijwaard van het betalen van een 
ontslagvergoeding. Deze vergoedingsvrijwaring kan worden geïnterpreteerd als een 
lastenverlichting voor de werkgever in perioden van economische malaise die maatschappelijk 
wordt gefinancierd door de Nederlandse belastingbetaler. We zien dit als een efficiënt 
georganiseerde vorm van solidariteit. Preventieve toetsing en de vergoedingsvrijwaring van het 
UWV zijn belangrijke instrumenten van het Nederlandse arbeidsmarktbeleid. Het voorkomt dat 
werkgevers op grote schaal misbruik maken van deze vorm van solidariteit en ontslag niet 
                                                        
241 Belangrijke bronnen die zijn gebruikt voor de beschrijving van de geschiedenis van het Nederlandse ontslagrecht 
in Hoofdstuk 2 zijn Naber (1981), Nyfer (2000), Heerma Van Voss (1992), Pennings (2007), CPB (2006), Loonstra and 
Zondag (2008) and Van Drongelen, and Van Rijs, (2008). 
242 Met dank aan Tamara Dekker en Eva Feron. 
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willekeurig wordt. In een theoretisch model van optimaal conjunctureel ontslagbeleid tonen wij 
aan dat de verwachte kosten van de vergoedingsvrijwaring lager zijn dan de kosten van 
werkloosheidsuitkeringen. Bovendien voorkomt het ‘UWV-instrument’ moreel riskant gedrag 
van werkgevers. Het UWV biedt werkgevers in economische problemen de mogelijkheid hun 
werknemers op een rechtmatige manier te ontslaan, zonder dat zij daarvoor een vergoeding 
hoeven te betalen. Voor onredelijke ontslagen wordt geen vergunning afgegeven. Op deze 
manier voorkomt het Nederlandse systeem vooral in economisch barre tijden dat de kosten die 
voortkomen uit onredelijke ontslagen worden afgewenteld op de belastingbetaler. Dit argument 
is niet nieuw. Integendeel. Bij decreet van de regering in ballingschap werd direct na afloop van 
de Tweede Wereldoorlog juist dit argument gebruikt om het duale stelsel te handhaven ter 
bevordering van het productief en concurrerend vermogen van de Nederlandse economie. 
  Hoofdstuk 6 laat zien dat de kans dat een werkgever zonder redelijke grond een UWV 
ontslagprocedure start, toeneemt bij stijgende werkloosheidspercentages. De kans echter dat 
het UWV een ontslagvergunning afgeeft, neemt af bij stijgende werkloosheidspercentages. Dit 
betekent dat de preventieve toetsing onredelijke ontslagen een halt toe brengt en met name in 
tijden van economische recessies extra kosten van onredelijke ontslagen voorkomt. We vinden 
geen bewijs dat de kwaliteit van de ontbindingsverzoeken bij de kantonrechter samenhangt met 
werkloosheid.  
 In Hoofdstuk 7 presenteren wij de op 18 juni 2012 door Minister Kamp geformuleerde 
plannen met betrekking tot de hervorming van het ontslagrecht en de WerkeloosheidsWet 
(WW). Deze plannen zijn eerder vorm gegeven in het Lenteakkoord door de Kunduz partijen 
VVD, CDA, D66, GroenLinks en ChristenUnie. In het kort bevat het voorgestelde plan van 
Minister Kamp de volgende drie hoofdelementen243: 
1) Het duale ontslagstelsel wordt vervangen door een enkelvoudig (civielrechtelijk 
repressief) stelsel. De preventieve toetsing wordt afgeschaft. Er wordt een hoor-
procedure ingevoerd tijdens welke de werknemer in de gelegenheid wordt gesteld te 
reageren op het voorgenomen ontslag. 
2) De ontslagvergoeding neemt plaats voor een transitiebudget dat moet worden ingezet 
om de transitie naar een andere baan vergemakkelijken (bijv. scholing). Dit 
transitiebudget is gelijk aan een kwart maandsalaris per dienstjaar met een maximum 
van 6 maanden en is voor iedereen, vaste en tijdelijke contracten.  
3) Werkgevers gaan betalen voor ten hoogste de eerste 6 maanden van de werke-
loosheidsuitkering.  
Wij uiten onze bezwaren tegen de plannen. In een kostenberekening laten wij zien dat de 
voorgestelde maatregelen niet zullen leiden tot een afname in kosten voor werkgevers. Ontslag 
zal voor met name kleinere werkgevers duurder worden. Ook leidt een repressieve toetsing tot 
onzekerheid. Mocht een ontslagen werknemer besluiten het ontslag aan te vechten bij de 
rechter, dan kunnen werkgevers lange tijd na het ontslag worden geconfronteerd met hoge 
kosten. De repressieve toetsing leidt ook voor werknemers tot veel onzekerheid omdat ook zij 
pas na een langdurige periode van onzekerheid uitsluitsel van de rechter krijgen. Het is 
aannemelijk dat veel werknemers besluiten af te zien van een rechterlijke procedure om het 
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ontslag aan te vechten. Als gevolg van deze beslissing komen sommigen van hen dus 
onrechtmatig op straat te staan244. 
 De publicatie van het Regeerakkoord op 29 oktober 2012 heeft geleid tot Hoofdstuk 8. Het 
is duidelijk dat de plannen zoals opgesteld door Minister Kamp, waarbij de PvdA niet betrokken 
was, meer drastische wijzigingen voorstelden. Wij zijn van mening dat het voorstel van de 
nieuwe regering, om preventieve toetsing te behouden en ondernemingen van het betalen van 
een transitievergoeding bij economische noodzaak te vrijwaren, een aanzienlijke verbetering is 
ten opzichte van het ondoordachte compromis van het Lenteakkoord. Naast de positieve 
aspecten van het regeerakkoord plaatsen wij ook enkele vraagtekens bij de nieuwe plannen. Zo 
gaan de kosten voor werkgevers die oorspronkelijk de UWV-route volgden omhoog en is het 
aannemelijk dat werknemers vaker hun ontslag achteraf bij de kantonrechter zullen aanvechten. 
Dergelijke maatregelen leiden niet tot de sociale innovatie die noodzakelijk is voor de 
modernisering van de arbeidsmarkt. 
 De algemene conclusie van deze bijdrage is dat wij het onverstandig achten de preventieve 
toetsing en de dualiteit van het systeem af te schaffen. De preventieve toetsing brengt 
onredelijke ontslagen een halt toe. Bovendien voorkomt preventieve toetsing van het UWV en 
de daarbij horende vergoedingsvrijwaring “moreel riskant” gedrag van werkgevers. De 
verwachte kosten van deze vergoedingsvrijwaring zijn lager dan de kosten van werkloos-
heidsuitkeringen. Het duale aspect van het Nederlandse systeem leidt tot keuzevrijheid, wat op 
zichzelf al een vorm van flexibiliteit is. Bovendien kent het systeem een sterke specialisatie: het 
UWV WERKbedrijf beslist met name over ontslag door langdurige ziekte en economische 
malaise. De kantonrechter wordt met name ingezet voor arbeidsconflicten. Beide specialisaties 
kennen een lange traditie met veel verworven kennis en ervaring. Afschaffing van het duale 
systeem is derhalve inefficiënt. 
 Modernisering van de werking van de Nederlandse arbeidsmarkt is wenselijk. Er schuilt 
echter een gevaar achter harmonisering met het Europese model: De werking van het 
Nederlandse stelsel zal lijden onder een aanpassing die gebaseerd is op meningen in plaats van 
op wetenschappelijk bewijs. 
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Appendix A: Rankings PES data, from lowest to highest percentage. 
Source PES: national data base (ARCOS), 20 08. 
Table A1 Rankings: Dismissal reason. 
 n Economical % of n 
 
 
Amersfoort 2,171 1,242 57.21
Haarlem 4,351 2,653 60.97
Den Haag 2,670 1,631 61.09
Maastricht 1,419 873 61.52
Rotterdam 2,432 1,545 63.53
Breda 1,828 1,212 66.30
Groningen 1,378 939 68.14
Leeuwarden 707 502 71.00
Eindhoven 4,582 3,277 71.52
Hengelo 1,633 1,170 71.65
Arnhem 3,660 2,686 73.39
Total 26,833 17,730 66.08
 
 n Dysfunctional 
behavior 
% of n  
Eindhoven 4,582 77 1.68  
Maastricht 1,419 27 1.90  
Hengelo 1,633 33 2.02  
Haarlem 4,351 103 2.37  
Amersfoort 2,171 52 2.40  
Rotterdam 2,432 59 2.43  
Leeuwarden 707 18 2.55  
Den Haag 2,670 72 2.70  
Arnhem 3,660 104 2.84  
Groningen 1,378 40 2.90  
Breda 1,828 60 3.28  
Total 26,833 645 2.40  
 
 n Disturbed 
relationship 
% of n 
Leeuwarden 707 6 0.85
Eindhoven 4,582 45 0.98
Maastricht 1,419 17 1.20
Arnhem 3,660 45 1.23
Den Haag 2,670 34 1.27
Groningen 1,378 18 1.31
Hengelo 1,633 22 1.35
Haarlem 4,351 62 1.42
Rotterdam 2,432 36 1.48
Breda 1,828 29 1.59
Amersfoort 2,171 40 1.84
Total 26,833 354 1.32
 
 n Reproachable 
behavior 
% of n 
Maastricht 1,419 39 2.75 
Breda 1,828 53 2.90 
Arnhem 3,660 123 3.36 
Groningen 1,378 47 3.41 
Leeuwarden 707 26 3.68 
Hengelo 1,633 64 3.92 
Eindhoven 4,582 187 4.08 
Amersfoort 2,171 123 5.67 
Den Haag 2,670 178 6.67 
Rotterdam 2,432 164 6.74 
Haarlem 4,351 340 7.81 
Total 26,833 1,344 5.01 
 n Frequent illness % of n 
Hengelo 1,633 0 0.00
Leeuwarden 707 0 0.00
Groningen 1,378 1 0.07
Arnhem 3,660 4 0.11
Amersfoort 2,171 3 0.14
Haarlem 4,351 7 0.16
Rotterdam 2,432 5 0.21
Eindhoven 4,582 10 0.22
Breda 1,828 4 0.22
Den Haag 2,670 7 0.26
Maastricht 1,419 5 0.35
Total 26,833 46 0.17
 
 n Prolonged illness % of n 
Arnhem 3,660 660 18.03 
Hengelo 1,633 316 19.35 
Eindhoven 4,582 921 20.10 
Leeuwarden 707 144 20.37 
Groningen 1,378 311 22.57 
Rotterdam 2,432 560 23.03 
Haarlem 4,351 1,040 23.90 
Breda 1,828 442 24.18 
Den Haag 2,670 694 25.99 
Amersfoort 2,171 639 29.43 
Maastricht 1,419 437 30.80 
Total 26,833 6,166 22.98 
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Table A1 continued. 
 n Measure 
reintegration 
% of n 
Leeuwarden 707 1 0.14
Eindhoven 4,582 8 0.17
Den Haag 2,670 10 0.37
Maastricht 1,419 6 0.42
Hengelo 1,633 7 0.43
Arnhem 3,660 16 0.44
Rotterdam 2,432 16 0.66
Groningen 1,378 14 1.02
Breda 1,828 23 1.26
Amersfoort 2,171 38 1.75
Haarlem 4,351 98 2.25
Total 26,833 237 0.88
Table A2 Rankings: Individual or collective economical dismissal. 
 n Economical: 
Individual 
% of n  
Den Haag 2,670 1,058 39.63
Arnhem 3,660 1,524 41.64
Breda 1,828 851 46.55
Eindhoven 4,583 2,190 47.79
Rotterdam 2,432 1,163 47.82
Haarlem 4,352 2,204 50.64
Amersfoort 2,171 1,116 51.40
Maastricht 1,419 768 54.12
Hengelo 1,633 891 54.56
Groningen ,1378 869 63.06
Leeuwarden 707 450 63.65
Total 26,833 13,084 48.76
 
 N Economical: 
Collective 
% of n  
Groningen 1378 70 5.08  
Amersfoort 2171 126 5.80  
Leeuwarden 707 52 7.36  
Maastricht 1419 105 7.40  
Haarlem 4352 449 10.32  
Rotterdam 2432 382 15.71  
Hengelo 1633 279 17.09  
Breda 1828 361 19.75  
Den Haag 2670 573 21.46  
Eindhoven 4583 1087 23.72  
Arnhem 3660 1162 31.75  
Total 26833 4646 17.31  
Table A3 Rankings: Age categories. 
 n 15-24 % of n 
astricht 1,419 46 3.24
Leeuwarden 707 23 3.25
Arnhem 3,660 133 3.63
Rotterdam 2,432 89 3.66
Eindhoven 4,583 174 3.80
Den Haag 2,670 105 3.93
Amersfoort 2,171 106 4.88
Breda 1,828 90 4.92
Haarlem 4,352 215 4.94
Hengelo 1,633 86 5.27
Groningen 1,378 102 7.40
Total 26,833 1,169 4.36
 
 n 25-44 % of n 
Breda 1,828 677 37.04 
Rotterdam 2,432 968 39.80 
Eindhoven 4,583 1,921 41.92 
Arnhem 3,660 1,537 41.99 
Leeuwarden 707 297 42.01 
Hengelo 1,633 702 42.99 
Amersfoort 2,171 947 43.62 
Den Haag 2,670 1,169 43.78 
Groningen 1,378 616 44.70 
Haarlem 4,352 2,004 46.05 
Maastricht 1,419 577 40.66 
Total 26,833 11,415 42.54 
. 
  
APPENDICES 
182 
Table A3 continued. 
 n 45-64 % of n 
Groningen 1,378 643 46.66
Haarlem 4,352 2,054 47.20
Hengelo 1,633 812 49.72
Amersfoort 2,171 1,087 50.07
Den Haag 2,670 1,356 50.79
Leeuwarden 707 371 52.48
Eindhoven 4,583 2,424 52.89
Arnhem 3,660 1,959 53.52
Maastricht 1,419 772 54.40
Rotterdam 2,432 1,340 55.10
Breda 1,828 1,029 56.29
Total 26,833 13,847 51.60
 
 n >65 % of n 
Groningen 1,378 5 0.36 
Leeuwarden 707 3 0.42 
Arnhem 3,660 16 0.44 
Eindhoven 4,583 25 0.55 
Hengelo 1,633 14 0.86 
Breda 1,828 17 0.93 
Den Haag 2,670 27 1.01 
Amersfoort 2,171 22 1.01 
Haarlem 4,352 46 1.06 
Rotterdam 2,432 26 1.07 
Maastricht 1,419 16 1.13 
Total 26,833 217 0.81 
Table A4 Rankings: Industry. 
 n Industry  
 
% of n 
Den Haag 2,670 46 1.72
Rotterdam 2,432 138 5.67
Haarlem 4,351 307 7.06
Groningen 1,378 101 7.33
Leeuwarden 707 54 7.64
Amersfoort 2,171 244 11.24
Maastricht 1,419 241 16.98
Breda 1,828 450 24.62
Arnhem 3,660 993 27.13
Hengelo 1,633 463 28.35
Eindhoven 4,582 1467 32.02
Total 26,833 4504 16.79
   
 
n Wholesale, 
trade, etc. 
% of n 
Arnhem 3,660 663 18.11 
Rotterdam 2,432 472 19.41 
Eindhoven 4,582 989 21.58 
Den Haag 2,670 580 21.72 
Hengelo 1,633 408 24.98 
Amersfoort 2,171 557 25.66 
Maastricht 1,419 389 27.41 
Haarlem 4,351 1208 27.76 
Leeuwarden 707 201 28.43 
Groningen 1,378 405 29.39 
Breda 1,828 549 30.03 
Total 26,833 6421 23.93 
 
 n Transport, storage, 
etc 
% of n 
Groningen 1,378 37 2.69
Arnhem 3,660 123 3.36
Amersfoort 2,171 75 3.45
Den Haag 2,670 106 3.97
Haarlem 4,351 195 4.48
Maastricht 1,419 66 4.65
Hengelo 1,633 86 5.27
Eindhoven 4,582 262 5.72
Breda 1,828 114 6.24
Rotterdam 2,432 207 8.51
Leeuwarden 707 96 13.58
Total 26,833 1367 5.09
   
 
n Hotel and 
catering 
% of n 
Eindhoven 4,582 59 1.29 
Arnhem 3,660 70 1.91 
Amersfoort 2,171 51 2.35 
Hengelo 1,633 40 2.45 
Maastricht 1,419 40 2.82 
Leeuwarden 707 20 2.83 
Groningen 1,378 42 3.05 
Breda 1,828 58 3.17 
Rotterdam 2,432 81 3.33 
Den Haag 2,670 93 3.48 
Haarlem 4,351 252 5.79 
Total 26,833 806 3.00 
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Table A4 continued. 
 n Commercial 
services 
% of n 
Rotterdam 2,432 268 11.02
Eindhoven 4,582 597 13.03
Breda 1,828 248 13.57
Den Haag 2,670 389 14.57
Arnhem 3,660 551 15.05
Leeuwarden 707 108 15.28
Hengelo 1,633 255 15.62
Groningen 1,378 227 16.47
Maastricht 1,419 248 17.48
Haarlem 4,351 1013 23.28
Amersfoort 2,171 633 29.16
Total 26,833 4537 16.91
 
n Health and 
wellness 
% of n 
 
Leeuwarden 707 60 8.49 
Groningen 1,378 125 9.07 
Breda 1,828 178 9.74 
Haarlem 4,351 493 11.33 
Eindhoven 4,582 527 11.50 
Hengelo 1,633 189 11.57 
Amersfoort 2,171 273 12.57 
Maastricht 1,419 215 15.15 
Rotterdam 2,432 388 15.95 
Den Haag 2,670 466 17.45 
Arnhem 3,660 687 18.77 
Total 26,833 3601 13.42 
 
 n Culture and 
Recreation 
% of n 
Amersfoort 2,171 49 2.26
Eindhoven 4,582 145 3.16
Arnhem 3,660 141 3.85
Breda 1,828 77 4.21
Leeuwarden 707 31 4.38
Maastricht 1,419 64 4.51
Hengelo 1,633 84 5.14
Haarlem 4,351 513 11.79
Groningen 1,378 186 13.50
Den Haag 2,670 450 16.85
Rotterdam 2,432 693 28.50
Total 26,833 2433 9.07
 
n Construction 
 
% of n 
Haarlem 4,351 135 3.10 
Den Haag 2,670 119 4.46 
Amersfoort 2,171 100 4.61 
Breda 1,828 85 4.65 
Hengelo 1,633 78 4.78 
Eindhoven 4,582 231 5.04 
Rotterdam 2,432 133 5.47 
Maastricht 1,419 83 5.85 
Arnhem 3,660 225 6.15 
Groningen 1,378 99 7.18 
Leeuwarden 707 52 7.36 
Total 26,833 1340 4.99 
 
 n Other % of n 
Hengelo 1,633 30 1.84
Rotterdam 2,432 52 2.14
Breda 1,828 69 3.77
Maastricht 1,419 73 5.14
Haarlem 4,351 235 5.40
Arnhem 3,660 207 5.66
Eindhoven 4,582 305 6.66
Amersfoort 2,171 189 8.71
Groningen 1,378 156 11.32
Leeuwarden 707 85 12.02
Den Haag 2,670 421 15.77
Total 26,833 1824 6.79
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Table A5 Rankings: Dismissal permission granted. 
 n Granted % of n 
Amersfoort 2,171 1,331 61.31
Groningen 1,378 862 62.55
Breda 1,828 1,149 62.86
Rotterdam 2,432 1,529 62.87
Hengelo 1,633 1,038 63.56
Den Haag 2,670 1,740 65.17
Leeuwarden 707 463 65.49
Arnhem 3,660 2,613 71.39
Eindhoven 4,583 3,293 71.85
Maastricht 1,419 1,047 73.78
Haarlem 4,352 3,240 74.45
Total 26,833 18,305 68.22
 
n Not granted % of n 
Maastricht 1,419 46 3.24 
Arnhem 3,660 122 3.33 
Eindhoven 4,583 172 3.75 
Haarlem 4,352 239 5.49 
Den Haag 2,670 154 5.77 
Rotterdam 2,432 149 6.13 
Amersfoort 2,171 147 6.77 
Hengelo 1,633 126 7.72 
Breda 1,828 197 10.78 
Leeuwarden 707 84 11.88 
Groningen 1,378 164 11.90 
Total 26,833 1,600 5.96 
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Appendix B: Rankings CBS data (Source: CBS (2009)) 
Table B1 Rankings: number of inhabitants per civil court district. 
Number of inhabitants 
Middelburg 380,585 
Dordrecht 391,145 
Assen 488,135 
Roermond 512,837 
Haarlem 566,285 
Groningen 573,459 
Alkmaar 595,425 
Maastricht 610,868 
Twente 618,992 
Leeuwarden 643,189 
Zwolle-Lelystad 879,690 
Arnhem 933,735 
Zutphen 1,050,134 
Breda 1,063,757 
Utrecht 1,201,350 
Rotterdam 1,360,610 
Den Bosch 1,361,070 
Amsterdam 1,464,453 
The Hague 1,709,680 
Total 16,405,399 
Table B2 Rankings: pressure.  
Total pressure 20 - 65 < 20, >65 % 
Amsterdam 940,064 525,461 55.90 
Groningen 357,694 215,792 60.33 
Utrecht 744,837 456,585 61.30 
The Hague 1,056,708 652,559 61.75 
Rotterdam 839,496 517,969 61.70 
Arnhem 577,508 357,554 61.91 
Breda 656,027 408,892 62.33 
Maastricht 375,073 235,921 62.90 
Alkmaar 364,400 230,385 63.22 
Den Bosch 831,081 530,427 63.82 
Roermond 312,462 200,444 64.15 
Zwolle-Lelystad 533,962 345,580 64.72 
Haarlem 340,539 225,482 66.21 
Twente 370,157 248,746 67.20 
Dordrecht 233,514 158,089 67.70 
Leeuwarden 382,964 259,700 67.81 
Zutphen 621,122 429,551 69.16 
Assen 288,490 199,701 69.22 
Middelburg 223,940 156,316 69.80 
Total 10,050,039 6,355,155 63.24 
 
Green pressure 20 - 65 <20 % 
Maastricht 375,073 124,524 33.20  
Amsterdam 940,064 330,814 35.19  
Groningen 357,694 128,929 36.04  
Roermond 312,462 118,670 37.98  
Rotterdam 839,496 319,009 38.00  
Breda 656,027 249,572 38.04  
The Hague 1,056,708 411,517 38.94  
Haarlem 340,539 132,863 39.02  
Arnhem 577,508 225,965 39.13  
Den Bosch 831,081 328,038 39.47  
Middelburg 223,940 89,213 39.84  
Alkmaar 364,400 146,574 40.22  
Utrecht 744,837 300,169 40.30  
Assen 288,490 116,805 40.49  
Leeuwarden 382,964 158,853 41.48  
Twente 370,157 154,356 41.70  
Dordrecht 233,514 99,243 42.50  
Zutphen 621,122 264,213 42.54  
Zwolle-Lelystad 533,962 240,943 45.12  
Total 10,050,039 3,940,271 39.21  
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Table B2 continued. 
Gray pressure 20 - 65 >65 % 
Zwolle-Lelystad 533,962 104,636 19.60 
Amsterdam 940,064 194,647 20.71 
Utrecht 744,837 156,416 21.00 
Arnhem 577,508 131,589 22.79 
The Hague 1,056,708 241,042 22.81 
Alkmaar 364,400 83,811 23.00 
Rotterdam 839,496 198,961 23.70 
Groningen 357,694 86,863 24.28 
Breda 656,027 159,321 24.29 
Den Bosch 831,081 202,389 24.35 
Dordrecht 233,514 58,845 25.20 
Twente 370,157 94,390 25.50 
Roermond 312,462 81,774 26.17 
Leeuwarden 382,964 100,847 26.33 
Zutphen 621,122 165,338 26.62 
Haarlem 340,539 92,619 27.20 
Assen 288,490 82,895 28.73 
Maastricht 375,073 111,397 29.70 
Middelburg 223,940 67,103 29.96 
Total 10,050,039 2,414,883 24.03 
Table B3 Rankings: percentage of autochthonous members and allochtonous members per district. 
  n Autochthonous % of n 
Amsterdam 1,464,453 951,767 64.99 
Rotterdam 1,360,610 953,788 70.10 
The Hague 1,709,680 1,258,588 73.62 
Maastricht 610,868 478,310 78.30 
Haarlem 566,285 452,747 79.95 
Utrecht 1,201,350 964,684 80.30 
Dordrecht 391,145 323,477 82.70 
Zwolle-Lelystad 879,690 727,509 82.70 
Roermond 512,837 426,023 83.07 
Arnhem 933,735 778,993 83.43 
Twente 618,992 517,477 83.60 
Breda 1,063,757 891,560 83.81 
Middelburg 380,585 323,039 84.88 
Den Bosch 1,361,070 1,159,946 85.22 
Alkmaar 595,425 512,942 86.15 
Groningen 573,459 502,671 87.66 
Zutphen 1,050,134 929,834 88.54 
Assen 488,135 445,912 91.35 
Leeuwarden 643,189 590,484 91.81 
Total 16,405,399 13,189,751 80.40 
 
n Allochtonous % of n 
Leeuwarden 643,189 52,705 8.19  
Assen 488,135 42,223 8.65  
Zutphen 1,050,134 120,300 11.46  
Groningen 573,459 70,788 12.34  
Alkmaar 595,425 82,483 13.85  
Den Bosch 1,361,070 201,124 14.78  
Middelburg 380,585 57,546 15.12  
Breda 1,063,757 172,197 16.19  
Twente 618,992 101,515 16.40  
Arnhem 933,735 154,742 16.57  
Roermond 512,837 86,814 16.93  
Zwolle-Lelystad 879,690 152,181 17.30  
Dordrecht 391,145 67,668 17.30  
Utrecht 1,201,350 236,666 19.70  
Haarlem 566,285 113,538 20.05  
Maastricht 610,868 132,558 21.70  
The Hague 1,709,680 451,092 26.38  
Rotterdam 1,360,610 406,822 29.90  
Amsterdam 1,464,453 512,686 35.01  
Total 16,405,399 3,215,648 19.60  
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Table B3 continued:  Allochtonous member subdivided into Western members and Non-Western members. 
 n             Western % of n
Leeuwarden 643,189 30,133 4.68 
Assen 488,135 27,349 5.60 
Zutphen 1,050,134 67,272 6.41 
Zwolle-Lelystad 879,690 56,359 6.41 
Groningen 573,459 39,149 6.83 
Alkmaar 595,425 43,418 7.29 
Dordrecht 391,145 28,554 7.30 
Den Bosch 1,361,070 107,249 7.88 
Breda 1,063,757 85,578 8.04 
Utrecht 1,201,350 98,511 8.20 
Twente 618,992 51,376 8.30 
Rotterdam 1,360,610 115,652 8.50 
Arnhem 933,735 82,388 8.82 
Haarlem 566,285 53,653 9.47 
The Hague 1,709,680 178,666 10.45 
Middelburg 380,585 40,029 10.52 
Roermond 512,837 55,909 10.90 
Amsterdam 1,464,453 182,849 12.49 
Maastricht 610,868 104,458 17.10 
Total 16,405,399 1,448,552 8.83 
 
 n Non-West.    % of n 
Assen 488,135 14,874 3.05  
Leeuwarden 643,189 22,572 3.51  
Middelburg 380,585 17,517 4.60  
Maastricht 610,868 28,711 4.70  
Zutphen 1,050,134 53,028 5.05  
Groningen 573,459 31,436 5.48  
Roermond 512,837 30,905 6.03  
Alkmaar 595,425 38,837 6.52  
Den Bosch 1,361,070 93,244 6.85  
Arnhem 933,735 72,354 7.75  
Twente 618,992 49,519 8.00  
Breda 1,063,757 86,619 8.14  
Dordrecht 391,145 39,506 10.10  
Haarlem 566,285 59,885 10.58  
Zwolle-Lelystad 879,690 95,822 10.89  
Utrecht 1,201,350 136,954 11.40  
The Hague 1,709,680 272,426 15.93  
Rotterdam 1,360,610 291,171 21.40  
Amsterdam 1,464,453 330,079 22.54  
Total 16,405,399 1,765,457  10.76  
Table B4 Industry rankings  
 n Forestry, 
fishing and 
agriculture  
% of n
Amsterdam 94,080 2,330 2.48 
Haarlem 28,670 750 2.62 
Rotterdam 64,695 2,995 4.63 
Maastricht 27,350 1,470 5.37 
Utrecht 68,615 4,205 6.13 
Dordrecht 19,915 1,370 6.88 
The Hague 88,470 7,600 8.59 
Breda 59,225 6,095 10.29 
Arnhem 49,510 5,195 10.49 
Den Bosch 80,785 9,790 12.12
Alkmaar 32,910 4,040 12.28 
Groningen 26,990 3,995 14.80 
Twente 30,770 4,930 16.02 
Roermond 27,205 4,540 16.69 
Zutphen 59,260 10,275 17.34 
Zwolle-Lelystad 45,150 7,965 17.64 
Assen 25,765 4,615 17.91 
Leeuwarden 36,130 6,795 18.81 
Middelburg 21,030 4,085 19.42 
Total 886,525 93,040 10.49 
 
n Industry 
and energy 
providers 
% of n 
Amsterdam 94,080 12,885 13.70  
Utrecht 68,615 10,555 15.38  
Middelburg 21,030 3,275 15.57  
Zwolle-Lelystad 45,150 7,370 16.32  
Maastricht 27,350 4,470 16.34  
Rotterdam 64,695 10,800 16.69  
Assen 25,765 4,310 16.73  
Groningen 26,990 4,545 16.84  
The Hague 88,470 15,025 16.98  
Arnhem 49,510 8,625 17.42  
Roermond 27,205 4,770 17.53  
Twente 30,770 5,575 18.12  
Zutphen 59,260 10,860 18.33  
Breda 59,225 11,295 19.07  
Leeuwarden 36,130 7,300 20.20  
Den Bosch 80,785 16,730 20.71  
Dordrecht 19,915 4,215 21.16  
Haarlem 28,670 6,105 21.29  
Alkmaar 32,910 7,470 22.70  
Total 886,525 156180 17.62  
 
   
.
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Table B4 continued. 
 N  Commercial 
services 
% of n
Leeuwarden 36,130 17,650 48.85 
Alkmaar 32,910 16,865 51.25 
Assen 25,765 13,245 51.41 
Zutphen 59,260 30,550 51.55 
Roermond 27,205 14,075 51.74 
Middelburg 21,030 11,065 52.62 
Zwolle-Lelystad 45,150 23,880 52.89 
Twente 30,770 16,455 53.48 
Groningen 26,990 14,520 53.80 
Den Bosch 80,785 43,840 54.27 
Arnhem 49,510 28,240 57.04 
Breda 59,225 33,845 57.15 
Dordrecht 19,915 11,920 59.85 
The Hague 88,470 53,065 59.98 
Maastricht 27,350 16,675 60.97 
Haarlem 28,670 17,580 61.32 
Utrecht 68,615 43,565 63.49 
Rotterdam 64,695 42,130 65.12 
Amsterdam 94,080 64,940 69.03 
Total 886,525 514,105 57.99 
 
n Non-Com. 
Services 
% of n 
Dordrecht 19,915 2,410 12.10  
Leeuwarden 36,130 4,380 12.12  
Middelburg 21,030 2,600 12.36  
Twente 30,770 3,810 12.38  
Zutphen 59,260 7,580 12.79  
Den Bosch 80,785 10,430 12.91  
Zwolle-Lelystad 45,150 5,930 13.13  
Breda 59,225 7,990 13.49  
Rotterdam 64,695 8,770 13.56  
Alkmaar 32,910 4,535 13.78  
Assen 25,765 3,610 14.01  
Roermond 27,205 3,825 14.06  
The Hague 88,470 12,795 14.46  
Groningen 26,990 3,930 14.56  
Haarlem 28,670 4,225 14.74  
Amsterdam 94,080 13,925 14.80  
Utrecht 68,615 10,295 15.00  
Arnhem 49,510 7,455 15.06  
Maastricht 27,350 4,740 17.33  
Total 886,525 123,235 13.90  
Table B5 Rankings: percentage of households living below the social minimum. 
 n Living below 
the social 
minimum 
% of n
Zutphen 428,833 27,373 6.38
Breda 461,326 32,293 7.00
Utrecht 532,036 37,243 7.00
Dordrecht 163,373 11,436 7.00
Haarlem 254,977 18,053 7.08
Den Bosch 575,497 43,448 7.55
Alkmaar 253,376 19,276 7.61
Assen 206,146 16,429 7.97
Twente 260,614 20,849 8.00
Roermond 214,310 17,145 8.00
Zwolle-Lelystad 359,313 28,838 8.03
Middelburg 165,569 13,723 8.29
Arnhem 411,009 34,270 8.34
The Hague 776,165 68,965 8.89
Leeuwarden 277,053 26,385 9.52
Rotterdam 622,998 62,300 10.00
Maastricht 283,254 28,325 10.00
Groningen 272,445 28,417 10.43
Amsterdam 723,908 81,435 11.25
Total 7,242,202 616,203 8.51
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Appendix C Missing data PES 
 
Overview of missing data  
Table 1 presents an overview of the number of missing values per variable in the PES data set 
(n=1,268). The largest percentage of missing values is seen for the variables Hourly wage, Wage 
per month and Legal form with 188, 177 and 125 missing values, respectively.  
Table C1 Overview of missing variables PES data (n=1,268, 2006-2009). 
 Present  Mean Std. Dev. Missing  
     Count Percent 
Hourly wage  1,080 Continuous 14.04 5.70 188 14.8 
Wage per month (incl 8% holiday pay) 1,097 Continuous 2,157.72 1,192.12 171 13.5 
Legal form of employer  1,143 Categorical 125 9.9 
Decision of the PES 1,233 Categorical 35 2.8 
Age employee when employed 1,238 Continuous 33.82 10.35 30 2.4 
Period of notice 1,241 Categorical 27 2.1 
Tenure in days 1,241 Continuous 3,901.42 3,209.44 27 2.1 
Tenure in months 1,241 Continuous 128.27 105.52 27 2.1 
Official duration of procedure in days 1,243 Continuous 33.88 32.25 25 2.0 
Official duration of procedure in months 1,243 Continuous 1.11 1.06 25 2.0 
Size of employer 1,253 Categorical 15 1.2 
Reason for dismissal 1,260 Categorical 8 .6 
Age employee at the time of procedure 1,264 Continuous 44.52 10.19 4 .3 
Duration of procedure in days 1,266 Continuous 42.39 35.25 2 .2 
Duration of procedure in months 1,266 Continuous 1.39 1.16 2 .2 
Time to notice in days 1,266 Continuous 12.71 8.31 2 .2 
Time to notice in months 1,266 Continuous .42 .27 2 .2 
Collective dismissal 1,268 Categorical 0 .0 
Industry of employer 1,268 Categorical 0 .0 
Contract 1,268 Categorical 0 .0 
Gender of employee 1,268 Categorical 0 .0 
 
Figure C1, Chart 1A, shows the number of cases that have at least 1 missing value on all 
variables presented in Table 1 above. Deleting all cases with at least one missing value would 
result in a deletion of 350 cases (27.6 percent of our data). Instead, we searched for another 
solution and replicated chart 1A for only those variables that have less than 5 percent of missing 
values. Chart 1B is the result of this replication and shows that 1,162 out of 1,268 have zero 
missing values on all variables expect for Hourly Wage, Wage per month and Legal form of 
employer. We selected these 1,162 cases and estimated the missing values for the variables 
Hourly Wage, Wage per month and Legal form of employer using OLS for the former two 
(continuous) variables and a multinomial logit model for the latter (categorical) variable. Section 
2 of this appendix will explain how.  
  
C
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1A  1B  
  
 
918 out of 1,268 cases have no missing values on all 
variables. 
 
 
1,162 out of 1,268 cases have no missing values on 
variables with less than 5 percent of missing values. These 
variables with less than 5 percent of missing values are 
(also see Table A1): 
Decision of the PES 
Age employee when employed 
Period of notice 
Tenure in days 
Tenure in months 
Official duration of procedure in days 
Official duration of procedure in months 
Size of employer 
Reason for dismissal 
Age employee at the time of procedure 
Duration of procedure in days 
Duration of procedure in months 
Time to notice in days 
Time to notice in months 
Collective dismissal 
Industry of employer 
Contract 
Gender of employee 
106 cases have missing value on at least one the above 
mentioned variables. These variables are excluded from 
our dataset. 
Figure C1 Missing value analysis, PES data (n=1.268, 2006-2009). 
 
Table C2 below shows that of all 1,162 selected cases, 147 cases have missing values on Hourly 
Wage, 159 cases have missing values on Wage per month and 107 cases have missing values on 
Legal form of employer. All other variables have zero missing values. 
Table C2 Number of missing values for Wage and Legal form (n=1.162, 2006-2009).  
 Present Missing  
  Count Percent 
Wage per month (incl. 8% holiday pay) 1,003 159 13.68 
Hourly wage 1,015 147 12.65 
Legal form of employer  1,055 107 9.21
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Estimation of missing data 
We estimated values of missing data points for the variable Wage per month and Hourly Wage 
by using the variables in the right-hand column of Figure 1 as independent variables. We 
assumed a linear relation between Wage per month (1a) and Hourly Wage (1b) and those 
variables. 
 
(1ܽ)				ܹ = 		ܺௐߚௐ +	ߝௐ  
(1ܾ)				ܪ = 		ܺுߚு +	ߝு , 
 
where W and H are vectors of n observations, XW and XH are n x k (+1) matrices, βW and βH are 
vectors of k (+1) unknown parameters245 and εW  and εH are random vectors consisting of n 
independently and normally distributed error terms with unknown values, n for (1a) equals 
1,003, n for (1b) equals 1,015.  
 
Next, we used the OLS principle to estimate W and βW (2a) and H and βH (2b) using only cases 
with zero missing values on Wage per month, Hourly Wage and the independent variables. 
 
(2ܽ)				 ෡ܹ = 		ܺௐߚௐ෢  , n =1,003  
(2ܾ)				ܪ෡ = 		ܺுߚு෢  , n=1,015 
 
Last, the values of the estimated parameter ߚௐ෢  and ߚு෢  are used to predict the 159 missing 
values of Wage per month and the 147 missing values of Hourly Wage.  
 A similar approach is taken to estimate the 107 missing values of the variable Legal Form. 
However, because Legal Form is a nominal variable with more than 2 categories, a multinomial 
logit model is used to estimate the missing values for this variable.  
 Table C3 and C4 show the estimated parameters for all three models. Last, Table A5 shows 
descriptive statistics of the data before (n=1,268) and after estimation of missing values 
(n=1,162).  
 
  
                                                        
245 K (+ 1) : Because we added a constant term to the model. 
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Table C3 OLS, dependent variables Wage per month and Hourly Wage PES data (n=1.162, years 2006-2009). 
 (2a) Wage per month (2b) Hourly wage 
 B Std. Error Sig. B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 946.52 273.85 .00 6.00 1.44 .00 
Duration of procedure 13.23 113.96 .91 .19 .60 .76 
Official duration of procedure 106.67 106.56 .32 .35 .56 .53 
Time to notice in months 29.14 127.69 .82 .57 .68 .39 
Period of notice in months 46.40 78.98 .56 .74 .42 .07 
Tenure in months .10 .68 .88 .00 .00 .24 
Age 8.13 3.60 .02 .09 .02 .00 
Permission granted -68.03 168.48 .69 .05 .89 .95 
Case withdrawn -246.58 196.98 .21 -.98 1.04 .35 
Reason of dismissal: economical -187.63 176.46 .29 -.25 .94 .79 
Reason of dismissal: Illness -473.95 189.63 .01 -2.01 1.01 .05 
Collective dismissal -45.68 109.25 .68 -.62 .58 .28 
Industry: Construction 439.54 166.34 .01 1.42 .88 .11 
Industry: Transport storage communication 298.75 167.77 .08 .23 .88 .79 
Industry: Health  204.72 144.09 .16 2.42 .76 .00 
Industry: Commercial services 240.84 137.66 .08 1.30 .73 .08 
Industry: Wholesale, trade and repairs 128.19 122.53 .30 .07 .64 .91 
Industry: Industry 700.57 132.10 .00 2.99 .70 .00 
Size: Small  -209.01 89.48 .02 -.27 .47 .56 
Size: Large 118.66 94.25 .21 1.56 .50 .00 
Permanent contract -497.31 211.72 .02 -1.67 1.11 .13 
Male 930.90 74.49 .00 2.31 .39 .00 
   
R2 0.58 0.42   
Observations 1,003 1,015   
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Appendix D Missing data civil court 
 
Overview of missing data 
Table D1 below presents an overview of the number of missing values per variable in the civil 
court dataset (n=2.803). The largest percentage of missing values is reported for the variables 
Hourly wage, Size and Duration of procedure  with 1,502, 341 and 173  missing values, 
respectively.  
 
Table D1 Overview of missing variables civil court data (n=2.803, 2003-2009). 
 Present  Mean Std. Dev. Missing  
     Count Percent 
Hourly wage 1,301 Continuous 14.85 7.24 1,502 53.59 
Size 2,462 Categorical 341 12.17 
Duration procedure in days 2,630 Continuous 11.11 20.14 173 6.17 
Duration procedure in months 2,630 Continuous .37 .66 173 6.17 
Age when employed 2,664 Continuous 31.29 9.46 139 4.96 
Time to end of employment relationship in days 2,667 Continuous 30.36 28.68 136 4.85 
Time to end of employment relationship in months 2,667 Continuous 1.00 .94 136 4.85 
Age the the time of trial 2,702 Continuous 40.77 10.52 101 3.60 
Severance pay 2,729 Continuous 22,108.70 47,612.83 74 2.64 
Monthly wage 2,742 Continuous 2,536.21 1,619.21 61 2.18 
Legal form 2,743 Categorical 1.88 1.69 60 2.14 
Tenure in days 2,769 Continuous 3,526.46 3,726.07 34 1.21 
Tenure in months 2,769 Continuous 115.94 122.50 34 1.21 
Decision judge 2,785 Categorical 1.13 .47 18 .64 
Industry 2,785 Categorical 18 .64 
Reason 2 cat. 2,791 Categorical 12 .43 
Gender 2,793 Categorical 10 .36 
Reason 1 cat.  2,795 Categorical 8 .29 
Who asked for dismissal 2,796 Categorical 7 .25 
Pro-forma 2,803 Categorical 0 .00 
Contract 2,803 Categorical 0 .00 
 
Figure D1, Chart 1A, shows the number of cases that have at least 1 missing value on all 
variables presented in Table 1 above. The chart shows that 1,844 out of 2,803 cases have 1 
missing value on at least one of the variables. A large part of this high percentage of incomplete 
cases is explained by the variable Hourly Wage. Similar to the approach taken with PES dataset 
we replicated chart 1A for only those variables that have less than 5 percent of missing values. 
Chart 1B is the result of this replication and shows that 2,390 out of 2,803 cases have zero 
missing values on all variables except for Hourly wage, Size and Duration of procedure. For these 
2,390 cases we estimated the missing values for the variables Hourly wage, Size and Duration of 
procedure using an OLS and a multinomial logit procedure. Section 2 of this appendix shows the 
results of these procedures.  
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1A  1B  
  
 
959 out of 2,803 cases have no missing values on all 
variables. 
 
2,390 out of 2,803 cases have no missing values on 
variables with less than 5 percent of missing values. 
These variables with less than 5 percent of missing 
values are (also see Table B1): 
Age when employed 
Time to end of employment relationship in days 
Time to end of employment relationship in months 
Age the the time of trial 
Severance pay 
Monthly wage 
Legal form 
Tenure in days 
Tenure in months 
Decision judge 
Industry 
Reason 2 cat. 
Gender 
Reason 1 cat.  
Who asked for dismissal 
Pro-forma 
Contract 
413 cases have missing value on at least one the above 
mentioned variables. 
Figure D1 Missing value analysis, civil court data (n=2,803, 2003-2009). 
 
Table D2 below shows that of all 2,390 selected cases, 1,250 cases have missing values on 
Hourly Wage, 281 cases have missing values on Size and 122 cases have missing values on 
Duration of procedure. All other variables have zero missing values.  
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Table D2 Missing values for Hourly wage, Size and Duration, civil court data (n=2.803, 2003-2009). 
 Present Missing  
  Count Percent 
Hourly wage 1,140 1,250 52.30 
Size 2,109 281 11.76 
Duration procedure in days 2,268 122 5.10 
Duration procedure in months* 2,268 122 5.10 
* We will only estimate duration of procedure in months and then calculate duration procedure in months using the 
estimated value. 
Estimation of missing data  
 We estimated values of missing data points for the variables Hourly Wage and Duration 
procedure in months using the variables in the right-hand column of Figure D1 as independent 
variables. We assumed a linear relation between Hourly Wage (1a) and Duration procedure in 
months (1b) and those variables.  
 
(1ܽ)				ܪ = 		ܺுߚு +	ߝு 
(1ܾ)				ܦ = 		ܺ஽ߚ஽ +	ߝ஽, 
 
where H and D are vectors of n observations, XH and XD are n x k (+1) matrices, βH and βD are 
vectors of k (+1) unknown parameters246 and εH and εD are random vectors consisting of  n 
independently and normally distributed  error terms with unknown values. n for (1a) equals 
1,140, n for (1b) equals 2,268.  
 
Next, we used the OLS principle to estimate H  and βH  (2a)  and D and βD (2b) using all cases 
that have no missing values for  the variables of interest. 
 
(2ܽ)				ܪ෡ = 		ܺுߚு෢  ,n=1,140 
(2ܾ)				ܦ෡ = 		ܺ஽ߚ஽෢  ,n=2,268 
 
Last, the estimated values of parameters ߚு෢  and ߚ஽෢  were used to predict the 1,250 missing 
values of Hourly Wage and the 122 missing values of  Duration procedure in months.  
 
A similar approach was taken to estimate the 281 missing values of the variable Size. However, 
because Size is variable with more than 2 categories, a multinomial logit model is used to 
estimate the missing values for this variable.247  
Table D3 and D4 shown the estimated parameters for all three models. Last, Table D5 shows 
descriptive statistics of the data before (n=2,803) and after estimation of missing values 
(n=2,390). 
                                                        
246 K (+ 1) : Because we added a constant term to the model. 
247 Because the variable size has a logical order, we tried to fit an ordered logit model first. We however, had to 
reject the ordered logit model assumption of parallel lines (e.g., equal regression coefficients). As such, the 
multinomial logit model that does not require this assumption is used as an alternative tool. 
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Table D3 OLS, dependent variables Hourly Wage and Duration, civil court data (n=2,390, 2003-2009). 
 (2a) Hourly Wage (2b) Duration in months 
 B Std. Error Sig. B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) 3.10 2.73 .01 2.06 .13 .00 
Time to end employment relationship in 
months 
.00 -.01 .99 -.03 .01 .00 
Tenure in months .00 -.06 .95 .00 .00 .05 
Age .05 4.13 .00 .00 .00 .17 
Monthly wage .00 44.74 .00 .00 .00 .69 
Contract dissolved .21 .51 .61 .11 .06 .08 
Pro-forma -.63 -2.16 .03 -1.07 .03 .00 
Reason: Economical .52 .86 .39 -.43 .07 .00 
Reason: Disturned relationship .51 .86 .39 -.50 .07 .00 
Who asked for rescission .51 .63 .53 -.48 .10 .00 
Industry: Construction -.16 -.31 .76 -.02 .05 .69 
Industry: Transport storage and 
communication 
-.99 -2.43 .02 .03 .04 .48 
Industry: Health  -.13 -.32 .75 .02 .05 .60 
Industry: Commercial services -.47 -1.44 .15 -.01 .03 .69 
Industry: Wholesale, trade and repairs -.67 -1.83 .07 .04 .04 .23 
Industry: Industry -.79 -2.33 .02 -.02 .03 .59 
Contract -.42 -.98 .33 .04 .05 .40 
Male -2.03 -8.86 .00 .02 .02 .28 
Severance pay .00 3.23 .00 .00 .00 .53 
Limited liability (BV) .01 .03 .98 -.02 .03 .45 
Foundation  1.10 2.42 .02 .03 .05 .50 
Sole trader (VOF) -.62 -1.07 .29 -.03 .06 .59 
   
R2 0.89 0.65   
Observations 1,140 2,268   
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Table D4 Multinomial logit, dependent variable Size, civil court data (n=2.390,  2003-2009). 
 less than 10 between 10-100 
 B Std. Error Sig. B Std. Error Sig. 
(Constant) .374 .899 .677 1.129 .657 .086 
Time to end employment relationship in 
months 
-.104 .096 .279 -.146 .063 .020 
Tenure in months -.005 .001 .000 -.003 .001 .000 
Age .020 .008 .013 .000 .006 .977 
Monthly wage .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .744 
Contract dissolved -.027 .315 .933 .096 .241 .691 
Pro-forma -.893 .219 .000 -.476 .172 .006 
Reason: Economical .907 .498 .069 .536 .330 .104 
Reason: Disturned relationship .837 .480 .081 .069 .320 .830 
Who asked for rescission -.557 .668 .404 -1.062 .508 .037 
Industry: Construction .406 .333 .223 .082 .265 .756 
Industry: Transport storage and 
communication 
-1.168 .305 .000 -.373 .191 .050 
Industry: Health  .139 .348 .689 -1.132 .294 .000 
Industry: Commercial services .317 .226 .161 -.068 .178 .703 
Industry: Wholesale, trade and repairs .186 .238 .434 -.010 .190 .959 
Industry: Industry -1.349 .272 .000 -.879 .173 .000 
Contract .220 .331 .506 .256 .273 .347 
Male .036 .165 .827 .132 .119 .267 
Severance pay .000 .000 .324 .000 .000 .018 
Limited liability (BV) -.514 .191 .007 .409 .168 .015 
Foundation  -2.163 .422 .000 -.022 .289 .939 
Sole trader (VOF) 2.794 .517 .000 1.221 .576 .034 
   
% predicted correctly 59   
Number of observations 2,109   
Note: The omitted category of the dependent variable is “more than 100 employees”. 
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